Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

158. Memorandum of a Conversation, Ambassador’s Residence, Paris, July 14, 1955, 10 p.m.¹

Paris, July 14, 1955, 10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary Dulles
• Mr. Francis Russell
• Mr. Macmillan
• Mr. Shuckburgh

Mr.Macmillan said that he had discussed with the British Cabinet this morning the new proposal that the Alpha Plan should be launched by means of a public statement rather than through the procedure of secret approaches to the parties.² He said that he had not had long notice of this change of plan and that the Cabinet had felt unable to take a final decision so quickly. They were concerned by the risks which the procedure would involve, risks which would fall to a large extent on Great Britain by reason of her commitments in the area. Mr.Macmillan himself would prefer that if the procedure of public statements were adopted, it should be a wholly joint announcement, rather than an announcement in which the United States declared a policy and Her Majesty’s Government said that they had been consulted and were in agreement. He said that the Israeli would in his view no doubt in the end accept the situation revealed by such statements, particularly since they were heavily dependent upon the United States. The greater difficulty was with the Arab world.

He therefore felt justified in asking Mr.Dulles to consider certain ways in which the United States could help to mitigate hostile reactions by the Arabs, and particularly dangerous effects on the position of Nuri, the Turco-Iraqi Pact, and the British-Iraqi Agreement. He had the following suggestions to make: (1) Would the United States consider giving its support to the Turco-Iraqi Pact now? (2) Would the United States be prepared to assure Nuri that he would receive arms by offshore purchase? He referred particularly to the case of tanks. (3) Should not our two Governments concert together what precautionary measures might be required in the event of outbreaks of one kind or another in the area?

In this connection Mr.Macmillan pointed out that the United States had originally been very favorable to the elaboration of the Northern Tier concept, that in the event Her Majesty’s Government had adhered to it and the United States had not, the Arab world as a whole was watching to see whether Iraq obtained the reward she expected for her courage in her taking this step, thereby splitting the Arab world.

Finally, Mr.Macmillan told Mr.Dulles that he had recently heard through Mr. Lester Pearson that the Egyptian Foreign Minister speaking privately had adumbrated a solution of the Palestine problem which did not differ greatly from the Alpha proposals. Although he did not necessarily represent entirely the views of the revolutionary command in Egypt, this was at least an encouraging feature.

A telegram from Sir Michael Wright, British Ambassador in Baghdad, on the possible effects of such statements in Iraq was read.

Mr.Dulles explained the political reasons which impelled him to make some statement on the subject of Israel in the near future. He did not say that it had to be this month or next month, but it must [be] some time in the early fall. He too had spoken to Fawzi who had agreed that if a settlement was to be reached, it must be through some initiative by the Western powers and must be during the current year. Mr.Byroade, the United States Ambassador in Cairo, had, however, warned him that it would be rash to pay too much attention to what Fawzi said in this matter.

As regards the procedure of private negotiation which of course he would have preferred, Mr.Dulles pointed out that this would not be sufficient in the coming months unless it might suggest rapid strides as to enable some public results to be shown in the next few months which he did not believe was likely. He said that he had himself been thinking of a statement rather less detailed than that which had now been produced by the Working Group.³ He would like to see the statement contain principles only. For example, he had suggested eliminating the references to Arab villages, their lands, the Latrun salient, and to the over and under passes in the Negev. He thought we would be more likely to avoid outbursts and attract inquiries into our proposals and that if we succeeded in doing that the Governments would have “gotten their feet wet”, and we should at least have made a beginning. Mr.Macmillan said that he agreed generally with this thought. He felt that it was not over details of this kind that the Arab outbursts would be likely to arise, but rather over a general proposition that they should make peace with Israel. Mr.Dulles said that he was thoroughly prepared to take the position that Israel should not get a security guarantee until a settlement had been worked out. He anticipated that there would be some pressure against this, but he felt that it would be possible to stand up to it.

As regards Iraq, Mr.Dulles said that the United States Government could indicate to her that it was impossible for the United States to join the Northern Tier Pact or indeed to make any pact with Arab states until this question was settled, but that if this could be achieved, the United States would be prepared to join the Pact. In the meantime the United States would maintain contact with the defense discussions of the Northern Tier through observers and would give its strong support to the Northern Tier. As regards timing Mr.Dulles said that he [had] undertaken through Mr.Eric Johnston that he would not make the statement until after Mr.Johnston’s forthcoming visit to the area in connection with the Jordan waters. Taking into account the holiday period around the end of August, this meant that the statement could probably not take place until about the first week of September.

It was agreed that Mr. Schuckburgh and Mr.Russell would review the various papers that had been drafted during the previous week on the launching of Alpha in the light of these discussions and present specific proposals to Mr.Macmillan and Mr.Dulles the following day.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123,CF 494. Top Secret. Drafted by Shuckburgh.
2. Aldrich reported on July 13 in telegram 148 from London that he had presented the proposal to Macmillan the previous afternoon and that the latter was presenting it to the Cabinet that day. (Ibid., Central Files, 684A.86/7–1355)
3. A copy of the Working Group’s draft statement for Secretary Dulles’ consideration isibid.,NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha. Secretary’s Statement: Letr of 7/22 to NE Chiefs of Mission, with 4 attachments re.
4. Infra.