150. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt1
53. Eyes only Ambassador. From the Secretary. I believe that is unavoidable that we soon make some statement of US policy toward the Israel-Arab problem. We have made no policy statement for over two years. During the Congressional elections, we said we would not do so because we felt sure that whatever we said would be tinged by politics, but we promised action soon afterwards. Now nine months have gone by since our October promises in that respect. If many more months go by, we will be in a worse position politically than during the Congressional elections. Inevitably, statements will be made on both political sides, and I don’t see how it is possible to prevent those statements having a very grave effect upon future relations. Therefore, it seems to me that a reasonably comprehensive statement should be made now which will represent the position to which the Administration, and I hope the Opposition, would adhere during the 1956 elections.
[Page 283]I have been struck by the fact that Fawzi shares the view that we should this year seek an overall solution of Arab-Israel problems. He told me that at San Francisco.2 He has repeated it here in Washington.3 He emphasizes three points: There should not be a security treaty with Israel before there is an overall settlement, and he then prefers a “declaration” to a treaty. He believes there should be adequate compensation for the property losses of the refugees, and he believes that there should be an adjustment in the Negev which would reunite the Arab world. His expressed idea of such adjustments is greatly exaggerated, but I would not expect less from an initial statement of trading position. He sought American financial help for High Dam, and when I indicated this would be more easy after Israeli settlement, he said he understood our position.Russell from London indicates that despite earlier misgivings about public Alpha statement by me in the near future, British now inclined to believe under all circumstances, this probably a desirable step, and I expect to discuss this with Macmillan in Paris.
I believe my two talks with Fawzi are such that he will believe that what I say has been influenced by his own judgment and that this may mitigate ill reception. Probably, there can be similar talks with Eban and possibly some Jewish leaders here with like result.
While therefore I recognize that both Jews and Arabs will as first reaction be publicly negative and critical, this will probably subside, and even if negotiations along the lines suggested do not soon get underway, we will have charted a course which is basically sound and to which we can perhaps hold during our national elections.
I suspect that any announcement may have a negative effect upon Johnston’s plan, but his effort has been going on now for two years and I see no prospect of consummation within another year or more. Therefore, I am not inclined to hold off on this account. However, I shall discuss this with Johnston on Monday.4
If you believe that there is a serious divergence between point of view expressed by Fawzi and that held by Nasser, please inform me promptly.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–955. Top Secret; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Drafted and approved by Dulles. Repeated to London eyes only Ambassador and Russell.↩
- See Document 138.↩
- The Secretary had met again with Fawzi on July 7. (Memorandum of conversation, by Dorsey; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86A/7–755)↩
- Seeinfra.↩