Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

151. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 11, 1955¹

Washington, July 11, 1955

SUBJECT

• Relationship of Public Statement on Arab-Israel Problem to Jordan Valley Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Eric Johnston
• S—The Secretary
• NEA—Mr.George V. Allen
• NE—Mr.William C. Burdett

Mr.Johnston stated he understood from Mr.Francis Russell that the Secretary was considering a public statement on the Arab-Israel problem and he requested the Secretary to indicate the nature of the proposed announcement.² The Secretary replied that he planned to comment on the explosive potentialities of the Arab-Israel situation and to indicate that if progress were made on such major matters as compensation for the refugees and border rectifications, including a land connection between Egypt and Jordan, that the U.S. would be prepared to assist by providing a loan to help Israel pay compensation and by extending a security guaranty of the borders agreed upon.

Mr.Johnston urged forcefully that the Secretary postpone a decision on whether or not to make a public statement until Mr.Johnston’s return from his impending trip to the area. He stated he would be back by August 25, at the latest, and possibly as early as August 15. Mr.Johnston thought the Arab-Israel problem should be approached from an economic standpoint and not a political one, because none of the Arab leaders would feel able to ask their people to accept a political settlement. He maintained that success in the Jordan Valley negotiations might well open the way to a solution of the entire problem. Mr.Johnston reported that considerable progress had been made recently with Israel, and he estimated his chances of obtaining agreement in principle during his next trip at about 50–50. However, if the Secretary were to make his planned statement, prospects for the Jordan Valley negotiations would be destroyed.

In reply the Secretary explained that he felt obliged to make a definitive statement of U.S. policy towards the area before the 1956 election campaign started. If he failed to chart out a specific course now, the issue would inevitably become enmeshed in domestic politics. The results could be severe damage to the U.S. position in the area as a whole. Israel was exerting strong pressure to secure a security guarantee, and we had been delaying since October 1954. It was impossible to continue doing so much longer. The Secretary pointed out that, according to his reports, agreement was unlikely during Mr.Johnston’s next trip. Even if agreement in principle were reached, the details still would have to be worked out, which would require a long time. It would be logical for Mr.Johnston to ask for a further delay in order that the final negotiations might be completed. The three or four weeks delay now requested was not critical, but he foresaw that it would be only the first of a series of additional delays. The Secretary mentioned that the British were thinking of making a statement before Commons rose on July 27.

At the conclusion of the discussion the Secretary agreed not to make a public statement himself before August 25, but added that he could not say whether the British would do so. The Secretary said that in preparing the statement, he would take into consideration, of course, the results of Mr.Johnston’s trip. Mr.Johnston expressed pleasure at the decision and gave the Secretary categorical assurances that he would not request any further delay in the issuance of a public statement.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–1155. Top Secret; Alpha; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Burdett.
2. Jernegan stated in a July 6 memorandum to Dulles that, in accordance with the latter’s instructions,Russell had telephoned Johnston in Spokane, Washington, and informed him that Dulles planned to make a public statement around August 15 presenting a program for a general Near Eastern settlement and that he hoped Johnston would be able to return to the Near East before July 28.Johnston expressed concern at this decision and subsequently requested an opportunity to talk to Dulles by telephone to attempt to dissuade him from it.Jernegan’s memorandum stated that Johnston was expected to argue that if his negotiations were successful, the Arabs would regard such a public statement as a “double cross.” (Ibid., 684A.86/7–655) No record of such a telephone conversation has been found.Johnston’s views are further discussed in a letter of July 7 from Troxel to Russell. (Ibid., 684A.86/7–755)
3. Dulles informed Russell the following day that, in light of Johnston’s assurances that “he had obtained sufficient agreement from Israel on Jordan water plan to justify 50–50 expectation of obtaining concurrence of Arab States during his visit Middle East at end of July”, he had “reluctantly agreed” to refrain from making his public statement before August 25, and he asked Russell to request a similar postponement by the British. (Telegram 199 to London, July 12;ibid., 684A.86/7–1255)