Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

143. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo,July 2, 1955—noon.

10. . . .Nasser,Hakim Amer and others had had long night meeting in which decision was reached set aside Russian offer of arms for cotton and make serious effort attempt purchase arms from US. Since then they have been in process preparing list (contained in immediately following message)² which I received morning July 1.Am merely acknowledging receipt of communication with indication that it will be submitted Washington. Do not plan any comment or discussion here prior to receipt advice from Department.

. . . . . . .

. . . this Embassy has attempted analysis of effect in Egypt, in general Middle East area including Israel, and on position of US versus Soviet bloc of various types of US response. Based upon this type analysis, and mindful of Department’s position on principle already conveyed Nasser in compliance Department telegram 2214,³ recommend US Government give favorable consideration Government of Egypt request and facilitate shipment as much as possible. Am not unaware that substantial purchases by Government of Egypt at this time will be most difficult domestically, but in making this recommendation am guided by following:

a. Necessity as I see it for US to take at this time some affirmative step halt growing belief on part Government of Egypt that identity of short term interest in foreign and economic fields exist only between Government of Egypt and Soviet bloc.

b. Fact that Egyptian officers, almost without exception, believe US has in fact denied Egypt opportunity to purchase weapons. This would be judged in context regime’s exaggerated idea value US friendship in terms military and economic aid in early days their friendship with US. This real factor for consideration when Nasser depends upon support of military in his general policies.

c. Conviction that, with general mood of desperation re Egyptian stability since February disruption of Gaza,Nasser has feeling he has no alternative than to obtain arms from some source in order keep confidence of military. Egyptian officers now know they have been offered arms for cotton by Russia. If they now informed effort was made with US and that we failed follow through or quibbled or delayed in response, majority would probably welcome Government of Egypt arrangements for arms with Soviets.

d. Fact that I am convinced Egypt has no intention to, nor sees no profit from, initiating hostilities. In any case added equipment would not give Egypt capability carry out successful aggressive action against Israel based on information available service attachés here.

e. Fact that, although some items on list have had bad psychological implications, list is not unreasonable from point view of adequate defense against Israel and would, even if obtained in entirety, leave Egypt considerably weaker than Israel. (In this connection when I spoke of tripartite declaration with Nasser in complying Department telegram 2214 he reminded me that declaration sanctions armed forces for legitimate self defense. This he says he does not have and even if we do have good intentions, Israelis could destroy Government of Egypt military and probably topple him before we could interfere. This is a tough one to answer when our own information made it appear as if Israel might do just that only a month ago.)

f. Fact that introduction Soviet arms in area will have great impact upon Middle East generally and strengthen opportunities for Soviet bloc in other endeavors. Even Israel, our own problem in connection with all this, should certainly be even more concerned than if arms purchased in US which certain to exercise continuing influence their use and logistic support.

Go-betweens who have in past been helpful and who seem genuinely concerned over trend US-Egyptian relations past few months, strongly stress that quick and affirmative handling this request will go far reestablish GOE confidence in US intentions toward Egypt. Cannot promise this would happen but believe chances are at least even this could be the case. On other hand, if we take opposite course results far easier to predict. Such action on our part will, I believe, be used to “clarify the record” and result in increased Soviet political penetration of Egypt and thence Arab world. We must remember that Egypt is certain continue to be real influence this total area, whether for good or bad.

Am sending as third cable this series summary of the pattern of Communist bloc activities here in Egypt.⁴ Am concerned, however, more by apparent flexibility in case of operations of Soviet and satellite representatives than I am with facts and statistics given that message. You will note that we do not see indication of greatly increased Communist bloc political and subversive activity in Egypt itself during past few months. Nevertheless, am convinced that bloc’s position in Arab states has greatly improved during this period. Believe this in large part consequence skillful method of operations employed by bloc representatives in taking advantage local opportunities caused by disruption and friction in area. In addition Soviets have natural advantage in that situation permits them to move in on Egypt under guise of legitimate trading interest and thus avoid arousing unduly Egypt’s fear of political penetration.

Our enemies are ready to do business on spur of moment, flatter local officials and make every effort to please whether requests seem designed for efficiency and real benefit or not. As example, Soviet Ambassador volunteered to Nasser help on high dam. No surveys or attachment of conditions (such as necessity agreement on Nile waters, et cetera) involved. He also offered economic development funds. Both were refused. When Nasser said how about some guns for cotton in same conversation, it is reliably reported Soviet Ambassador took list of available equipment from his pocket with prices indicated, and stated delivery could be made within six weeks with payment in cotton. Other interesting examples involving GOE procurement from Hungary of locomotives which it originally intended to obtain with US aid will be sent separately.

If decision is to try affirmatively meet greater part of requirements, there will be great benefits here by acting quickly. If local attaché information correct, it would appear that bulk of heavy items requested are World War II vintage believed to be readily available and at reduced prices.

As to procedures, should think Egyptian Ambassador and attaches Washington should handle arrangements with Department and Pentagon. Would hope avoid necessity in this commercial deal, under existing 408 e agreement,⁵ repetition past procedures of missions to and from Washington (unless GOE desires otherwise) prior to any affirmative response, and I would hope, some deliveries.⁶

Byroade

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/7–255. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 4:59 p.m.
2. Infra.
3. See footnote 2, Document 132.
4. Document 145.

5. Section 408(e) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, which became Public Law 329 on October 6, 1949, enabled the President to transfer or to sell equipment, materials, or services to a nation which had joined the United States in a collective defense or regional arrangement. For text of the act, see 63 Stat. (pt. 1) 714.

   Egypt and the United States, through an exchange of notes, had concluded a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement on April 29, 1952. For texts of these notes, see TIAS No. 3564, printed in 7 UST (pt. 1) 841.

6. Allen informed Byroade on July 12 that the Department was “giving urgent and sympathetic consideration Egyptian request for arms.” (Telegram 77 to Cairo; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/7–1255)Byroade acknowledged receipt of this cable on July 14 but warned “any significant delay now will be same as negative answer.” He also reported that he had received a number of queries from the Egyptians as to when they could expect a response from the United States.Byroade urged that he be sent a rapid reply from Washington, since the Soviet Ambassador had recently asked the Egyptians what they planned to do with the Soviet offer of arms. (Telegram 72 from Cairo;Ibid., 674.84A/7–1455)