Office of the Historian

144. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1

Cairo,July 2, 1955—2 p.m.

11. Re Embtel 10.2 The following communication dated June 30 was received by me from Chef du Cabinet Ali Sabry:

“With reference to your Excellency’s discussion with the Prime Minister on the 22nd of June 1955,3 regarding the purchase of arms from the US, by the Government of Egypt, I enclose herein, a list of the requirements the Egyptian armed forces would be willing to procure.”

The attached list as follows:

I.

A. 120 M4A3ES medium tanks, 76 mm guns (or later model suitable for desert warfare). Tanks to be accompanied by all items except personal sidearms necessary to equip 2 US separate medium tank battalions.

B. 200,000 rounds 76 mm ammo in proportions of basic load.

II.
15 M24 flame thrower tanks. Also specifications of flame fuel and an estimate of fuel consumption per combat day.
III.
T/O and E equipment for one armored infantry battalion (M59 APCs, or later model, if any) less personal sidearms.
IV.

A. 10,000 rounds 75 mm HE.

B. 10,000 rounds 75 mm APC.

C. 4,000 rounds 75 mm HEAT.

D. 5,000 rounds 75 mm WP.

E. 10 tons propellant for 75 mm HE.

F. 10 tons propellant for 37 mm HE and AP.

V.
30 B–26 (A–26) aircraft, accompanied by the T/O and E equipment needed to outfit a US Air Force unit or units represented by this number of planes.
VI.
Three target towing aircraft. Also information on the modification of aircraft for target towing.
VII.
2,000 napalm bombs.4

Byroade
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/7–255. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 5:19 p.m.↩
  2. Supra.↩
  3. See Document 137.↩
  4. On July 11, Under Secretary Hoover, in a memorandum to the Secretary, informed Dulles that earlier that day he had shown the President the list of military items requested by the Egyptians. The President “observed that while it might appear costly to the Egyptians, it actually did not represent a particularly potent military force. Unless we felt it would raise undue complications with the Israelis, he saw no objection to selling them part or all of it. The President thought we should make a concerted effort to ‘woo’Nasser.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/7–1155)↩