Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

126. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the President and the Secretary of State, White House, Washington, June 15, 1955¹

Washington, June 15, 1955

I told the President that the situation around the Gaza neutralized strip was serious; that the Israeli were massing forces there and that there was some evidence that they might move in and take over the whole of this strip, driving out the Egyptians.² I said that the NSC paper³ contemplated that in the event of action of this sort, the United States might unilaterally take economic sanction, including cutting off remittances of funds to Israel. I expressed the view that we should try, if possible, to get the United Nations recommendations in the matter rather than act unilaterally. The President agreed with this point of view and suggested that Lodge could take this up with the United Nations and try to get appropriate action by the Security Council. I said there was always the problem of the veto, but that I thought that as things were now going, if the action were against Israel, the Soviets would probably concur in it but not vice versa. The President thought it particularly important that the finding as to who was at fault should be made by the United Nations and that we should not take that responsibility alone. I said that General Burns was watching the situation closely and would probably be in a position to make a quick report to the Security Council.⁴

The President also said that while he thought we should in general adhere to the NSC policy paper on the subject, he thought that, in the first instance, we should limit ourselves to suspending governmental aid and hold back on interrupting private transmittals of funds as a second step, if the first step did not work.

JFD

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers; Meetings with the President. Top Secret. Drafted by Dulles.
2. According to telegram MAI 693 from the U.S. Army Attaché in Tel Aviv, June 7, an Israeli source informed him that day “that he personally believes IDF to overrun Gaza strip without notice and he is certain his top superior believes same. Bases his feeling on truculence Israeli civilians and military; the political advantages accruing to MAPAI party; irredentist claims to strip and desire colonize there; getting rid refugees whose headlong flight would impede Egypt army def or counter atk and not discounting value to IDF as practice alone, as well as opportunity for glory. Believes however another incident necessary as excuse. He estimates two days at most to accomplish.Comment: I concur his beliefs.” (Department of State,NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc., beginning after 2d London Talks—April 26–June 30, ’55)
3. Reference is to NSC 5428; see footnote 2, supra.
4. According to a June 15 memorandum for the files by Barco,Dulles discussed this with Lodge upon his arrival in New York later that day.Lodge then telephoned Hammarskjöld, informed him of the U.S. concern with developments in the Gaza area, and requested that the U.N. Secretariat be prepared for a meeting of the Security Council in San Francisco during the Tenth Anniversary Meeting of the signing of the U.N. Charter. He told Hammarskjöld that time might be of the essence and urged that if such a meeting should prove necessary, a full report from Burns should be ready for it.Hammarskjöld telephoned Lodge later to say that he had issued the necessary instructions to Burns. (Department of State,UNP Files: Lot 58 D 224, Palestine)Barco recorded in a June 16 memorandum for the files that Hammarskjöld had informed him by telephone that Burns was prepared to report immediately in the event of an attack. (Ibid.)