118. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1
1034. I met with Prime Minister at noon yesterday in his office in Tel Aviv (Embtel 1028)2 and handed him memorandum transmitted Deptel 693. In subsequent oral conversation I emphasized to him that our representations to Egypt were stated strongly and dealt with specific measures required by Egypt to bring the Gaza strip situation under control. Secondly, I informed him that we were pressing GOE to agree to high level talks, adding that the British and French were taking similar measures (Deptel 699). With reference to Deptel 700 I reminded Sharett distinctly that the tripartite declaration applies to armistice lines as well as to frontiers.
The Prime Minister read the memorandum and although apparently taking the final paragraphs most seriously, made no comment until he had finished reading and I had completed my statements as indicated above. He then said he would like to give me his reactions in a completely friendly manner and with full appreciation of the promptness with which the US Government had made representations to GOE and informed him of those actions.
His first comment referred to paragraph three Deptel 693. He said with regard to the tragic sequence of events since February 28, he must point out that the initial action in every case had been taken “by the other side”—that every cycle of trouble had been started by Egypt. He also reiterated his previous arguments to the effect that, while opinions may differ regarding Israel’s use of patrols, there was no justification whatever for Egypt to follow its program of persistent firing on those patrols.
[Page 227]Regarding high level talks and cooperation with UNTSO, he said he was planning to talk with General Burns the following morning. He underlined the fact that Egypt had not yet replied to Burns’ invitation to a joint high level meeting, which invitation the GOI had accepted immediately. He then raised certain objections to the new conditions which had been introduced in connection with the proposed talks as reported to him by General Burns. He was especially critical of Nasser’s insistence that high level (military) talks must be premised on prior acceptance by GOI of Nasser’s proposal for a demilitarized zone.3 He remarked that the theory of demilitarized zones had been proven generally in practice as ineffective and a source of continuing trouble. He spoke at some length on the inequities of the proposal as viewed by Israel, pointed out that infiltration was solely an Egyptian action as Israel did not practice it. He said, “we do not infiltrate into Gaza. The infiltrators come from Gaza and although the situation has improved in that respect and it is not the major problem now, the demilitarized zone proposal would recreate this problem in a very serious manner. Thus, the emphasis would be shifted from the present military problem to that of infiltration”. With regard to both infiltration but especially military actions by persons in Gaza, he said “we do not say our irregulars or unknown persons perpetrate these actions. Quite the contrary. We decided, as in a recent incident, who was responsible. The Egyptians say they cannot be responsible for some of these actions. In the latest Burns-Nasser talk,Nasser admitted that Egyptian troops had opened fire but repudiated responsibility for mine laying, saying he did not know who did it. We do not say this. In the face of mutual evacuation, therefore, it could not be the same for Israel as for Egypt; Egypt will not be prevented from using irregulars, and this is of no small danger from Israel’s viewpoint”. He also said, “to evacuate troops from the area would leave the ground free for marauding, theft, pillaging and other incidents. The presence of troops prevents that. Any suggestion to Israel to accept the withdrawal of troops proposal unconditionally would seem to betray a lack of familiarity with the problem and could lead to one-sidedly grave effects”.
I suggested that joint patrols could supply the necessary controls in the evacuated areas. He gave no convincing reply to that point [Page 228] and after an exchange of arguments and comment, he admitted that this point could be considered at any joint high level meeting eventually set up. I also suggested that GOI’s initial lack of enthusiasm for the “no man’s land” plan was to a considerable extent due to the fact that the plan was advanced by Nasser. He then inquired whether the present reaction to the plan might be substantially improved if the project were presented formally by General Burns. (Sharett had previously advanced claim that Egypt was clearly the aggressor and was now seeking its reward for aggression by presenting this plan and Israel could not accept such dictation “at the point of a bayonet”.) The reply to my question was non-committal but it was clear that he saw the point. I took this opportunity to again emphasize the very substantial progress which would be made if a high level military meeting, without any prior rejections or prior acceptances of conditions applying to subjects which might be discussed at such meetings, could be arranged.
At the close of our conversations, which were conducted pleasantly and in a relaxed atmosphere, we summed up our understandings as described above and it was agreed that I would report back to Washington that Sharett had no objections to a high level military meeting and would make no advance rejection of any concrete proposals prior to such meeting. This understanding with Sharett was arrived at, however, only after I had urged him not to fake [make?] a categorical rejection of the proposal for a “no man’s land”, pointing out that such action would be as open to criticism as was Nasser’s demand for a categorical acceptance by Israel of his plan—a condition to which Sharett had strongly objected.
Comment: I was unable to determine whether Sharett was reflecting directly the sense of the Cabinet meeting held on Sunday,4 which is reported to have considered the Gaza situation. This seems likely although no firm or formal decision may have been made at that meeting. When I left him, I again reminded him that there should be no rejection of any proposal prior to the talks and he confirmed my understanding.Herzog of Foreign Office, who was present during the conversation, undertook to again stress to the Prime Minister the visible disadvantages to Israel of a rejection of the demilitarized zone plan prior to the high level meeting.
However, some afternoon papers carried stories that the GOI had rejected the demilitarized zone plan. Later in the day I talked to Herzog about these stories and he assured me that they had no authorized basis but that they would add a new factor and that Prime Minister had commented to him that every effort should be [Page 229] made to speed up the high level meeting. The Prime Minister would take this line with General Burns in his conversation today.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–755. Secret; Priority. Received at 9:31 p.m. Repeated to Cairo and London.↩
- Ambassador Lawson reported on June 6 that he had met with Prime Minister Sharett that day and had conveyed to him the message transmitted in telegram 693 to Tel Aviv (Document 111) as well as the Department’s other comments suggested in telegrams 699 (same as 1850 to Cairo; see footnote 3, Document 116) and 700 to Tel Aviv (see footnote 2, Document 111). (Ibid., 674.84A/6–655)↩
- Reference is to a proposal which Nasser made to Burns on June 1 and Burns conveyed to the Israelis the following day for withdrawal of all Egyptian and Israeli troops from a zone one half or one kilometer wide on both sides of the line of demarcation. (Telegram 346 from Jerusalem, June 3;ibid., 674.84À/6–355)Byroade reported on June 5 that Fawzi had told Stevenson the previous day that the Egyptians were willing to conduct high-level talks with the Israelis if they accepted this proposal. (Telegram 1850 from Cairo, June 5;ibid., 674.84A/6–555)↩
- June 5.↩