Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

116. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo,June 6, 1955—2 p.m.

1855. Following reference Gaza.

1. Counselor this morning made démarche Department’s 2108,² June 4 to Director Political Section Egyptian Foreign Office since Fawzi unavailable and Embassy wished close coordination reference timing approaches of US,UK and France (Embassy telegram 1850, June 5³). Director promised inform Fawzi at once. He said he hoped Israel would take seriously Nasser’s statement June 4 (Embassy telegram 1847⁴); there should be no doubt reference consequences of Israelis’ attack against Arab territory. He mentioned also assurances of support for Egypt received recently from Arab Governments (Embassy telegram 1854⁵).

2. French Ambassador saw Fawzi this morning.⁶

3. Stevenson pressed Nasser last night to agree to “high level” meeting at least at Chief-of-Staff level. He found Nasser in bitter and disappointed frame of mind.Nasser complained to him that US memorandum put all blame on Egypt and condemned her for events May 30th even though these had not been considered by MAC. He referred to new “Israeli attack” with heavy weapons June 5 (Embassy telegram 1854).Nasser repeated to Stevenson his statement to Burns (Embassy telegram 1827⁷) that he felt personally responsible casualties resulting from original Gaza incident because he had encouraged troops to believe there would be no Israeli attack.

Stevenson assured Nasser that “we are not blaming Egypt as much as Israel”. However,UN observer had seen Egyptian fire first shot and mining highly provocative. In any case objective all concerned must be to reduce tension. Long argument then followed reference “high level” meeting.Nasser contended that if GOE agreed to meeting Ben-Gurion would take this as proof of the Tightness of his aggressive policy.Stevenson tried disabuse Nasser of this idea; said talks would strengthen hand of Sharett and moderates.Nasser finally consented think over idea of talks carefully. In his telegram to British Foreign Office Stevenson expressed view that only basis on which Nasser likely agree to talks is if Burns convokes meeting and invites Egyptian and Israeli Chiefs of Staff to come to discuss with him proposals to reduce border tensions.

Byroade

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–655. Secret; Priority. Received at 12:11 p.m. Repeated priority to London, Tel Aviv, Paris, Jerusalem, and USUN.
2. The Department informed Byroade and Lawson that their British counterparts had received instructions to make démarches similar to those outlined in Documents 111 and 112. It instructed them to concert with their British and French colleagues in both capitals to press the Egyptians to agree to high-level talks and to urge on Israel the dangers of rejecting practical proposals such as joint patrols and withdrawal of troops. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/6–455)
3. Not printed. (Ibid., 674.84A/6–555)
4. Byroade reported on June 4 that the Egyptian press was featuring stories that General Burns had warned Nasser of the seriousness of the Gaza situation and had expressed his fear to Nasser that the “Israelis would attempt occupy Gaza Strip.”Nasser was reported to have replied that, “If such an attempt should be made it will have no other meaning than renewal of the war.” (Ibid., 674.84A/6–455)
5. The Embassy in Cairo on June 6 reported that statements from Jordanian, Lebanese, and Iraqi officials supporting Egypt in the event of an Israeli attempt to seize the Gaza Strip had appeared in the Egyptian press. The Embassy also summarized press stories alleging new Israeli attacks along the Gaza Strip demarcation line. (Ibid., 674.84A/6–655)
6. Ambassador Byroade reported on June 7 that his French colleague, Comte Armand de Blanquet du Chayla, had met with Fawzi the previous morning, and that the session “had not been particularly productive” because Fawzi had merely repeated Nasser’s statement to Stevenson that a meeting with the Israelis at the Minister of War level was impossible. (Telegram 1859 from Cairo;ibid., 674.84A/6–755)
7. Not printed. (Ibid., 674.84A/6–155)