Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

99. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State¹

Amman, June 25, 1957—5 p.m.

1885. Reference Department telegram 2003, June 17.² Joint Anglo-American assessment Jordan situation follows:

The following is verbatim text.

Jordan—A joint Anglo-American assessment.

1. We have examined the present situation in Jordan from the viewpoint of Anglo-American policy and our joint assessment is set forth below:

2. The American and British arguments on which this assessment is based are set out in appendices A and B which are being forwarded separate despatch.

3. Joint assessment.

I. The preservation of Jordan as an independent and pro-Western state, or her incorporation in a larger pro-Western entity, is of the highest importance to Anglo-American policy.

II. The present anti-Communist regime in Jordan is about as satisfactory as can be hoped for at present from Western viewpoint. Although not broadly popular and depending almost entirely on the continued safety of King Hussein, the Hashem–Rifai government is reasonably stable. Calm prevails throughout country and populace accepts martial law arrangements under which the next session of the House of Representatives has been put off for 90 days, and probably for much longer. Some changes in the personnel of the present Cabinet are possible, but Jordan’s basic policy and pro-Western alignment should remain unchanged.

III. However, Jordan is economically non-viable and must have outside support to the extent of approximately pound sterling 15 million to sustain minimum government operations, including payment of the Army and a modest development program, otherwise the present regime will collapse. If the present regime is to demonstrate the tangible results of its pro-Western policy and achieve political stability, a sum of approximately pound sterling 20 million, including USOM/Jordan expenditures, appears desirable.

IV. On its present resources it would not be safe to assume that the government will be able fully to pay the Army from October onwards, and the crisis may develop as early as August.

V. Aid to Jordan could take three forms:

A. Budgetary aid.

A minimum of pound sterling 6.5 million in addition to present Saudi Arabian and American commitments is required during the current HKJ financial year. For the achievement of broader political aims (see paragraph III above) pound sterling 11.5 million will therefore be needed.

B. Economic aid.

This is urgently needed to deal with unemployment, and stimulate the economy generally, apart from its long-term importance. (This is included in V A above).

C. Military aid.

In the form of equipment, and if the Jordanians so request, of training facilities and military advice. Only minor economies now possible in defense expenditures. Spending on national guard already much reduced, but cuts in the Jordan Arab Army would lay Hussein open to the charge by Nasser of failing to protect the Arab world against Israel. Jordanian Air Force should be continued at absolute minimum level as a morale factor only.

VI. If the government collapses, the most likely alternative would be a return to an extremist left-wing nationalist government of the Nabulsi type.

VII. This would rightly be regarded throughout the Arab world as a resounding victory for Nasser and the Kremlin.

VIII. A possible alternative, or a possible consequence, would be the complete disintegration of Jordan, almost certainly bringing with it armed clashes between Jordan’s Arab and Israeli neighbors in circumstances which would greatly increase the risk of a major war.

IX. The only powers outside the Russian-Egyptian camp which can be expected to support Jordan are the USA, the UK, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and possibly the Gulf states, particularly Kuwait.

X. Fusion or federation with one or more of her Arab neighbors may be the long-term solution of Jordan’s problems and is well worthy of study but this cannot take place in time to avert Jordan’s imminent crisis.

4. Recommendations.

I. The American and British Governments should use every effort to persuade the Government of Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states to contribute their maximum to the funds necessary for Jordan’s maintenance.

II. The American and British Governments should consult urgently as to how the differences should be provided.

III. The importance of the refugee problem as an obstacle to permanent stability in Jordan cannot be overstated. The American and British Governments should do everything possible to expedite the solution of this problem.

IV. Closest coordination of Anglo-American policy in Jordan is essential. Jordan should be regarded as a proving ground for the demonstration of active Anglo-American cooperation in the Middle East.³

Signed C.H. Johnston and Lester D. Mallory.

Mallory

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 885.10/6–2557. Secret. Repeated to London.
2. In telegram 2003 to Amman, June 17, the Department instructed the Embassy to proceed with the joint assessment of the Jordanian situation. According to the Department, the British decision to continue aid to Jordan might depend in large measure on the assessment. The Department expressed the hope that British aid would continue. (Ibid., 785.5441/6–1457)

3. The texts of the American and British position papers prepared for use in the joint Anglo-American assessment were forwarded in despatch 327 from Amman, June 24. (Ibid., 785.00/6–2457) These papers include, among other things, discussion of the current regime, the economic situation, and forecasts on the future of Jordan.

   On June 26, the Embassy reported that there was “substantial agreement” with the British on the joint assessment, but there were differences on the following subjects: Palestinian refugee attitudes toward returning to Israel; the degree of seriousness of the economic situation in Jordan; and the level of financial assistance required to support Jordan during any fiscal year. (Telegram 1899 from Amman; ibid., 885.10/6–2657)