Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

92. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, June 7, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Military Assistance to Jordan

Discussion

The Jordan Government has requested from the United States: 1) economic aid; 2) budgetary support; 3) military assistance in the form of grants of hardware; and 4) assistance in military training. The $10 million grant to Jordan under Section 201² of the Mutual Security Act has been applied to budgetary support. We have suggested to the Embassy at Amman that funds allocated to Jordan in previous years for development assistance be reprogrammed to take into account current needs.

The Jordanians have stated that they were prepared to sign a military assistance agreement with the United States.

On the question of military hardware, the Department of Defense informs us that they are aware of Jordan’s present stocks and future needs. Defense says that they have no direct military interest in Jordan as such but are willing to extend military assistance to Jordan on the basis of a political decision by the Department of State that such assistance is in the United States interest. Defense is also willing to make training facilities available to the Jordanians.

It is clearly in the United States interest that the Jordan Army remain an effective force for the maintenance of internal security in the country, that its loyalty to the King remain unquestioned, and that its morale remain high. It should continue to consider the Free World as the major source of supply for arms. At the same time, in view of the lack of Defense interest in Jordan, it would be difficult to justify a military assistance relationship of the type which we have, for example, with the countries of the Baghdad Pact.

Alternative Courses of Action

1. Direct United States Assistance: The Jordanians envisage a program of grant United States military aid in the form of a large quantity of modern United States weapons and state that they are prepared to sign the necessary agreements. We feel that the disadvantages of such a course outweigh the primary advantage which would accrue in terms of Jordan Army pleasure at having the latest type of United States weapons at its disposal. We also incline to the belief that the Jordanians are not presently fully aware of the terms and implications of our standard grant military aid agreement. The negotiation of such an agreement with Jordan, given the complex situation within Jordan and in Jordan’s relations with neighboring states would almost inevitably be very difficult. It might also put us in a position of having to justify before Congress a program of continuing military assistance to Jordan on the basis of Jordan’s forces playing an effective role in the defense of Free World interests in the area. Among other factors militating against this course of action are:

a) It would almost inevitably lead to a cycle of inflated Jordanian expectations and what would have to be disappointing United States performance in terms of types and quantities actually delivered.

b) It would require a shift in our present policy of avoiding the position of major supplier of arms to Israel and its immediate neighbors. It could well generate pressures for similar assistance to Israel.

c) A major delivery of United States arms to Jordan, whose forces from the outset have been trained and equipped by the British, would create very real problems in the fields of maintenance and spare parts, technical training, and the disposition of standardized weapons among the Jordan forces.

While we would not preclude the making available to Jordan of certain items of United States equipment necessary to make up a balanced program, we believe that for political reasons, primary emphasis should be placed on the restoration of an effective relationship between Jordan and its traditional supplier. The United States should however be in a position to offer military training slots, primarily for relations and morale purposes, to personnel of the Jordan Army.

2. Assistance Through a Friendly Arab State: Nuri Said has strongly advised that any military assistance to Jordan should come through Iraq and Saudi Arabia. He feels that such a move would help strengthen Iraq’s position in the Arab world.

We are, of course, anxious that the United States not emerge as the sole source of aid for Jordan and to persuade other friendly Arab states to assist Jordan. We are hoping that Nuri Said can be convinced to make some economic assistance available to Jordan. We are encouraging the growing belief on the part of Saud and the Iraqis that the maintenance of Jordan’s independence is in their interest and that they should work together in the pursuit of this interest.

At the same time, attempting to channel substantial United States military aid to Jordan through Saudi Arabia and Iraq would create a number of very real practical problems. Neither of these countries maintains large stockpiles of weapons which the Jordanians consider desirable. This would mean that Iraq and Saudi Arabia would have to serve as transit points for United States shipments. Releases of United States-furnished arms to Jordan by Saudi Arabia and Iraq would raise the problem of United States consent to the transfers in accordance with the requirements of the Mutual Security law. We would probably have to contend with a tendency on the part of the Iraqis and the Saudis to use United States arms delivered to them for transmission to Jordan as bargaining points to assure that we deliver nothing to Jordan superior in type and quantity to, or on more favorable terms than, what is being delivered to Iraq and Saudi Arabia. There might also be a tendency on the part of Iraq and Saudi Arabia to add the United States delivered arms to their own stocks and to try to substitute less desirable or older weapons for delivery to Jordan. The overall political risks involved in doing through nearby countries what in itself is risky would be compounded.

We therefore believe that our primary objective in dealing with this matter with Iraq and Saudi Arabia should be to persuade them to make funds available to Jordan to help Jordan acquire military goods from its traditional supplier. This would not exclude the possibility of suggesting that Iraq and Saudi Arabia make token grants of arms for political reasons.

3. Assistance in Procuring Arms from the United Kingdom: We believe that the best course of action would be one in which the primary emphasis would be on the maintenance of the traditional supply relationship between the United Kingdom and Jordan. This obviates the logistic and standardization problem. Although Britain no longer has a treaty with Jordan, we feel that the training problems created by deliveries of British goods could probably be handled on a satisfactory ad hoc basis. The restoration of Britain to the traditional supply position which it has held in Jordan would minimize the impact of arms deliveries to Jordan on the Palestine problem. We feel that the British would be pleased at the prospect of an enhanced position in Jordan and at United States assistance in assuring such a position. It would also be in line with the President’s discussion with Macmillan in Bermuda that the United States favored a continuing role for Great Britain in the Middle East.

United States military aid to Jordan should be implemented very largely in terms of off-shore procurement for matériel in the United Kingdom for the purchase of arms and military equipment. Admittedly, this course of action would not have as much political appeal to the Jordanians as the prospect of F–100 jet fighters and the latest in United States armor. At the same time, the arguments in favor of standardization and simplified supply problems are very compelling. The size of the program we established would indicate to the Jordanians our very real interest in their maintaining an effective fighting force.

Elements of a Military Assistance Program for Jordan

1. There is needed a determination by the President, under Section 401a of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended,³ that a program of military assistance of up to $10 million should be established for Jordan in FY 1957. We recommend the use of this Presidential authority in this case because it will permit a waiver of the legal requirement that Jordan enter into a standard bilateral military assistance agreement, which involves quite extensive assurances on the part of a grant aid recipient. For the reasons indicated earlier in this memorandum, we feel that from both the United States and Jordanian points of view the negotiation of such an agreement should not be attempted at this time, and further that the assurances which we believe we can obtain will be sufficient to protect United States interests.

2. A 401a determination by the President would enable us only to require from the Jordanians a simple exchange of notes containing assurances that the arms would not be used for aggressive purposes and that they would not be transferred without our consent, together with such other assurances as the United States might deem desirable. We would make clear that this was a one-shot operation and that it would not be an attempt to fill all the needs of Jordan’s armed forces. While we would propose to assume this stance vis-à-vis the Jordanians, it should be recognized at the outset that the possibility is remote that a one-shot operation will prove to be sufficient to attain long-run objectives we seek in Jordan. Our experience in the initiation of previous military assistance programs demonstrates that it is extremely difficult to abruptly cut off assistance after a relatively short period without incurring serious political liabilities. Nevertheless, even if we are unsuccessful in our attempt to accomplish our objectives solely within the magnitude of the military assistance program herein recommended, we feel that both the short and prospective long-term benefits to be derived from developing a closer Jordanian association with the West are worth the expenditures involved; certainly so long as magnitudes in the future do not greatly exceed that proposed herein. Although we would not indicate to the Jordanians the term of years which we would expect such a program to last, since this might be construed as implying a commitment to come forward again at the end of such a period, we would, for internal planning purposes, expect the $10 million program to extend over a period of two years.

3. Upon completion of the exchange of notes with the Jordanians, the United States, through defense agencies in Europe and in consultation with the British and the Jordanians, would develop a program which would adequately reflect legitimate Jordanian requirements for arms and training. The program would be primarily for off-shore procurement of arms in the United Kingdom for delivery to Jordan.

4. In the course of these developments, we could keep the Saudis and Iraqis informed and urge that they make cash contributions for the purchase of arms available to the Jordanians.

Recommendations

1. That you approve in principle the approach outlined in the four paragraphs immediately preceding.

2. That NEA be authorized to indicate to the British the course of action we envisage and enlist their cooperation and support.

3. That we proceed to seek a determination by the President under Section 401a of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, authorizing the establishment of a $10 million military assistance program for Jordan. (A memorandum is in preparation.)

4. That at the appropriate time we proceed to the negotiations with the Jordanians and the discussions with the Saudis and Iraqis along the lines set forth above.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.5–MSP/6–757. Secret. Drafted by Bergus between May 29 and June 1 and sent through Murphy and S/S. Herter initialed the memorandum.
2. Section 201 of the Mutual Security Act (approved on August 26, 1954, as Public Law 665) dealt with the authorization of funds. For text, see 68 Stat. 832.
3. Section 401a dealt with special funds. See 70 Stat. 557.

4. Dulles initialed his approval of each of the four recommendations. A notation on the source text indicates the concurrences of DOD, ICA, U/MSA, and EUR.

   On June 12, in a memorandum to Rountree, Burdett noted that Dulles had approved the paper recommending a military assistance program for Jordan. He wrote: “There remains the question of NEA’s approach to the British. There are obvious dangers in the Jordanians obtaining an impression that we are working out a program with the British prior to our consulting them. Furthermore, since we are not asking the British to draw up a program, there appears little need for informing them now. Accordingly, we propose that the British be informed at approximately the same time as we approach the Jordanians.” Rountree noted on the memorandum: “I agree—Perhaps shortly before we talk with the Jordanians.” (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 61 D 20, Military assistance to Jordan)

   That same day, at the Secretary’s staff meeting, Dulles noted that he had approved the recommendation that the United States implement a small program of military aid to Jordan. The Secretary added that it might be wise to inform the Israelis of the American plan and try to persuade them against making a similar request. Rountree expressed some doubt about this course in view of recent Israeli requests for arms. Dulles, however, believed that Israel approved of U.S. policy in Jordan and could be persuaded to support this aspect of it. Accordingly, Dulles asked Rountree to inform the Israelis in an effort to persuade them not to make a similar request for arms. (Ibid., Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)