Office of the Historian

71. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 24, 1957, 5:35 p.m.1

Washington, April 24, 1957, 5:35 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Recent Developments Regarding Jordan

PARTICIPANTS

  • U.K.
    • Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
    • Mr. J.E. Coulson, Minister
  • U.S.
    • The Secretary
    • Mr. Fraser Wilkins, NE

The Secretary said that he had asked the British Ambassador to call because he wanted to tell him about certain recent developments regarding Jordan. He said that we had received a purported message from King Hussein through intelligence channels in which he said he proposed to take a strong line in Jordan, including martial law on the West Bank, suspension of constitutional rights and a strong statement regarding the activities of Egypt and Syria in Jordan. In his message King Hussein asked if he could count on United States support if Israel or the Soviet Union intervened in the situation.

The Secretary said that after consultation with the President we had sent a message to King Hussein that, assuming he had proceeded along the lines which he had already indicated, we would make clear to Israel that any intervention by it would involve a strong adverse reaction on the part of the United States.2 He also said that we would regard any overt intervention by the Soviet Union as a challenge under the Middle East Doctrine and that if requested by Jordan we would intervene militarily. The Secretary said we had not [Page 107] yet heard whether King Hussein had taken any of the actions which he had proposed in his message.

The Secretary continued that he had spoken with the Israeli Ambassador this afternoon and had informed him of what King Hussein planned to do and of the attitude of the United States….

The Secretary said that we believed if King Hussein did act and was able to achieve his objectives it would represent a significant development. We continued anxious to give King Hussein effective support. According to the latest information from intelligence sources the King had made a public statement, but we had no further details.

The British Ambassador appreciated the information and said that Nuri had spoken with the British Ambassador in Baghdad, making two points: 1) King Hussein should ask the Syrians to withdraw from Jordan and 2) King Hussein should request Iraqi troops, in writing, if he actually wanted them to enter Jordan.

Sir Harold noted that King Hussein might turn to Britain for help but they had very few troops remaining in Jordan, some at Aqaba and possibly 800 at Mafraq.3

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 685.00/4–2457. Secret. Drafted by Wilkins on April 25. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles’ Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)↩
  2. In telegram 1462 to Amman, April 24. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–2457)↩
  3. On April 25 the Department forwarded the substance of Dulles’ conversation with Caccia to the Embassy in London. (Telegram 7536; Department of State, Central Files, 685.00/4–2557)↩