62. Memorandum of a Conversation, Acting Secretary Herter’s Residence, Washington, April 14, 1957, 2:45 p.m.1
SUBJECT
- The Situation in Jordan and the Possibility of British Intervention
PARTICIPANTS
- The Acting Secretary
- Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
- Mr. Willie Morris, British Embassy
- Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell, NE
The Acting Secretary received the British Ambassador at the latter’s urgent request. The Ambassador was under instructions from Selwyn Lloyd. Sir Harold read several messages just received from the British Embassy in Amman. The struggle for power being waged by King Hussein was reaching a climax. On Saturday2 General Nuwwar had attempted to stage a coup against the King, with the assistance of some of the Syrian military now in Jordan, but the King, forewarned, had frustrated this. General Nuwwar had been arrested and was now in prison, and General Hiyari had been named in his place. The Royal Palace was being fortified against attack, and from the nature of the measures being taken it appeared that the attack was expected from military elements, not from street mobs. The Ambassador said that the British Government assumed we agreed that it was in our interest for the King to win this fight. The Acting Secretary replied that we definitely did agree.
Ambassador Caccia went on to state that Selwyn Lloyd had instructed him by telephone from Scotland to ask the Department what its attitude would be in the circumstance that King Hussein should appeal to the British for military intervention on his behalf. Would the United States support the United Kingdom if the latter took an affirmative decision? There was still an air squadron at Mafraq and some British troops at Aqaba, of the number of which the Ambassador was not informed. Because of the situation of the United Kingdom in the Middle East at the moment, an appeal to the British for help would obviously be a step taken by Hussein in desperation before going under, but the British Government wished to consult with the United States about this in advance, in order to avoid another serious split between the two countries with regard to possible developments in the Middle East. Intervention would be a [Page 93] drastic step with such light forces as the British now had in Jordan, and the safety of the some 1500 British subjects in the Amman–Mafraq area was an important consideration. Their lives might be gravely endangered should the operation fail. Failure would also be a grievous blow to British prestige.
The Acting Secretary said this was a most serious question which he would like a little time to answer. The situation in Jordan was very fluid at the moment, and it was difficult to form an accurate picture of what was going on. The Ambassador’s question had very important implications, not only for the present but for the future. The Anglo-Jordan treaty was no longer in effect. There was the possibility that the Syrians would intervene. If British military action should save Hussein for the moment, what would be the next step? The Ambassador said that there might be the good possibility that the intervention would give forces loyal to the King time to rally around him. In any event, this would be the purpose of the intervention.
The Ambassador then asked whether the Eisenhower Doctrine would not apply in this case. The Acting Secretary doubted this very much, pointing out that the Doctrine was applicable in cases of overt aggression by international Communism or by states in the area dominated by international Communism. The trouble here was that the Jordan situation, despite its international overtones, was essentially an internal problem. The Ambassador thought that the Egyptian and Syrian subversion involved might be basis for the application of the Eisenhower Doctrine. He suggested that what was happening in Jordan had many similarities to what happened in Czechoslovakia, where an internal situation resulted in a Communist takeover. We could not afford to lose Jordan in this way, in the Ambassador’s opinion. He did not wish to imply, however, that the British Government was all set to move in Jordan. London realized the difficulties inherent in intervention, and at the moment did not know what it would do if King Hussein should ask for British aid. It would be very helpful to have an agreed United States–United Kingdom position, and in any event the British wished the Americans to be fully informed now of possible future steps, so that later there would be a minimum of trouble in the United Nations and elsewhere.
The possibility of Iraqi and Saudi intervention was discussed. The American side expressed the view that it would be much better if the action, should there be any, were confined to regional forces. Iraq was understood to be hesitant to move alone, however, and King Saud probably would not want to involve his own forces in actual fighting against other Arabs in Jordan. The possibility that the Israelis might move was also discussed, and the British were informed [Page 94] that Sunday morning another message had been sent to our Embassy in Tel Aviv stressing the need to urge restraint upon the Israelis in the current delicate situation in Jordan.
Ambassador Caccia then wondered whether it might not be helpful to have King Saud issue a public statement in support of Hussein. (Subsequent to the adjournment of the meeting, Mr. Morris telephoned Mr. Rockwell to say that the Ambassador had had another telephone conversation with Selwyn Lloyd, and the British Embassy now hoped that it would be possible for us to urge King Saud to take this step.)
… Meanwhile we would give the Ambassador’s question the very serious consideration it obviously required and would be in touch with Sir Harold at the earliest opportunity. The British Ambassador thanked the Acting Secretary for receiving him on Sunday, and he and Mr. Morris took their leave.