Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

53. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan¹

Washington, December 24, 1956—5:36 p.m.

748. Embtel 618,² Embtel 647,³ Jidda’s 335.⁴ At early opportunity you should approach King Hussein along lines indicated below stating we appreciate frankness with which he has discussed his problems with us and that we understand his concern regarding problems which confront Jordan. We appreciate reasons behind King’s request that discussion of American assistance be confined to himself. At same time Prime Minister has indicated to us his awareness of King’s request. You may therefore in your discretion make following views known Prime Minister also as seems desirable:

1. Possible sources of assistance for Jordan. There are heavy demands in other Arab states as well as Jordan for social and economic development projects; consequently, even if Jordan were assisted by some Arab states today there would be no certainty that these same states could continue assistance indefinitely in future. Soviet assistance carries with it danger of Communist penetration and loss of independence. Jordan should therefore not lightly terminate its present financial relations with UK, especially in the absence of clear and acceptable alternatives.

2. Anglo-Jordanian Relations. UK capacity to develop new relationships is great. After World War II UK made new arrangements with India, Burma, Ceylon. Over years UK and Jordan have adjusted their relations in light of changing circumstances. There is now no reason to believe they could not continue to be improved.

3. US Assistance. US presently making available some $8 million annually in technical assistance and economic aid and some $17.5 million annually in contributions for Arab refugees over half of whom are in Jordan. US has also sought to assist in maintenance of peace. Following recent outbreak of hostilities in Egypt US honored its pledge and moved for action in UN. Hostilities were stopped and foreign troops are now being withdrawn. If Jordan should now move to cut itself off from Western countries and to associate itself with Soviet Bloc, these steps might be expected to affect Jordan’s relations with its Western friends and might be expected limit their ability to help.

You might conclude by emphasizing that we would appreciate King Hussein’s further views, that for our part we are continuing to examine all aspects of matter and that we feel confident that answer lies in assistance from existing sources including US with adjustments if necessary in light new situation. We will have further comments to present at later stage.⁵

FYI in originally drafting Deptel 698,⁶ we considered possibility that Jordan Govt, despite assurances of King and Abu Nuwar, was committed to course which could lead only to increasing Syrian-USSR influence in Jordan. We feel that Nabulsi must be as aware as are we of fact that Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia not in position replace British as reliable source subsidy and that money would have to come from other quarters. We are particularly disturbed over possibility that Nabulsi may feel he can play off USSR against West in bargaining for aid to Jordan.

Question of Jordan’s federation with one or more other Arab States is one for Jordan alone to resolve. US position has been that we would not oppose such developments provided they in accordance with freely expressed wish of peoples concerned. However, think it can be seriously questioned as to whether increase of Syrian influence in Jordan at this time and under these circumstances really in best interests of Jordan people.

Also appreciate strains which UK-Jordan relations have undergone in past few months. We believe, however, that constructive approach to present problems by both British and Jordanians might lead to beneficial results for both parties. What we seek to avoid, inter alia, is termination of UK–HKJ relationship in circumstances which would be taken as symbolic of split by Jordan with its Western friends. We feel it essential that Nabulsi and King be aware of importance we give to HKJ attitude on these questions as well as need for Jordan maintain strong ties with West if Jordan’s economic needs are to be met and if Jordan people are to maintain any vestige of independence and self-determination.

Separate telegram is being sent to Jidda in which Amb Wads-worth is authorized further to discuss with King Saud question of economic assistance for Jordan.⁷ It seems to us that Saudi Arabia (and perhaps Iraq at later stage) should also have interest in preservation of independent Jordan and in extension assistance for that purpose. End FYI.

Re Embtel 652,⁸ you may in your discretion inform British Ambassador of your conversations with King Hussein.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 685.00/12–2456. Top Secret. Drafted by Wilkins, Rockwell, and Bergus and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, and London.
2. See footnote 3, Document 50.
3. Telegram 647 from Amman, December 20, reported a conversation concerning Jordan’s desire for U.S. assistance. Mallory commented that it was unlikely that British hopes for a continuation of the status quo would be realized, that Jordan was under heavy pressure, and that the anti-Western forces would probably win unless U.S. assistance was provided. He recommended that unless a prompt settlement of the Palestinian problem could be envisaged, assistance should be provided to Jordan on an interim basis. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/12–2056)
4. See footnote 4, Document 252.
5. Mallory reported in telegram 679 from Amman, December 27, that he had carried out his instructions. He stated that the Middle East war had made continued British financial assistance politically unacceptable to the Jordanian Government and people, that Israel’s augmented military strength had increased Jordan’s concern about its security, and that Jordan intended to seek aid from Arab sources but hoped to be able to rely on U.S. assistance if Arab aid was not forthcoming. (Department of State, Central Files, 685.00/2–2756)
6. Document 50.
7. Supra.
8. In telegram 652 from Amman, December 21, Mallory informed the Department that the British Embassy had made indirect and “not so indirect” inquiries about Jordan’s request to the United States for assistance and that Mallory had sought to cover the matter. British Ambassador Johnston, however, informed him that Under Secretary Hoover had reportedly inquired of Caccia how Britain might react to American aid to Jordan or even to a possible American takeover of the British position in Jordan. Lloyd reportedly remarked to Caccia that it was an “interesting” idea and would be discussed with Dulles at Paris. For this reason, Mallory felt obliged to tell Johnson that Hussein had indeed mentioned the question of aid, but had not made an official request. Mallory concluded: “Can Department furnish any navigational help? We have thus far escaped obstacles but this flying blind is becoming risky.” (Department of State, Central Files, 641.85/12–2156)