5. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State1
198. Paris for Russell.2 Overall conclusions reached in penetrating telegram 3673 to Department from Damascus are generally applicable here with respect to both US interests and possible courses of action. Jordanian reactions to recent events while in keeping with previous trends have also been strong and prompt a reexamination our position. There is universal popular Jordanian enthusiasm for flame of Arab political liberation ignited by Nasser’s arms deal with Soviet bloc. Jordanians shared Arab feeling of gaining initiative. A Russian token offer of arms for local national guard would have tremendous propaganda effectiveness.
Government cannot or will not carry through “unpopular” policies. This weakness growing and mass pressure now so sways Amman authorities they fear mob action if government tries to move against current Arab thinking. British influence, long a stabilizing force in Jordan, is steadily declining and if tested might be found insufficient. The Throne, formerly source of real strength, has become virtually impotent. The center of mass power has moved from east bank Bedouin to Palestinian Arabs who are bitter over existence of Israel and implacably opposed any settlement with Israel.
Bitterness towards and distrust of US following Palestine war receded substantially in the face of Eisenhower and Dulles policy of impartiality. Due events of past year, much of this gain has been [Page 7] lost. It appears unlikely unfavorable trend can be reversed during continuation of the policies recently followed by US in this area. Several courses might be considered to stem anti-western tide.
- a.
- Inducements such as arms, money or treaties. Because feeling towards Israel is so deep and emotional, money does not suffice. This shown by reluctance accept proposed $200 million expenditure Jordan Valley plan. New guarantees against Israel have little or no appeal to Jordanians in their present mood. Arms to Jordan alone are unthinkable unless in larger pattern of northern tier, et cetera.
- b.
- We might try pressures. This could mean stopping ICA activities, withdrawing UNRWA subsistence to refugees and getting British to reduce or end annual subsidies and loans. Such pressures at this time would be counter-productive. New Russian policy in Near East indicates Moscow would be delighted make gesture of filling vacuum created.
- c.
- Propaganda is powerful weapon but must have some solid basis. Reiterated protestations of friendship have worn thin out here.
- d.
- Realignment of interest through additional members in Turko-Iraqi Pact would be useful, for example, adherence by Jordan and US. Effect on Israel might be counter-balanced by some limited security guarantee, membership in NATO or new Mediterranean grouping to include her.
- e.
- Jordan is economically non-viable and promises to remain. In long run logical way overcome Jordan’s weakness is to join in some manner with a viable unit, for example, Iraq. Such union would be attractive to many Jordanians. British would probably not object strongly since they have the same interests and privileges in both countries… .
Summary: There is no easy course open and when all factors are considered, one is always returned to the hard and overriding fact that to have Jordanians (and presumably other Arabs) on our side requires restraint in our relations with Israel.
Political situation in Jordan is disintegrating and resulting instability is playing into hands of anti-western nationalists and Communists. Unless something is done to reverse unfavorable trend this former strong point in Near East will become source of weakness to west.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/10–2255. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, Karachi, Moscow, Rome, Tehran, and Tripoli.↩
- Russell was accompanying Dulles on his trip to Europe to attend the Foreign Ministers meeting held in Geneva, October 27–November 16.↩
- Document 312.↩