Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

47. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree) to the Acting Secretary of State¹

Washington, November 26, 1956.

SUBJECT

• A United States Program for Jordan²

The Problem:

Jordan, which has never been a viable state, economically or politically, was created and maintained by the British. In return for an expenditure in Jordan in the magnitude of $30 to $40 million annually, Britain obtained the following benefits: military transit and base rights; the services of the British-trained and officered Arab Legion (which proved its worth to Britain in Iraq in 1941, and in Palestine 1947–1948); a sphere of abiding British political influence in the Middle East as postwar British withdrawals took place from Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt.

UK-Jordan relations have been in difficulties since the assassination of King Abdullah in 1951. The decline of British influence was sharply accelerated by the public unrest created by an abortive British attempt to bring Jordan into the Baghdad Pact in December 1955. This touched off events culminating in the dismissal of Glubb, Commander of the Arab Legion, in February 1956. The UK-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in October 1956 has brought a crisis for the future of significant British influence in Jordan. The Jordan Parliament has unanimously recommended the abrogation of the UK-Jordan treaty and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR and Communist China.

Our Ambassador at Amman has had a series of discussions with the King and Abu Nuwar, Commander of the Arab Army. The Jordan Government’s position seems to be this: Jordan will not recognize the USSR or Communist China. Jordan will defer for the time being abrogation of the UK-Jordan treaty, but a break with Britain is probably inevitable. Jordan realizes that it needs non-Arab assistance to survive, and would prefer such assistance from the United States. If United States help were not available, however, Jordan would accept assistance from the USSR. We have told the Jordanians that their views are receiving closest study in Washington. We have also urged them to take no precipitate action.

Our Embassy in Moscow feels that the USSR would respond favorably to a Jordan request for aid. Embassy London reports an awareness on the part of the British as to their loss of position in Jordan, but British intentions towards Jordan appear obscure.

Basic Considerations:

1. The increase of USSR, Syrian, or Egyptian influence in Jordan challenges United States interests in the Near East and should be prevented. It is to United States interest to have the United Kingdom position in Jordan maintained as long as possible.

2. A United States program aimed solely at maintaining the status quo in Jordan would be unrealistic, in view of the lack of political and economic viability of the state. United States activities in Jordan should be aimed at the ultimate peaceful integration of the country into one or more of the territories of neighboring states friendly to the West. A first step in this process could be the fostering of augmented Iraqi influence in Jordan.

3. Jordan is the only Arab state in which the unresolved issues arising out of the Palestine conflict are the primary political and economic facts. Any resolution of the Palestine problem along lines acceptable to the United States will require substantial United States influence in Jordan.

4. A United States program to augment or supplant British influence in Jordan would raise a number of problems. In the first place, the UK-Jordan treaty is not, according to its terms, subject to denunciation until 1968 or to revision until 1963. Its unilateral obligation by Jordan over British protest could create juridical as well as political problems. At the same time, the British have, in the past, indicated a certain willingness to revise the treaty well in advance of 1963. They offered drastic revision to Jordan in the context of Jordan’s adhering to the Baghdad Pact. Accordingly, revision or termination of the treaty by mutual consent should not be ruled out.

British assistance to Jordan has been predominately in the field of defense and internal security—a defensive alliance and total support of Jordan’s defense budget. It would not be desirable for the United States to enter into such a relationship, which in any event has become irritating to the Jordanians. The most feasible means of assistance to Jordan would probably be a United States or United States-Iraqi program of budgetary support, with joint Jordan-Iraqi cash military procurement and training activities in accordance with Article 7 of the Jordan-Iraq treaty of 1947. These should be from traditional Western sources.

5. Israel would, in keeping with its policy of seeking to prevent close Arab ties with the United States and the West, oppose an augmentation of United States influence in Jordan unless the United States were prepared to establish a clear relationship with Israel at the same time, perhaps by a security arrangement.

6. Jordan’s natural ties—historic, geographic, linguistic—are with Syria, a country presently unfriendly to the United States.

The dynastic and treaty relationship between Jordan and Iraq is overshadowed by mutual distrust between ruling elements in the two countries as well as Iraqi unpopularity among the mass of Jordanians. At the same time, Iraq is probably the only Arab country which would be in a position to enter into long-standing economic and military aid relationships with Jordan.

Saudi Arabia has in the past asserted territorial claims to roughly the southern third of Jordan. However, it is doubtful that King Saud would view with equanimity a collapse of Jordan which brought organized Communist activity to his northern frontiers. We have urged King Saud to support King Hussein in his decision not to recognize Communist states and to avoid precipitate action with respect to the Jordan-UK treaty.

Egypt has sought to increase its influence in Jordan with the primary objective of removing British influence and secondarily as a means of maintaining pressure on Israel and Iraq.

These Arab states have shown more interest in keeping each other out of Jordan than in taking it over.

Recommended Elements of a Program for Jordan:

1. A decision in principle within the United States Government to offer budgetary support to Jordan at the rate of approximately $30 million annually, directly and in conjunction with Iraq assistance efforts in Jordan.

2. An approach to the British based on United States concern at the developing situation in Jordan and United States interest in preventing a Communist take-over in Jordan with a view to ascertaining their willingness to continue some assistance to Jordan on the basis of a revised UK-Jordan relationship such as the payment of rental for base facilities. If the British feel that they are no longer in a position to assure Jordan’s remaining friendly to the West, the United States would be willing to augment its present efforts in that country. These could be phased into such United Kingdom assistance to Jordan as the United Kingdom and Jordan may agree shall remain. We could assure the British that such efforts on our part would not be aimed at supplanting long-standing British commercial and cultural interests in Jordan.

3. Assuming British recognition of the need for increased United States efforts in Jordan, an approach to the Jordanians to the effect that the United States is disposed to assist Jordan on the basis that the Jordanian people wish to remain in the free world and are willing to cooperate with it. One of the forms of such cooperation would be full cooperation with the UNTSO and the ceasing of fedayeen activity against Israel based on [in?] Jordan. We feel that Jordan with its many pressing problems and meagre resources needs to strengthen its relations in the area as well as with the United States in view of forces in the area seeking, with Soviet assistance, to take over Jordan. Accordingly United States aid to Jordan would be forthcoming in the context of Iraqi-Jordanian political and economic cooperation. The United States seeks no military facilities in Jordan.

4. An approach to Iraq repeating the above points, pointing out that while the United States is willing to assume a large part of the burden of assisting Jordan, it is greatly in Iraq’s interest to participate in these efforts to the utmost of its abilities. In addition to offering financial assistance, Iraq should make the strengthening of Iraqi influence in Jordan a matter of first priority in its foreign policy and be prepared to devote the necessary effort and skill to this enterprise. Iraqi assistance to Jordan should be in the context of the Iraq-Jordan treaty of 1947 and general friendly interest. There should be no attempt at this time to formulate new treaty relationships or bring Jordan into the Baghdad Pact.

5. An approach to Saudi Arabia pointing out the urgent necessity of United States-Iraqi efforts in Jordan to prevent, inter alia, Communist takeover of territory on Saudi Arabia’s northern border through which TAPLINE runs. Conversely, we can assure the Saudis that United States-Iraqi activities in Jordan will in no way jeopardize Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity. We are aware of Saudi Arabian interests in Jordan and are prepared to discuss with the Saudis how best these interests can be furthered.

6. Lebanese support of United States-Iraqi efforts in Jordan should be obtained to broaden the basis of Arab support.

7. An approach to Israel should be made to the effect that Israel can not help but benefit from measures aimed at increasing United States influence and general stability in Jordan. Israel’s acceptance of this fact will enhance United States-Israel relations. The United States will continue to use its influence in Jordan and in the United Nations to strengthen border security. It is of the utmost importance that Israel pursue a course of action which will lessen rather than increase border tensions. The growth of United States influence in Jordan increases the possibilities for an Arab-Israel settlement.

Recommendation:

That NEA further discuss the foregoing suggestions with other departments and agencies of the Government and submit specific recommendations for approval.

1. Source: Department of State, NEA/NE Files: Lot 58 D 398, Memos to the Secretary thru S/S June-Dec. Secret. Drafted by Bergus. The source text bears no indication that it was sent to the Acting Secretary or approved.
2. On December 3, at a meeting in the Secretary’s office, attended by Dulles, Hoover, Murphy, Henderson, and others, the subject of Jordan was raised in the course of a review of the current situation in the Middle East. According to an “informal record” of the meeting prepared by Greene, Rountree noted that Jordan was the “one pressing question” which required a U.S. decision. Rountree remarked that the Department had asked the British for their views, but added that “we may have to move in the next few days to provide budgetary assistance to Jordan, some of which helps support the Arab Legion, in order to forestall a Soviet move.” (Ibid. Central Files, 780.00/12–356)