Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

393. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey¹

Washington, September 10, 1957—10:09 p.m.

755. Deptel 752.² FYI Following decisions re Syrian crisis have been reached at highest level US Government. We desire Ambassador Warren, after reading reftel, convey them orally to Iraqi Crown Prince immediately emphasizing pressing need maintain absolute secrecy.³

1. US has been gratified by close and valuable consultations with GOI in connection with grave danger to security of ME represented by current events in Syria. US has now reached at highest level certain conclusions concerning this problem and in spirit above consultations desires to convey these conclusions to GOI.

2. Nations are confronted at periods in history with need to take decisions fundamentally affecting their own destinies. US believes such momentous decisions may be taken only by nation concerned. Holding to this belief, US does not consider it can assume responsibility of urging Iraq to follow any specific course of action or inaction. US is making following views known to Iraq in thought that GOI is entitled to have available all relevant information regarding US attitude in formulating Iraqi policy regarding Syrian situation.

3. US judges that Syria has become, or is about to become, base for military and subversive activities in Near East designed to destroy independence of those countries and subject them to Soviet Communist domination. If aggressive spirit being inculcated into Syria by means of Soviet arms and propaganda should manifest itself in actual aggressive deeds—and some such manifestations have already occurred in Lebanon—US would hold that case existed for individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

4. If Syria’s Arab neighbors should consider their security endangered by threat of Syrian aggression and should request from US economic assistance and military supplies in connection with a concrete plan effectively to meet such aggression, US would give prompt and sympathetic consideration to such request.

5. If any one or more of Syria’s Arab neighbors, responding to provocation, should act pursuant to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, US would, upon request, and pursuant to Middle East Resolution, extend such countries economic assistance and military supplies; it would support such countries if attacked in UN Security Council or General Assembly.

6. If any of Syria’s Moslem neighbors were physically attacked by Sino-Soviet Bloc, US upon request, would be prepared use its own armed forces to assist any such nation or nations against such armed aggression. This would include organized use of “volunteers” from Sino-Soviet Bloc countries.

7. If hostilities between Iraq and Syria should result in closing of the pipelines and the cutting off of revenues from Iraq, US would, as temporary measure, help to mitigate financial consequences of this to Iraq.

. . . . . . .

9. If any of Syria’s neighbors should become involved in hostilities with Syria, it is a precondition to any US support that it be made clear that such hostilities are not for purpose of impairing political independence or territory of Syria but are merely for purpose of restoring Syria to the Syrians.

10. US believes that if any action were taken in respect to armed provocation to eradicate danger represented by current Syrian situation, initiative in first instance should come from Arab state or states…

11. In light of current developments US has already approached Government of Israel to request that it refrain from intervening in situation, and US prepared to continue to endeavor to restrain Israel.

12. US will continue to deploy Sixth Fleet in Eastern Mediterranean.

13. US is informing Turkey of its position on this matter and is speaking in general terms to Governments of Jordan and Lebanon.

14. US has consulted with UK which is in complete agreement with this position.

We are repeating for your information and guidance telegrams sent to Amman, Tel Aviv and Beirut. Substance messages to Amman and Beirut may be conveyed to Crown Prince.⁴

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 123. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rockwell and Burdett; cleared in draft with Dulles; and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Baghdad, Amman, and Beirut.
2. Not printed. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 584 to Baghdad, September 12, the Department of State directed Ambassador Gallman immediately to inform Prime Minister Jawdat of the message sent to the Crown Prince. The telegram commented: “We have reached this decision after further consideration of likely unfavorable effects of not informing Prime Minister.” (Ibid.)
4. At 6 p.m. on September 12, Warren, accompanied by Miner, delivered the message to Crown Prince Abdul-illah on board the Iraqi royal yacht in the Bosporus. Warren reported that the Crown Prince listened intently and nodded his head from time to time. During their discussion, among other points Abdul-illah emphasized the need for Iraqi-Jordanian cooperation in any military action against Syria, particularly on geographic grounds, and showed great interest over the references to “volunteers” and U.S. financial assistance in mitigating effects if the pipeline were cut. (Telegram 704 from Ankara, September 12; ibid.)