353. Despatch From the Embassy in Syria to
the Department of State1
No. 18
Damascus, July 15,
1957.
SUBJECT
- Embassy-Foreign Office Discussions of United States-Syrian
Relations
The Embassy transmits herewith a memorandum of my conversations of June
24 and June 27, 1957 with Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Bitar at which senior officials of the
Foreign Office and the Embassy were present. The purpose of the
conversations, held at the instance of the Foreign Minister, was to
clarify outstanding issues between the United States and Syria as a
basis for discussion during my forthcoming consultation in the
Department.
The first conversation was dominated by a discussion of Arab unity,
whereas the second dealt with so-called “causes of misunderstanding”
namely (a) Israel, (b) Aqaba,2 (c) the American Doctrine,3 (d) American economic
aid and (e) Algeria.
The Syrian viewpoints expressed during the conversation were for the most
part repetitions of familiar arguments which the Syrian Government
employs to attack American policy. An outstanding omission was the
failure of the Syrians directly to attack the Baghdad Pact (though
perhaps frequent references to United States support of “reactionary”
regimes could be construed as an indirect assault on the Pact). The
Embassy attaches no particular significance to the omission, which may
have been oversight.
The highlight of the conversation was a rather clear revelation of Syrian
objectives vis-à-vis Israel. Foreign Minister Bitar’s statement that though the Arabs
do not ask the destruction of Israel or elimination of the Jewish
community, they do seek to change the character of the Zionist, and what
they consider to be the expansionist regime in Israel could be taken as
a frank recognition that Arab military power is insufficient to
overwhelm Israel. However, by forcing the return of the Arab refugees as
a large disaffected element to Israel, by stopping Jewish immigration
and—the Embassy would add—by a tight maintenance of the Arab economic
boycott, the Foreign Minister and like-minded associates hope to cause a
basic change in the nature of the state of Israel.
Subsequent to preparation of this despatch a note has been received from
the Foreign Office enclosing an aide-mémoire summarizing
[Page 621]
the points raised in the conversation. As
soon as a translation is completed, the text will be compared with the
attached memorandum and a separate report made to the Department.4
[Enclosure]
Memorandum of Conversations, American Embassy, Damascus, June 24
and 27, 1957 Damascus, June 24 and 27, 1957
PARTICIPANTS
-
For Syria
- H.E. Salah al-Din Bitar, Minister
of Foreign Affairs
- Dr. Salah al-Din
Tarazi, Secretary General of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs
- Mr. Ghalib Kayyali, Director of
Western and Eastern Political Affairs of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
- For the United States
- Ambassador James S.
Moose, Jr.
- Robert C.
Strong, Counselor of Embassy
- Richard Funkhouser, First
Secretary of Embassy
- John R. Barrow, Second Secretary
of Embassy
SUBJECT
- Improvement of United States-Syrian Relations
I. Conversation of June 24,
1957
Prior to Ambassador Moose’s
departure for consultations and home leave, Foreign Minister
Bitar expressed a desire
that two sessions of talks be held to determine the areas where
American and Syrian policies are in conflict and to seek means by
which differences could be composed. Bitar asked Ambassador Moose to begin by outlining the basic elements of
American policy.
Ambassador Moose said that
the United States, having observed the extension of communist
influence by methods of force and subversion in different areas of
the world, stands ready to help nations of the Middle East—who
regard the communist menace as we do and who express a desire for
such help—to safeguard their independence. Therefore if we could
agree in principle on (a) the
[Page 622]
existence of a communist threat and (b) the
desirability of safeguarding the independence of Middle Eastern
nations, it might then be possible to proceed to agreements on
matters of more limited scope.
Foreign Minister Bitar
introduced the question of the Richards Mission stating he had been “astonished” to
learn that the Mission was dissatisfied with the welcome extended by
the Syrian Government.5 The Ambassador briefly but frankly
recalled the official, semi-official and controlled press attacks on
the American Doctrine which had served to tie the Government’s hands
and eliminate the possibility of fruitful negotiation. The Syrian
officials offered no rebuttal.
Bitar then raised the question
of “Arab unity”, which dominated the conversation for the remainder
of the session of approximately three hours. The main points which
emerged during Bitar’s
presentation were:
- (1)
- Arab unity is a basic and essential urge among the Arab
people;
- (2)
- That urge must be given expression through “democratic”,
as opposed to “authoritarian”, processes;
- (3)
- It would be to the advantage of the United States to
encourage Arab unity for the following reasons:
- (a)
- A unified Arab world would have the strength to
safeguard Arab independence;
- (b)
- A unified Arab world would have the ability to
resist penetration of communism or other foreign
ideologies;
- (c)
- A unified Arab world would have the capacity to
protect oil, pipelines and communication
routes.6
Ambassador Moose stated he
knew of no change in American policy on Arab unity since it was
defined circa 1951 by the then Secretary of State Dean
Acheson: the United States would not oppose unions of
Arab countries provided they were in accordance with the desires of
the governments and peoples concerned.
[Page 623]
Bitar thought this policy to
be too passive and conducive to division rather than unity. He urged
that the United States actively promote Arab unity.
Ambassador Moose replied that
it would be exceedingly difficult for the United States to assume an
active role in advance of agreement among the Arab states
themselves. Recent events did not encourage the belief that the Arab
states were moving closer together. However, should some way be
found to surmount the difficulties that presently exist, the United
States would be obliged to consider carefully the advantages and
disadvantages of supporting a given movement for union. Obviously if
the intentions of the leadership of such a movement were hostile to
the United States or in favor of opening the Near East to Soviet
penetration, there would be disadvantages from the American point of
view.
Bitar said that in a unified
Arab world those that might be favorable toward the Soviet Union
would be counter-balanced by those of opposite tendencies. He
reverted again to the theme that unity must be achieved by
“democratic” processes.
II Conversation of June 27,
1957
In addition to the question of Arab unity, which had dominated the
previous meeting, Bitar
outlined the following “causes of misunderstanding” between the
United States and “the Arabs”.
- (a)
Israel
Bitar emphasized the
following points:
- (1)
- Any UN
consideration of the Palestine problem should begin
not only with the present situation but should
comprehend the past; it should take into account the
fact that Israel has existed only nine years whereas
Palestine was predominantly Arab for many centuries;
it should consider the injustices inflicted upon the
Arabs.
- (2)
The Arabs do not ask the destruction of Israel
or the elimination of the existing Jewish
community. They have no objection to the Jews
enjoying a measure of autonomy and to their
developing their own culture. They would, however,
like to see changed the fanatically Zionist,
expansionist character of the present Israel
regime. They regard this regime as a prime danger
which obscures, in their minds, the communist
danger.
The Arabs consider it essential a) that the Arab
refugees be allowed to return to their homes and
b) that further Jewish immigration be stopped.
These steps, Bitar believed, would inter alia
foster the changes the Arabs desire in the nature
of the Israeli regime. The Arabs have no intention
to revive hostilities and will continue to respect
the armistice agreements, but they could not
consider peace negotiations with a regime of
“invaders”.
- (b)
Aqaba
Bitar considered that
declarations of USG
officials to the effect that Aqaba is an international
waterway are improper and evidence of partiality toward
Israel.
In addition to political and legal arguments along lines of
the Foreign Office official statement (reported in Embassy
telegram 30867), Bitar said it was feared that Israel is
attempting to create at Elath a military base which inter
alia would menace 100 miles of Arab coasts in the Gulf. It
was to be borne in mind, he said, that Israel claimed
certain areas near and including Medina as part of its
“future” Zionist state. Nor did the Arabs consider that
Israel needed use of the Gulf for purposes of economic
expansion.
Asked why the Arabs did not press for an opinion by the
International Court of Justice or other competent tribunal,
the Syrians said the question could be asked in reverse,
since it is Israel who portrays itself as the injured party.
They also emphasized that the UN Resolution of November 2, 1956 provided for
a return to the status quo before the British-French-Israel
invasion of Egypt. Israel did not use the Gulf prior to the
invasion.
- (c)
American Doctrine
Bitar said that
although the USG had
stressed safeguarding the independence of Middle Eastern
nations, it was evident that the USG does not comprehend the Arab desire for an
“independent” foreign policy. The United States, he said,
equates Arab nationalism with communism; it characterizes
everything as either pro-Communist or pro-West, failing to
recognize that there is a “third way”. The United States
recognizes only a Communist menace and ignores the Zionist
and imperialist menaces.
Further, the United States finds friends for its policy only
among reactionary, dictatorial, police regimes which have
become divisive forces obstructing Arab unity.
Such regimes, in Bitar’s opinion, cannot endure. The United
States would better serve its interests by encouraging Arab
nationalism and Arab unity, which ultimately would be
effective safeguards against Communist
penetration.
- (d)
American Economic Aid
Admitting that the Arab countries, including Syria, need
economic aid, Bitar
said that such aid must be given “without political
conditions”. Perhaps it was difficult to define just what
constituted “political conditions”, but Syria would consider
aid given to reactionary regimes for the purpose of
suppressing “democratic” elements and dividing the Arab
world as certainly constituting “conditional” aid. Bitar specifically
criticized American aid to Jordan.
Bitar said that
American aid would be palatable a) if given to the Arab
countries in bloc (rather than to individual regimes) and b)
if given through UN auspices
to show that it was not intended to change the character of
any given regime.
- (e)
Algeria
Bitar said the French
were not only obstructing Algerian independence but were
engaging in a war of extermination en masse.
[Page 625]
The United States should take
stronger measures to persuade France to cease this
inhumanity and to recognize Algerian aspirations.
At the conclusion of Bitar’s
presentation, Ambassador Moose said he would present the Minister’s views to
the authorities in Washington in the best fashion possible. He
feared, however, that he would be unable to answer on the basis of
information given him by the Foreign Minister inevitable questions
from Washington authorities. He thought, for example, that
considering everything the United States has done to promote the
independence of Arab countries, including the independence of Syria,
United States Government officials would be shocked at Bitar’s contention that the United
States does not recognize Arab nationalism and equates it with
communism.
As regards the so-called “conditions” which we imposed on economic
aid, Ambassador Moose noted
that among the Arab countries from North Africa to the Persian Gulf
(including Egypt) only Syria has found American “conditions” too
onerous. And if the Foreign Minister’s objection to “conditions”
were raised in Washington someone might ask “What has Syria itself
done?”. Syria and Egypt have both withdrawn economic aid from Jordan
because the latter has not conformed to Syrian and Egyptian
policy.
Bitar said that Syria and
Egypt had offered aid to Jordan to promote Arab unity which he did
not regard as a “condition” but a basic aspiration of all Arabs. The
present Jordan regime is receiving American aid and acts contrary to
the people’s aspirations for unity. Syria and Egypt thus consider
the regime has no need for their aid.
