345. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State1
1761. Prime Minister Assali called me to Foreign Ministry morning January 25 to say GOS had just learned why Amir Abdul Ilah Iraqi Crown Prince accompanied by Iraqi notables representing Sunni Shii and Kurdish elements was making visits to Ankara, Beirut, London and Washington. Abdul Ilah is promoting plan said Sabri Bey whereby Iraq would intervene militarily in Syria, place Abdul Ilah on Syrian throne and divide Jordan between Iraq and Syria, restore IPC pipeline operation and establish order including close Syro-Iraqi relationship under aegis House of Hashim. President Chamoun of Lebanon continued Prime Minister had given scheme his blessing and Abdul Ilah was seeking support in other capitals mentioned.
Prime Minister recounted conversation January 23 when Iraq Minister Rawi told him that Iraq not pleased with Syrian attitude toward Iraq generally and with Syrian attitude toward resumption IPC pumping operations in particular. Recalling that there can be no more short profitable wars Prime Minister expressed hope USG would discourage Abdul Ilah and any allies he might have found.
Prime Minister professed desire cooperate with USG and repeated that he favored resumption of IPC operations (under threat of further interruption) but that his Ministers not all of this opinion [Page 611] (Embtel 57122) and expressed determination of Israeli Government impose own conditions on evacuation Gaza Strip and Aqaba Gulf coast weakened his arguments. When I replied Minister State Khalid Al Azm shared his views I (Embtel 16803) and the two of them should wield much influence in Cabinet, Prime Minister said he had some hope of obtaining Cabinet concurrence in three-four days. He indicated that Syrian need for IPC revenue was important factor.
I noted that plan attributed to Adbul Ilah was not new and that Colonel Shishakli had brought it to attention USG as long ago 1953. I expressed hope report was not revival of old rumor nor new rumor of Soviet origin. I recalled that Foreign Minister Bitar had asked me transmit to Washington more than one alarming but unfounded report circulated by Tass Agency. Prime Minister quickly replied report received yesterday from Cairo and so not of Russian origin.
In response to question Prime Minister asserted he had discussed report with Azm only, but he would discuss it with Soviet Ambassador Nemtchina and with authorities of Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon.
I said I would report conversation to Department promptly and would of course inform Prime Minister of any reaction from Washington. I recalled first of general principles guiding US policy in NE (Depcirtel 4264) and wondered if it would be applicable to situation such as he described. On other hand, I expressed belief USG could hardly object if majority Syrian people wanted Abdul Ilah as King. Prime Minister laughed and said such contingency too remote to merit consideration.
Comment: I do not share Prime Minister’s easy confidence that report cannot be of Russian origin because it came from Cairo. In fact, because it came from Cairo I consider it only slightly less suspect than if it had come directly from Moscow.
Department may wish me to reply orally to Prime Minister that Syria might first endeavor compose its differences with Iraq by (1) [Page 612] authorizing IPC to resume operations and (2) abandoning its policy of vilifying Iraq.5
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 683.87/1–2657. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Ankara, London, and Paris.↩
- Reference is presumably to telegram 1712 from Damascus, January 17. (Ibid., 883.2553/1–1757)↩
- Not printed. (Ibid., 674.83/1–1257)↩
- Not printed.↩
On January 28, the Department responded to telegram 1761 as follows: “In oral reply to Asali you might suggest that instead of contributing to spread of unfounded reports which increase divisions between states in area, GOS should contribute to stability and reduction of tensions by endeavoring to compose its differences with Iraq. Steps GOS could take include authorizing IPC to resume operations and cessation anti-Iraqi press and radio campaigns.”
This message was sent erroneously to Beirut as telegram 2703. (Department of State, Central Files, 683.87/1–2657). On January 30, the Department redirected the message priority to Damascus for action. (Ibid., 683.87/1–3057)
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