34. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Ambassador to Jordan (Mallory), Department of State, Washington, September 10, 19561
SUBJECT
- The Situation in the Near East and in Jordan
In response to Ambassador Mallory’s request for guidance prior to returning to his post, the Secretary said that the United States now finds itself in a difficult position in the Near East. We have strong bonds of friendship with the United Kingdom and France, but we cannot agree with their current approach to Near Eastern problems. This smacks of the power politics of the past; London and Paris like to speak to the Arab capitals with the authority of the “supernation.”
The Secretary said that we consider Nasser an extremely dangerous individual. We believe that other Arab leaders agree with us, but don’t dare speak out against the Egyptian President.
This week, said the Secretary, a decision may be reached on whether the United Kingdom and France are going to use force in an attempt to solve the Suez problem. He had been working with the President over the weekend in an effort to inject moderation into an explosive and very dangerous situation. If force were used, an additional complication might be a decision by Israel to take advantage by participating in the conflict. In the event of the outbreak of hostilities, it would be very difficult for Americans in the Near East, [Page 50] since they would inevitably be associated in local minds with the British and French.
The Secretary went on to say that if recourse to military methods is not used, we believe that processes exist for the deflation of Nasser. There are economic measures, such as alternate routes to the Suez Canal, adjustment of United States cotton export policy, and curtailment of United States aid programs. Also, Arab jealousies might work against Nasser if the West did not make him a martyr.
. . . . . . .
Ambassador Mallory said that the United Kingdom’s position in the Near East and in Jordan was deteriorating. The United Kingdom pays an annual subsidy to Jordan of about £10 million, which was considered a good investment when it provided for a dependable military entity such as the Arab Legion, as well as two airfields in Jordan. The question now is whether, under the present circumstances, the United Kingdom will consider it worthwhile to keep on paying the subsidy. The Ambassador asked what our attitude would be if the United Kingdom decided to pull out. Would we pull out too, or try to supplant the British? The Ambassador went on to say that Point IV was being attacked by the Jordanians for political and other reasons and that in his opinion we have gone through the best projects.
The Secretary said that he did not like to provide a direct answer to a question like this without having more background. However, his off-the-cuff reaction was that in circumstances such as the Ambassador had described, we would cut back our assistance to Jordan. The Secretary emphasized the increasing difficulty the Department was having in getting funds from Congress for aid programs.
The Secretary then mentioned to the Ambassador the new circular instruction, sent out during the Ambassador’s absence on leave, concerning the increased responsibilities of Chiefs of Mission for programs in their countries. The Department did not wish the Chiefs of Mission merely to acquiesce in plans for aid programs. If they thought for instance that there are too many Americans in a country or that a particular aspect of a program would not be beneficial, they should make their views forcefully known to the Department.
The Secretary concluded by wishing Ambassador Mallory good luck as he returned to Amman and by stating that the Department had full trust and confidence in him. The Ambassador thanked the Secretary for the time he had given him and the valuable guidance he had provided.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/9–1056. Top Secret. Drafted by Rockwell, September 11–17.↩