Office of the Historian

339. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State1

Damascus, November 14, 1956—6 p.m.

1176. Reference: Embassy telegram 1175.2 Further comment: GOS itself (1) created atmosphere favorable sabotage IPC pipeline and (2) failed signally carry out promises of protection while (3) has made no move to dismiss, apprehend or punish high GOS officials known by GOS to have participated in sabotage. Now under scarcely veiled threat reprisal GOS demands that all elements IPC (Gulbenkian3 interests excepted) plus Caltex make unusual efforts remedy Syrian oil shortage.

Two points can be adduced in favor compliance:

(1)
That companies should not incur risk GOS reprisal; and
(2)
That failure of Western oil companies supply Syria’s needs will cause GOS seek Soviet oil thus pushing Syria further into Soviet orbit. In my opinion, neither argument is controlling. While failure companies to do Syrian bidding might cause retaliation, there is no reasonable expectation that compliance would assure them normal or profitable operations in Syria even for short time. On contrary, trend in Syria for some time has been toward progressive limitation freedom these companies to operate. Yielding to current Syrian demands would scarcely improve the companies’ prospects. Only a basic change in Syrian attitude would do that.

Tapline is in position somewhat different from that of its component parts but that compliance would provide any real safety for tapline is doubtful. Tapline has gone unscathed so far, more, it is believed, because of Egyptian and Syrian reluctance to diminish Saudi oil production (and so to decrease Saudi revenues) than because of any regard to American property.

Insofar as pushing Syria into Soviet orbit is concerned, this is believed to be an eventuality to be feared less than it is a reality to be dealt with. If the Soviet bloc wished to supply Syria with gas, oil [Page 600] and kerosene, it is unlikely that Syria would now demand such oil of Western companies.

The companies might refrain from any extra effort to help Syria because:

(1)
Compliance may merely constitute invitation to GOS to make further demands and so hasten day when marketing companies can no longer operate in Syria;
(2)
Now when Syria needs oil badly might be the best time for the companies to face the basic issue of how long they must respond to GOS demands, no matter how arbitrary; and
(3)
Sabotage IPC pipeline for which GOS cannot escape large measure responsibility has put additional strain on production and distribution of oil by Western companies and GOS failure provide security oil installations or punish saboteurs should give GOS lowest priority in claims for companies’ help.

Recommendation: That Department consider adopting attitude that IPC and Aramco and their component companies, regardless of Syrian need, should give no priority to Syrian request for gas, oil and kerosene until after GOS has taken effective action punish persons responsible for sabotage IPC line, particularly GOS officials.

Moose
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 880.2553/11–1456. Secret. Repeated to Beirut, Jidda, Paris, London, and Rome.↩

  2. Telegram 1175 from Damascus, November 14, reported in part that Syrian Minister of Public Works Jabiri had asked a Tapline official that Tapline’s parent-company Aramco or its participants supply Syria with 210,000 to 240,000 tons of fuel oil and gas over the next 12 months. (Ibid.)

    Prior to telegram 1175, several reports indicated that Syrian Intelligence Chief Lieutenant Colonel Sarraj had threatened to blow up Tapline and Aramco installations in Syria if the request were not met. (Telegram 1157 from Damascus, November 13; Ibid., 880.2553/11–1356; and telegram CX–140 from USARMA Beirut, November 14; Ibid., 883.2553/11–1456)

    ↩
  3. The Gulbenkians were a prominent Armenian family with important financial interests in Iraqi oil.↩