285. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 25, 1957, 10:30 a.m.1

MTW MC 15

SUBJECT

  • Arabian Peninsula
[Page 510]

PARTICIPANTS

  • American
    • The Secretary
    • The Under Secretary
    • Mr. Robert Murphy, G
    • Mr. Douglas C. Dillon, W
    • Ambassador John Hay Whitney
    • Ambassador Livingston T. Merchant
    • Mr. William M. Rountree, NEA
    • Mr. Andrew H. Berding, P
    • Mr. John Wesley Jones, EUR
    • Mr. Gerard C. Smith, S/AE
    • Mr. Marselis C. Parsons, Jr., BNA
    • Mr. Isaiah Frank, OT
    • Mr. William N. Dale, BNA
    • Mr. John Dorman, NE
  • British
    • Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, British Foreign Secretary
    • Sir Norman Brook, Foreign Office
    • Sir William Hayter, KCMG, Foreign Office
    • Sir Patrick Dean, KCMG, Foreign Office
    • Sir Harold Caccia, British Ambassador
    • Viscount Samuel Hood, Minister, British Embassy
    • Mr. Roger Jackling, Head of Chancery
    • Mr. Dennis Laskey, Private Secretary/Foreign Secretary
    • Mr. Willie Morris, First Secretary, British Embassy
    • Mr. F.J. Leishman, First Secretary, British Embassy
    • Mr. J.C.A. Roper, First Secretary, British Embassy

The Secretary said that the US and UK were faced by two large problems: Israel and the UK relationship with Saudi Arabia.2 The situation in the Yemen seemed to be improving and the West was [Page 511] apparently gaining in influence in that country. However, the Buraimi question, giving rise to the UK-Saudi dispute, still bothered us.

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd agreed that the situation in the Yemen was improving. As the Secretary was doubtless aware, there was a possibility of a visit to London by the Crown Prince. At the Imam’s request, the British Foreign Office had sent an official to the Yemen to make the arrangements for the visit. The Imam, Mr. Lloyd said, was frightened by the Russians, wished to assure his succession by the Crown Prince, and did not know exactly how he stood with King Saud.

Turning to the Buraimi question, Mr. Lloyd said that the Sultan of Muscat would visit London in November. It would greatly relieve the situation if King Saud would recognize the present boundaries of Muscat. However, King Saud could not be nice to the Sultan since the Sultan had not been nice to the Imam.

Mr. Lloyd said that King Saud had taken the initiative in approaching the UK through Charles Malik. King Saud had recommended that conversations be held with Ambassador Khayyal, who was number two on the Saudi Arabian Delegation to the UNGA and Malik was now arranging an appointment for Sir Roger [Pierson] Dixon to see Ambassador Khayyal. Mr. Lloyd said he would have preferred to talk with Azzam Pasha, whom Mr. Lloyd knew well.

Mr. Rountree observed that Ambassador Khayyal was a good man. However, there was a certain demarcation between the responsibilities of Ambassador Khayyal and Azzam Pasha, and it was probable that the Ambassador would want Azzam Pasha to sit in on any conversations which he might have with the British. Mr. Rountree thought it might be wise to have Shukairy out of the talks.

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 928. Secret. Drafted by Dorman. A notation on the source text indicates that the paper was approved by Secretary Dulles. Between October 23 and 25 a British delegation headed by Prime Minister Macmillan was in Washington for discussions with the President and Secretary of State.
  2. In an October 21 memorandum to the President outlining Dulles’ views on the purpose of the conference with the British, the Secretary noted in part:

    “We are interested in the maintenance of the British position in the Persian Gulf and would like to persuade them to make adjustments necessary to assure maintenance of that position. In this connection, we also favor the resumption of Anglo-Saudi relations on a sound basis as soon as possible.” (Ibid., Central Files, 033.4111/ 10–2157)

    On October 22, in a conversation with Ambassador al-Khayyal and Faisal Badawi of the Saudi Embassy, among others, Dulles raised the question of the Arabian Peninsula. The memorandum of conversation reads as follows:

    “The Secretary stated that during the forthcoming talks with British Prime Minister Macmillan, he planned to raise once again the question of a solution to problems in the southern portion of the Arabian peninsula. He said he realized previous US efforts had not been totally successful, but stated that the US had not given up. He said the US was willing to make a further attempt to find a basis for the resumption of friendly relations between the UK and Saudi Arabia, although he did not wish to create excessive hopes in Saudi Arabian minds. He added that he recognized that the British were concerned over the strength of their position in the area, but that he did not believe that it would be a sign of weakness for them to come to a settlement.” (Ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)