Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

271. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 7, 1957, 3:30–7:30 p.m.¹

Washington, February 7, 1957, 3:30–7:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Further U.S.-Saudi Arabian Talks

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S. Officials
  • The Secretary
  • G—Mr. Murphy
  • NEA—Mr. Rountree
  • Ambassador Richards
  • Ambassador Wadsworth
  • NE—Mr. Wilkins, Mr. Newsom
  • Mr. Stoltzfus, Recorder
  • Mr. Nowfel, Interpreter
• Representing Saudi Arabia
  • Shaikh Yusuf Yasin
  • Shaikh Mohammad Surur
  • Ambassador Al-Khayyal
  • Mamdouh Adib, Recorder
  • Abdul Aziz Majid, Interpreter

The Secretary began the meeting by saying that he had before him a memorandum that the United States had prepared in response to the Arab four-power memorandum His Majesty had brought with him from Cairo. The Secretary said he understood that the four-power memorandum expressed the views of King Hussain, President Nasser, the Prime Minister of Syria, and His Majesty. The Secretary gave a copy of the U.S. memorandum to Shaikh Yusuf.²

Shaikh Yusuf thanked the Secretary and commented that the U.S. memorandum would be the subject of review and later comment by His Majesty. The Secretary said that he had not expected to discuss the U.S. memorandum at this meeting but he suggested that it be considered in substance as the U.S. point of view. He said the Saudis would find that the memorandum expressed the same views that he and his associates had explained orally in other discussions during the past week. Shaikh Yusuf replied that perhaps there would be time to transmit the Saudi comments on this memorandum by the next morning. He had, however, been instructed by His Majesty to raise certain other subjects with the Secretary at this meeting. Some of these subjects might include points in the U.S. memorandum.

[Here follows discussion of the Arab-Israeli conflict, United Nations resolutions, and the questions of the Gulf of Aqaba, the Straits of Tiran, and Sharm al-Sheikh.]

Shaikh Yusuf said he now wished to raise certain subjects of primary concern to the U.S. and Saudi Arabia only. With regard to the exchange of the drafts of notes between them, he said that he wished to know (1) what had been prepared by the United States concerning the subjects that had been discussed during the past week; (2) whether it would be possible to prepare a summary of these talks; and (3) what would be published on these talks.

The Secretary said that he had before him a draft note summarizing the results of Mr. Murphy’s talks with His Majesty’s Counselors. He suggested it might be helpful if the interpreter were to read this note to Shaikh Yusuf in Arabic. (For the text of the note, see Tab A.³) Mr. Murphy said that it had been the Secretary’s suggestion that this note and the Saudi answer be supplemented by detailed memoranda covering the military and economic talks that had been held between the two sides. Mr. Murphy suggested that these supplementary memoranda could be included as annexes to the notes exchanged between the two parties since they explained in greater detail the items discussed in his talks on February 6 with Shaikh Yusuf and Shaikh Mohammad Surur.

Shaikh Yusuf thanked the Secretary and Mr. Murphy for these summaries of the talks of the past week. He said that if he had any complaint to make it was only against the shortness of the time available. He said that it might be difficult for the Saudi side to give a prompt answer to the note and memoranda since they would require translation into Arabic before they were shown to His Majesty. He asked whether it would be possible to have copies of them the same evening so that they could be taken up with His Majesty the next day. The Secretary and Mr. Murphy agreed to have them ready before the close of the meeting.

Shaikh Yusuf thanked the Secretary and Mr. Murphy and said that, though this was hard work, it was in the mutual interest of both parties to finish the job promptly. Shaikh Yusuf added that His Majesty could at least give his general reaction to the note before his departure. In any case, he said, the final agreement would not be a secret one and therefore the notes should be studied with a view to guarding the common interest and making certain that parts which might possibly create adverse propaganda against the two countries were eliminated. In any event he wished to have time perhaps that evening or the next day to study the notes and submit his comments.

The Secretary said he was equally anxious not to include anything in the notes which would prove embarrassing to Saudi Arabia or be incompatible with its complete sovereignty. Shaikh Yusuf said he appreciated this and believed that both sides should discuss the matter, not as two competing teams but as one team working together for the good of all.

Shaikh Yusuf said that he wished to emphasize once again to the Secretary His Majesty’s point of view that Saudi Arabia’s attempt to acquire adequate arms and equipment within a space of two years would impose heavy burdens on the country’s economy. If the army, navy, and air programs were all to be carried out at the same time, it might well increase Saudi Arabia’s total military expenditures by $100 million a year. Unfortunately however, Shaikh Yusuf said, Saudi Arabia was behind in its military defenses and had to make up for lost time. Saudi Arabia did not wish to press its needs on the United States, but it believed the United States should be aware of the facts. Just as Saudi Arabia would be forced to pay an additional $100 million for training and equipping its army, navy and air force, so it would also have to pay proportionately for salaries, installations and many other obligations within the country. These facts, Shaikh Yusuf said, had recently been explained in full to Ambassador Wadsworth in Riyadh by the Minister of Finance. Saudi Arabia had committed itself to carry out the full defense program suggested by the United States, but His Majesty wished his friends to realize that this program would entail heavy economic burdens on the country and he had asked whether the United States could assist Saudi Arabia in this regard either now or in the future.

The Secretary said that he understood that most of the financing would be on credit. Mr. Murphy added that Shaikh Yusuf had explained Saudi Arabia’s financial problems in previous talks and that he had expressed to Shaikh Yusuf the interest, sympathy, and appreciation of the United States for these problems.

The Secretary said he would like to take this occasion to observe that, in the judgment of the President, himself, and the Secretary of the Treasury, most of the countries of the area were engaged in excessive military programs. These military establishments were very expensive to maintain. The United States was devoting to its military establishment and to those of its allies amounts which many of the ablest economists in the United States felt were excessive. The Secretary said he noted that the Soviet Union had announced substantial reductions in its expenditures on its military forces. Of course, Russia pretended that its reason was that it wished to reduce its armaments, but the actual reason was economic. The United Kingdom was also reducing its military commitments out of financial necessity. The Secretary said he believed that in general the military establishments in most countries were too big. He said he hoped very much that Saudi Arabia would not object to his friendly and well-intentioned advice not to embark on such a large military program that it would strain the economy of the country and force it to depend on an outside power which might prove unreliable and dangerous to Saudi Arabian independence. The Secretary said that the initial financial outlay for arms and military equipment was the lowest. It was the tremendous cost of maintenance, training, and spare parts that eventually ate into the economic vitals of a country. The Secretary said he wished to assure His Excellency, however, that the United States recognized the need of Saudi Arabia for some additional military equipment in order to be better able to defend the Dhahran Airfield, and maintain internal order. He said that he sincerely hoped that Saudi Arabia would not seek so large a military establishment that it could no longer maintain a sound economy or that would be in excess of its economic resources.

Shaikh Yusuf said he was grateful for the Secretary’s advice. He said that Saudi Arabia had not been able to get arms previously and thus had to make up for lost time. Saudi Arabia was now trying to get arms only in sufficient quantities to satisfy its needs, and he certainly did not feel that its requests had been excessive. The amounts that had been discussed and agreed upon were Saudi Arabia’s minimum needs, which even U.S. experts agreed were essential for internal security. Even this small amount, Shaikh Yusuf said, constituted a heavy burden on the country.

The Secretary said he wondered which military experts Shaikh Yusuf referred to. His thought was that the local military experts, in making their estimates of requirements, were not always in possession of full information on budget matters or the impact on the budget of their own recommendations.⁴

Shaikh Yusuf said that His Majesty wanted to know why the U.S. was able to offer grant aid to some countries purchasing arms from the U.S. whereas it was apparently unable to do so in Saudi Arabia’s case. Shaikh Yusuf said that the only difference he could see between the agreement offered to Saudi Arabia and the Mutual Security agreements that the U.S. had with some other countries was in Article IV. Was Article IV as important as all that? Saudi Arabia was steadfast in its friendship for the U.S. and it had promised to be so in the future. The United States could find Saudi Arabia a more reliable friend than those other countries to which it had given grant aid. Shaikh Yusuf pointed out that His Majesty had, after all, managed to defend his oil fields, the pipe lines, Dhahran, and the whole country against all threats to them. This was more than could be said for some of the other friends of the United States. Shaikh Yusuf said that His Majesty wished only to explain in a friendly manner Saudi Arabia’s burdens and to ask the U.S. to give them some consideration. The U.S. could rest assured, however, that Saudi Arabia was not now pressing for any change in the present agreement. He only hoped that the U.S. might find it possible to help later, perhaps by means of the President’s new doctrine.

The Secretary then handed to Shaikh Yusuf a detailed memorandum of the military talks of the past week.⁵ He suggested to Shaikh Yusuf that this memorandum be kept permanently secret and that the draft note be kept secret until final agreement had been obtained on its terms and arrangements made for its publication. Shaikh Yusuf expressed his agreement.

The Secretary said he had a few matters to raise with Shaikh Yusuf at this time. Referring to the islands of Farsi and Arabi, the Secretary said that the Saudi memorandum on the subject⁶ had only been received on the sixth of February, and the Department’s study of it had not yet been completed. The Secretary said that he would communicate the views of the U.S. on the subject, when its study had been completed, to the Saudi Ambassador in Washington. In any event, the Secretary said, Shaikh Yusuf could be confident that if the U.S. could be useful in solving a problem between two of its friends, Saudi Arabia and Iran, it would be very happy to do so.

With respect to the Yemen, the Secretary said he wished to express the concern of the United States Government over reports that considerable quantities of Soviet bloc equipment were entering that country. The Secretary said there were also reports from Amman suggesting that Russian or Czech weapons and equipment were being delivered from Syria to Saudi Arabia.

Shaikh Yusuf said that he could guarantee absolutely that this information was not true. The true story, Shaikh Yusuf said, was as follows: During the recent crisis His Majesty had asked Syria and Egypt for some anti-aircraft guns, provided they were not of Russian manufacture. This had been done because at that time Israeli aircraft were making daily sorties over Saudi Arabian territory, particularly in the Tebuk area. The guns that His Majesty received were, he believed, of Swiss manufacture. Shaikh Yusuf said he wished to emphasize, however, that in the past the Russians had frequently offered arms to Saudi Arabia and were in fact continuing to do so. Russian agents in Pakistan, Indonesia, and many other countries were continually pressing Saudi Embassies to report Russia’s offers of arms and equipment to His Majesty. Shaikh Yusuf said he would therefore like to caution the U.S. about reports it received concerning Russian arms for Saudi Arabia. His Majesty had given his word that he would take no Soviet arms and he would do nothing behind the back of the U.S. With regard to the Yemen, Shaikh Yusuf said that he wanted to know whether these Russian arms had supposedly been delivered before or after the closing of the Suez Canal. How, he asked, would they have gotten through to the Yemen with the canal closed and Israel controlling the Sinai and Aqaba. Mr. Rountree said that the reports suggested that the Soviet arms for Yemen were being flown from Egypt.

The Secretary said that in any event he wished to state that the U.S. Government understood and appreciated the position of His Majesty and Saudi Arabia on Soviet arms. He had mentioned this subject because he had wished to get the information necessary to help dissipate what he himself had felt were false rumors. Shaikh Yusuf thanked the Secretary and said he would be gratified if he were informed of any adverse reports of this nature about Saudi Arabia; and he offered, in turn, to inform the United States if Saudi Arabia were to receive adverse reports concerning U.S. activities as well. This exchange of information, he thought, would be very useful to both countries. The Secretary concurred and said that was the way for friends to act. It would be unfortunate, he said, to allow the relations of the two countries to become estranged by what could well turn out to be false reports. Shaikh Yusuf added that both sides needed to be very careful and watchful, because their enemies were many and capable.

The Secretary said he wished to mention to Shaikh Yusuf the difficulties that were apparently being met by U.S. official personnel regarding the shipment of their personal effects to and from Saudi Arabia. Ambassador Wadsworth added that this was a matter of long-standing and involved the general principle of the treatment in Saudi Arabia of U.S. clerical staff and Consular employees who were not bearers of diplomatic passports.

Shaikh Yusuf said he did not have any information at hand on the matter and could therefore not give a categorical answer. However, he could assure the United States that American official personnel would be treated exactly as Saudi official personnel were treated in the United States. The only exception he could think of was in regard to religious matters. He said that what he had in mind were certain established religious customs that could not be changed, as for example, the fact that only Moslems could visit the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.

The Secretary said he would like to call Shaikh Yusuf’s attention to the fact that efforts to establish closer relations with Saudi Arabia were complicated by religious factors in this country as well. The Secretary said he hoped, however, that Saudi Arabia could give consideration to the possibility of allowing U.S. citizens regardless of their religious faith to at least transit Saudi Arabian territory.

Shaikh Yusuf inquired whether the Secretary was not afraid that some of them might constitute a danger to the Dhahran Airfield. The Secretary replied that he did not think that any American citizen carrying a United States passport would constitute any such danger.

Shaikh Yusuf said that His Majesty had been frank during his appearance on television the day before. During his interview, His Majesty had said that there was no enmity between Saudi Arabia and the Jews as such. The Moslems respected Jews as “people of the Book,” but Saudi Arabia did consider all Zionists their enemies. Thus, any Jew who could prove that he had no dealings with the Zionists would not be barred from Saudi Arabia. Shaikh Yusuf noted that in fact one Jew had had dinner with His Majesty recently in Riyadh. The Secretary said that he was glad to have that statement from Shaikh Yusuf.

The Secretary said he also wished to mention that the U.S. hoped a better relationship could be developed between Saudi Arabia on one hand and the United Kingdom and France on the other. The United States believed that although these countries had perhaps made some mistakes they were basically good countries.

Shaikh Yusuf said that he would convey this point to His Majesty. The reasons why Saudi Arabia cut off its relations with these countries, he said, were well known. If the aggression against Egypt and its aftermath could be resolved and a constructive settlement reached, nothing would be more desirable, from the Saudi Arabian point of view, than for its relations to be re-established with the United Kingdom and France. Shaikh Yusuf said that he felt the Secretary could use his good influence to help settle the outstanding difficulties, and that his influence would go a long way towards improving the whole situation. Shaikh Yusuf remarked that, unfortunately, the position with Britain was worse now than it had been when the Secretary visited Riyadh four years ago.

The Secretary said that, as a final point, he thought it would be useful to have the two sides get together immediately to work out a final draft of the joint communiqué, so that it would be ready for issuance the next day. The Secretary selected Mr. Newsom to work with a member of the Saudi party on this project. Shaikh Yusuf agreed to this procedure, and indicated that he wished to work on it himself for the Saudi side. He said that the results of the economic talks had been intentionally omitted from the Saudi preliminary draft pending final agreement on the subject between the two sides.

Referring to Buraimi, Shaikh Yusuf said that His Majesty had been thankful and appreciative of the Secretary’s explanation of United States interest in Saudi Arabia’s problems with respect to the disputed areas. Shaikh Yusuf added that, because of the current state of Saudi Arabia’s relations with the United Kingdom, however, it would not be possible to allow the situation to remain indefinitely as it was. Shaikh Yusuf said that a long time ago King Abdul Aziz (ibn Saud) had asked the United States to arbitrate the question of Buraimi but the United States had declined to accept. Saudi Arabia was now again prepared to offer its support to the United States Government if it would act as mediator in this matter, and it had no objection if the United States wished to offer to both parties its views on a solution to the dispute. Shaikh Yusuf said that it would be very useful if the Secretary could find a way to make the United Kingdom accept some solution of the question, because Saudi Arabia saw little hope or use in continuing its bilateral negotiations with Great Britain. During all these months, Shaikh Yusuf said, the only thing that he had been able to discuss with Great Britain was whether the subject of Buraimi would be item number six or item number seven on the agenda.

The Secretary said he did not believe that the U.S. would want to assume the responsibility of arbitrating the question of Buraimi and the disputed areas and he doubted that the United Kingdom would, in any case, accept the U.S. in that role. The United States, he said, still hoped that something would come out of direct negotiations. The Secretary said that he appreciated that Shaikh Yusuf was not satisfied with the course this matter had taken in recent months. The United States was not satisfied either, and had frequently talked the matter over with the United Kingdom. The Secretary said he assumed that the United States would continue to do so, since the United States and the United Kingdom representatives seldom met without having this question brought up and without United States expressing its hope for a quick solution of the problem. At the moment, the Secretary said, the U.S. could promise only to continue to use its good offices toward a solution of the dispute. The U.S. would, of course, be glad to entertain any fresh suggestions on the subject that the Saudi Arabian Government might wish to make. The Secretary added that he was sure the United Kingdom would not accept the United States as arbiter because it already felt the United States was too friendly with Saudi Arabia.

Shaikh Yusuf said that he would like Britain to understand the friendship that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia enjoyed because it was a true friendship. However, he would also like to point out that Saudi Arabia’s gains meant U.S. gains as well. Shaikh Yusuf said it occurred to him that if the United States wished to see the re-establishment of relations between Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom and France, its active intercession in the Buraimi question might be of great help in that direction. In this connection, Shaikh Yusuf said, the United States Government could suggest various alternatives that might help to solve outstanding problems between Britain and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia was not obstinate and only wanted its own rights without causing bitterness.

[Here follows discussion of Egypt’s frozen assets in the United States and Algeria.]

Shaikh Yusuf said that his final question was one that everyone in the Arab Middle East was asking and that was: what did the U.S. specifically want from the Arabs?

The Secretary replied that he could answer that very easily. The United States wanted nothing from the Arabs except that they be truly independent and enjoy economic stability and prosperity. The United States desired no political engagements of any kind and looked only for an expression of the sincere desire of every Arab state to maintain its own independence.

Shaikh Yusuf remarked that the Secretary’s reply constituted a statement of principle. However, he also wished to know what the U.S. demanded of certain Arab states as a price for its friendship. For example, Shaikh Yusuf said, King Hussein had asked His Majesty to help him obtain U.S. assistance for Jordan, and His Majesty wanted Jordan to be helped. Syria also needed assistance and so did Egypt. Shaikh Yusuf said his question was: what did the U.S. specifically require from these states before it would offer its aid to them. The Secretary replied that the only conditions for U.S. assistance were the ones he had already mentioned. Of course, the U.S. wished to be certain that the country requesting U.S. assistance really was seeking to maintain its own independence. For example, the Secretary said, King Hussein recently wrote a letter in which he indicated that his own Government was not being vigilant in the matters of Communist subversion and subversive elements in Jordan. If that was the judgment of the King of Jordan, the U.S. could scarcely be blamed for concluding that the Jordanian Government did not appear to be earnestly seeking to maintain the independence of the country. If other countries acted more like Saudi Arabia, the Secretary said, their relations with the United Sates would be good. The Secretary added that, when asked by officials of other Arab states what they should do to improve their relations with the United States, Shaikh Yusuf might simply tell them to behave as Saudi Arabia did.

Shaikh Yusuf said that he would try to make them do so.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86A/2–1057. Confidential. Drafted by Stoltzfus on February 10.
2. Dated February 7, it was a reply to the Four-Power memorandum presented to the President by King Saud on January 30. In addition to responding to each of the 10 points raised in the Arab memorandum, the U.S. memorandum cited two problems which it considered “harmful” to the stability and security of the Middle East: the Palestine issue and the Suez Canal problem. For text, see ibid., Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 833. Texts of both the U.S. and Arab memoranda were transmitted in Department of State instruction CA–6659, February 18, to Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Jidda, Baghdad, Khartoum, Tripoli, Tel Aviv, London, and Paris. (Ibid., Central Files, 786A.11/2–1857)
3. Dated February 7, not printed; it indicated that the United States was prepared to consider its note and a reply by King Saud as “constituting firm agreement” between the two governments of the renewal of the Dhahran Airfield for a 5-year period. The note also confirmed U.S. intentions to provide military equipment for two infantry divisions, additional construction at Dhahran not to exceed $5 million, and various military training programs for the Saudi Army, Air Force, and Navy. These programs were not to exceed $50 million over a 5-year period. The note also indicated U.S. intentions to assist in certain economic projects, particularly the development of the Port of Dammam.
4. According to a note to Oulashin dated February 16, attached to the source text, Sturgill noted that Macomber had approved the memorandum of conversation for distribution. Sturgill added, however, that Macomber did request that the sentence beginning with the words, “His thought was that the local military experts” be revised “to reflect that the Secretary was thinking in terms of estimates received from local military personnel not having possession of full information on budget matters or the impact on the budget of their own recommendations.”
5. See Enclosure 1, infra.
6. Not printed. The Saudi memorandum, entitled “Proofs and Evidence Establishing the Sovereignty of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia over the Islands of Farisiyah and Arabiyah Lying in the Arabian Gulf (The Persian Gulf),” was attached to a memorandum, February 9, from Wilkins to Murphy. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/2–957)