Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

26. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs¹

O/PS/7

Washington, April 19, 1956.

Problem

Future United States Policy Toward Jordan.

Discussion

The failure to solve the Palestine problem has caused a progressive deterioration in the western position in Jordan since the termination of the Arab-Israel war. The 500,000 refugees in Jordan who have little hope of being integrated into the economy of the country are the primary source of instability. Having been uprooted for 8 years, the refugees are more and more inclined to listen to communist or extreme nationalist propaganda.

Jordanian unrest was first conclusively demonstrated during October of 1954 in the riots which took place as a result of the government-rigged parliamentary elections. Following British efforts to induce Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact, nation-wide violence occurred in December 1955 and January 1956 which was directed at American institutions though western consulates, UNRWA, and Jordan Government offices were likewise attacked. Popular opposition to the Pact was fanned by communists, Egyptian and Saudi agents who found a common meeting ground over this issue. Thereafter, Nationalist sentiment brought about the abrupt dismissal of General Glubb and other officers by King Hussein. The Arab Legion has thus been weakened. The British no longer control its movements… .

The December-January riots and subsequent events have demonstrated that:

1. Direct British influence in Jordan has been weakened.

2. Neutralist and pre-communist sentiment has increased.

3. The success of the rioters has developed a psychology of rebellion in the Jordanian population and made difficult effective Government control.

4. Though thus far King Hussein has refused to accept ESS offers of financial support in lieu of the British subsidy, popular pressure to do so may force him to abandon his position. If he accepts, the EES powers are in a position to cancel the aid and gradually dismember Jordan. If he continues his refusal, he is likely to be forced off the throne with probably the same end result—the partition of Jordan between Syria and Saudi Arabia.

5. Christian-Moslem differences have increased.

6. American missionary establishments continue in danger.

7. The refugees have adopted a nihilist philosophy which during January caused them to continue rioting after calm had been restored in other parts of the country. However, the experience of mob rule and wholesale property destruction has caused business men and officials to realize that a further breakdown of law and order could affect them.

8. Removal of British control of the Arab Legion may lead to the infiltration into Israel from Jordan and the likelihood of border clashes.

9. There is now no appreciable difference in interests and aims between the urban inhabitants of East Jordan and those of the West Bank as a result of the sizeable influx of Palestinians as refugees, merchants and government officials into the settled areas of Transjordan.

It may not be said that United States policies in Jordan have been successful. U.S. economic assistance whether given directly or through UNRWA is taken as a form of atonement for the U.S. support for the partition of Palestine. Jordan has a “relief mentality.” Since its establishment Jordan has been supported by the British. It has received aid for the refugees from the United Nations since 1948. The absorptive capacity of the country restricts the provision of technical assistance. The presence of many Americans in Amman living in better personal circumstances than the local population creates local antagonisms. The deep-seated hostility toward foreign countries has presented a formidable obstacle to ICA and USIS. U.S. information programs have met with serious practical difficulties.

The partition of Jordan among its neighbors should be constantly kept in mind. British influence is bound to decline. Iraqi attempts to strengthen Iraqi influence made at the present time in a context of British prodding can not succeed. At the same time, while the ESS powers could create chaos in Jordan, they are not yet able to make an effective satellite of the country. Thus the conflicting interests and unhappy state of mind which plague the West present obstacles to Colonel Nasser as well. A Soviet attempt to take over the country by internal subversion might be met by vigorous military action and physical conquest of parts of the country by Israel, Iraq and perhaps Saudi Arabia.

Recommendations

1. General Policy. Our general policy line should be that we wish to maintain friendly, cooperative relations if Jordan wishes them. We would support the association of Jordan, in its present or in a new form, with one or more Arab states if the government and people so wish.

Meanwhile, we should support the British position in the country. Nevertheless, we should persuade the British to forego actions which seem colonial and seek to channel British influence in a direction which will demonstrate to the Jordanians the value of an attachment to the West.

2. Economic Aid. We should continue technical assistance projects but should phase out those of marginal value and those in which the Jordan Government has expressed no particular interest. We should continue development assistance but should concentrate on one or two good projects and those whose value to the country is easily demonstrated. Such projects should be given publicity when commenced and finished according to schedules announced at the inceptions of the projects.

U.S. contributions to the UNRWA relief program should [be] given in the form of agricultural commodities rather than cash and should be administered by Jordan.

Development and technical assistance projects of ICA, British Development Board, and UNRWA should be carefully coordinated.

3. Information Policy. We should emphasize Arab development with western assistance rather than oblique and repetitious attempts to derogate the Soviets. U.S. information activities should give a good coverage of world news and should be devoid of all but the most subtle propaganda.

We should stress the strong and mutually profitable relationships existing between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia (given a favorable outcome of the Dhahran Air Base negotiation), the U.S. and Iraq and the U.S. and Lebanon.

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1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega—Meetings of MEPPG (agenda, memos of conv., etc.) 4/9/56 to 6/30/56. Secret. According to a covering memorandum by Kirk in S/S, April 19, this paper was drafted by Bergus and Blackiston and approved by Wilkins.