Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

24. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Wilkins) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen)¹

Washington , March 28, 1956 .

SUBJECT

• Developments in Jordan and Iraq

Ronald Bailey stopped in to see me this afternoon at the request of the British Ambassador. He said that he had been instructed to maintain liaison with me for the purpose of providing the Watch Committee with significant British information with respect to developments in the Near East. You may wish to mention the following two points, or pass this memorandum, to S and U:²

1. On March 24 the Jordan Prime Minister had just confirmed to the British Ambassador in Amman report that Ali Hiyari, who had been Jordanian Chief of Staff since Glubb’s departure, had now been appointed to command an Arab Legion division. Nuwar had been made new Chief of Staff.³ The report was that King Hussein had no knowledge of this change. A “Free Officers” pamphlet was being circulated calling for complete freeing of Arab Legion from British Officers. The British Foreign Office had thereafter telegraphed the British Ambassador in Amman that these developments appear very dangerous not only for the U.K. position in Jordan, but also for the King. The Ambassador was instructed to approach the King along the following lines:

a. Current negotiations to associate British Officers with the Arab Legion in Jordan seem to be progressing satisfactorily; therefore agreement might now be reached.

b. The U.K. was anxious with respect to the situation in Jordan and in the Legion might be getting out of control, with grave risks to the throne, particularly from a coup d’état.

c. A replacement of some of the young officers responsible for the last coup might be desirable.

d. If the King was disposed to take action the U.K. believed there were senior Arab officers who could handle the Legion: Sharia, Kiyari, Fawaz Muhairi.

e. The U.K. would help; it would postpone for a limited time release of remaining British Officers in executive command.

If the King agrees as above, the U.K. did not believe it could be done with Rifai in office.

2. The Iraqi Crown Prince and Nuri Pasha have recently discussed possible changes in the Iraq Prime Ministership with former Iraqi Prime Ministers. Surprisingly, Salih Jabr had supported continuance of Nuri in office. The Crown Prince had strongly supported the continuance of Nuri in office. The British Foreign Office telegraphed the British Ambassador in Baghdad and said it was pleased with the Crown Prince’s robust attitude and had gone on to describe the situation in Jordan and had asked the British Ambassador to discuss with the Iraqis. The British thought there was a real danger in Jordan of civil war or a pro-Egyptian Government through a coup d’état. The British wished to know what action Iraq would take in such circumstances and thought Iraq and the U.K. should each know what the other was doing and adopt a common plan. Iraq was aware of British dispositions in Jordan. There was also a parachute brigade in Cyprus. Operational plans to secure Mafraq and Amman Airfields and to provide protection for the King was being considered. There were supply difficulties which the U.K. and Iraq should discuss. How could land connections with Iraq be kept open?

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/3–2856. Top Secret. Drafted by Wilkins. Also addressed to Rountree.
2. No indication was found that the memorandum was forwarded to Dulles or Hoover.
3. Lieutenant Colonel Ali Abu Nuwar, formerly commander of the Princess Aliya Brigade of the Arab Legion.