Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

239. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State ¹

Jidda , July 7, 1956—3 p.m.

7. My telegram 575,² repeated information Cairo 73, London 99. Department’s June 2 summary of “views on Dhahran negotiations” (based on reference telegram) suggests that following subordinate considerations may be of interest if we either wish to continue negotiations or decide to “clear out”. In either event, I submit, we shall need more time than now remains before July 19 to reach even preliminary understanding as to future relationships at DAF.

(1) King Saud and Royal court have now left Riyadh and will spend few days in Taif before proceeding Mecca for annual pilgrimage. Latter will culminate July 19 with Feast of Sacrifice. During fortnight before and after that date King will be, if not inaccessible, at best overwhelmingly occupied with pilgrimage affairs; following which his tentative schedule calls for visits to Jidda, Medina and Riyadh before leaving early August for state visits to Afghanistan and Indonesia.

My thought is that, if Department have special message for King, it could best be delivered in Mecca by Mohamed Effendi who at same time would arrange audience for me during King’s Jidda visit.

(2) On the substance, if we wish to continue negotiations, Department may wish consider possibility authorizing me suggest that:

(a) In addition to “extending credit to Saudi Arabia repayable over 5 years for purchasing arms,” we would undertake ship during next 6 months the $35 million worth of arms now “on order” with USG, leaving for later negotiation question of how and when payment therefor would be made (see last page, last enclosure my despatch 213³); and

(b) On supposition two governments will eventually agree on basic issue, we propose interim study at technical level, by representatives of Saudi Defense Ministry and USAF, with view to determining mutually agreeable formula for continuing exercise by USAF of its minimum peace time requirements at DAF.

Comment: Time-gaining approach along these two lines might be useful per se, in that it might lead King Saud to realistic reconsideration of basic issue, i.e. whether he just continue insist, as major quid pro quo, or gift of arms, or money to buy them, for extension DAF agreement.

Perhaps more important, it might carry us over period American elections and thus render possible, should USG later so desire, extension of invitation to King Saud to visit Washington early next year.

(3) If, on other hand, we decide it be best to plan as of now to “clear out”, Department may wish consider possibility authorizing me suggest to King Saud that it would be to mutual advantage were we to phase out our activities over next two years.

I would wish, then, to say that most obvious advantage to both governments would be one of convenience: to USG because it will take us some 2 years to construct elsewhere facilities similar to those we now use at Dhahran; and to SAG because thoughtfully conceived phasing-out program (which USAF would be glad elaborate with Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation) would enable SAG efficiently to phase take-over of operations and maintenance DAF with its own rather than foreign personnel.

(4) Before Hancock left for Washington he discussed briefly another possible approach which I have since definitively discarded. It was that we say frankly to King Saud that, in our considered opinion, Egyptian-sponsored 2-year 2-divisional plan is contrary to his and our interests because it would “put his beard in the hand of the Egyptian”.

To take any such line at this time, I am convinced, would be offensive, ineffective and counter-productive because for better or for worse Saudi Arabia is tied to Egypt only by their common cause against Iraq. Mohamed Effendi puts it, “Saudi Arabia needs a strong Arab friend”.

Interesting support is lent this view in Najib Rawi’s comment (Cairo Embtel 2567⁴) that attempts to woo Egypt’s present allies away from her are unlikely to succeed; and by Charles Malik (in July Foreign Affairs) where he says, “unless Saudi Arabia feels itself firmly secure, it must ally itself with Egypt”.

(5) That Saudis do not desire to break off negotiations may perhaps be deduced from facts that Abdul Rahman Azzam called on me early last week to discuss Buraimi, that Finance Minister Surur requests our assistance in buying gold (my telegram 3, July 4⁵), that Prince Faisal who seldom attends official receptions came to mine on July 4 and Prince Mishaal sent special regrets with “congratulations and best wishes for independence our two friendly countries”, and that Faisal has since sent me memorandum re SAG protest against British intervention in Franco-Saudi arms deal (my telegram 6, July 7⁶).

Mohamed Effendi comments as he did after last month’s negotiations, “overall impression is they are as anxious as we to reach agreement, but they want arms in return”.⁷

Wadsworth

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/7–756. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Cairo and London.
2. Telegram 575, June 20, contained Wadsworth’s comments on prospects for renegotiation of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement. (Ibid., 711.56386A/6–2056)
3. Not printed. (Ibid., 711.56386A/6–1356)
4. Dated June 25, not printed. (Ibid., 674.87/6–2556)
5. Not printed. (Ibid., 886A.131/7–456))
6. Not printed. (Ibid., 786A.56/7–756))
7. In an official-informal letter to Wadsworth, July 9, Allen informed the Ambassador, inter alia, that while the Department of Defense believed Dhahran to be of “real value,” it was not prepared to consider the Saudi proposal of $250 million in rent. There was little support, Allen added, in either State or Defense for rent, grant aid, cash payment or credit, though the Department of Defense was urgently examining possible concessions. In a notation on the source text, Allen added: “I discussed your No. 7, July 7, with Bob Murphy this morning. The point of view here is that we do not want to ‘clear out’ if we can stay in on any reasonable basis, but we must let the Saudis know quite clearly that we are prepared to clear out—and mean what we say—if the Saudis feel that our presence there is contrary to their own interests. The petition by 600 people against the DAF agreement makes the field of less interest to us because we do not like to operate in a hostile atmosphere. Our experience is that the supplying of guns does not cure a situation of this kind—not for long anyway.” (Ibid., NEA/ARP Files: Lot 69 D 547, Dhahran Airfield, Memos— Miscellaneous (Inter-Office, to Sec. etc.))