227. Editorial Note
On May 3, in a luncheon meeting in Paris during the Foreign Ministers Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Dulles and Lloyd, accompanied by British Foreign Office and Department of State officials, discussed the Middle Eastern situation. After a discussion of Soviet objectives in the area, the Arab–Israeli conflict, joint Anglo–American policies, and the Aswan Dam, the British Foreign Secretary raised the question of Saudi Arabia. The report of the discussion includes the following:
“Turning to Saudi–Arabia, Lloyd reviewed progress Dodds–Parker mission and expressed gratification that first objective of bringing British Ambassador back and commencing talks on relatively friendly basis had been achieved. He thought next phase would be continuation of talks by Ambassador in Jidda and Riyadh. He was also considering inviting Azzam Pasha to visit him in London to discuss matter. He thought such conversations with Azzam would be particularly desirable in view Azzam’s influence upon King and Lloyd’s belief Azzam perhaps more intelligent and objective than other Saudi–Arabian reps who might be dealing with matter. He felt he should himself avoid meeting Feisal until later stages of negotiations.
“Lloyd was not optimistic regarding actual settlement of Buraimi issue and placed main hope in possibility protracted negotiations which would keep matter ‘on ice’ for some time during which other elements U.K.–Saudi relations might be improved.
“Lloyd inquired whether we felt Saudis were disposed turn away from Egypt. Secretary replied real progress this connection would depend upon success in other directions. Saudis’ main concern was their disputes with British, with Hashemites and with Israeli. It will require continuous efforts by all of us to bring about situation in which Saudi–Egyptian ties will be less appealing to them. If progress can be made in British–Saudi rapprochement, in an improvement in Iraq–Saudi relations, and in the direction of a solution to Israeli problem, Secretary felt situation in Saudi–Arabia could be much improved. Meanwhile, we were greatly encouraged by fact that Saudis continued refuse Soviet arms and technicians and professed, we believe sincerely, that they desired full cooperation with us. Secretary referred to forthcoming negotiations on Dhahran Airfield and said he thought it would be necessary for us to agree to [Page 366] sell some arms to Saudis. Lloyd’s only reaction to latter comment was jokingly to ask whether the purpose of arms would be to attack Buraimi.
“Lloyd inquired whether U.S. had made representations to SAG re recent anti–British activities. He was told we had issued instructions U.S. Chargé to express our concern re reports provision of arms to tribes in Aden, expulsion British members FAO anti–Locust mission, and harsh anti–British propaganda on Saudi radio and in Saudi papers. Lloyd expressed appreciation.” (Secto 11 from Paris, May 4; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/5–456)
Later that day, Dulles informed the President by telegram that, while Lloyd felt that the British and Americans were coming closer together on the Middle East, the British were still sensitive about Saudi Arabia and “fear that our policy of trying to wean the Saudis away from Egypt may be at the expense of selling out the British in Buraimi etc.” (Dulte 3 from Paris, May 3; Ibid., 110.11–DU/5–356)