Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

217. Memorandum for the Record, by the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)¹

Washington, February 21, 1956.

RE

• Suspension of Export Licenses for Military Materials to Middle East

Mr. Hagerty called me Thursday evening about 10:30 p.m., February 16, from Thomasville, Georgia, where he was accompanying the President on a vacation with Secretary Humphrey.

Mr. Hagerty was greatly concerned regarding press and Congressional reactions to a shipment of 18 light tanks then being loaded in New York for shipment to Saudi Arabia. I told him I would look into it and call him back. He felt we should take immediate action to halt the shipment if an “impossible” public relations problem was to be avoided.

During the next two hours I talked again several times with Mr. Hagerty, as well as with George Allen, Gordon Gray and Robert Anderson. The tanks were apparently on lighters, ready for loading on the steamer, and scheduled for sailing the next morning at 10:00 a.m., February 17.

Apparently a responsible person in the Department had given the impression to the press that no such shipment had been authorized. As a result, there had been press, radio and Congressional allegations during the afternoon that the shipment was being handled in an improper manner and that the government agencies concerned were not aware of the transaction, or of the policy implications or repercussions.

If the shipment were permanently cancelled, it would unquestionably provoke the Saudi Arabians to the point where our future relations would be seriously jeopardized; they would probably proceed to buy arms from the Soviets; the negotiations for renewal of the Dhahran airbase would be difficult, if not impossible; and vital U.S. resources could be lost.

In the meantime Mr. Hagerty advised me he had wakened the President,² and that the President felt the shipment should be stopped. I did not have an opportunity to talk to the President.

Allen, Gray and I decided to temporarily suspend all valid export licenses of military equipment to Saudi Arabia, Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan for purposes of a review. I so advised Mr. Hagerty, and he issued a statement in Thomasville giving the President’s approval.

Allen and Gray undertook to put the enforcement order into effect with the U.S. Customs.

At a meeting in my office on the morning of February 17, the matter was reviewed by the following members of the Department: Murphy, Henderson, Phleger, Allen, Morton, Hill, and their staffs. A preliminary review of the export licenses indicated that they were not large in amount, and that for the most part they represented transactions initiated during the summer of 1955. A more detailed examination was started, to be completed in the afternoon.

It was agreed that the information officer would merely state “that the entire matter was under review.”

At a meeting late in the afternoon, details of the outstanding export licenses were available. A summary is attached hereto of those which had been issued since August 17, 1955.³

After the examination, it was the strong feeling of all present that the licenses should be reinstated. The Defense Department fully concurred, and a working group was designated to draft a statement overnight.

On Saturday, February 18, I had breakfast with Senator Know–land. I pointed out that the temporary suspension was already having severe repercussions in Saudi Arabia⁴ and we would probably have to release the tanks soon if a major break in our relations was to be avoided. I outlined to him the result of our review. He agreed that we would probably have to take action, and that while there would undoubtedly be criticism from the Zionists, our policy of making a deliberate review would avoid charges of irresponsibility and create the opportunity for a complete statement.

I went over the matter with Senator George in his office during the afternoon. He also agreed that we would probably have to release the tanks and suggested that the President should make a strong statement authorizing the action. When I asked him if he would support the President, he said, “I think so”, but would not definitely commit himself. He proceeded to tell me of his troubles with the Zionists in Georgia.

Senator George believed that the Secretary and I should go before the Foreign Relations Committee in executive session to review the entire Middle East situation soon after the Secretary’s return from vacation. He felt it would be undesirable for me to go alone, before the Secretary got back, as the Committee would want to hear from him in any event. He tentatively fixed the date for Friday afternoon, February 24.⁵ The Senator gave every appearance of cordiality throughout the conversation.

During the afternoon of February 18, a copy of the proposed statement was transmitted to Thomasville. I reached the President by telephone at 6:50 p.m., upon his return from the country. He approved the statement for immediate release and it was handed to the press by the Department at 7:30 p.m.

A copy of the release is attached.⁶

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Israeli Relations 1951–1957. Secret; Personal and Private. In a covering letter dated February 21, Hoover wrote to Dulles:

   “In the attached Memorandum for the Record you will find the story of our troubles with the Saudi Arabian tanks.

   “It probably was inevitable that the subject would break into the open eventually, but I think we have come out of it reasonably well. It is becoming more obvious all the time that we will have to sell the Israelis some defensive arms in the near future, but it can be held off at least until Bob Anderson completes his mission.

   “I hope you are good and strong, after your vacation, for the Under Secretary feels a little beaten up!”

   A marginal notation by Macomber indicates that the Secretary saw Hoover’s letter.

2. According to Dulles, in a memorandum of conversation with the President on March 2, “the President referred, somewhat apologetically, to the Saudi tank matter, saying he had been disturbed all of a sudden in the evening when he was relaxed and going to bed, but that he remembered a good rule in war, which was probably also a good rule in peace, that is, not to disturb carefully thought out plans in a spirit of sudden emergency without calm review of the whole situation.” (Ibid.)
3. Not printed.
4. Telegram 392 to Jidda, February 17, instructed Wadsworth to inform King Saud of the temporary suspension and to assure him that the U.S. Government remained “highly sympathetic” to Saudi requirements and that the suspension was temporary. (Department of State, Central Files, 786A.561/2–1756) Telegram 374 from Jidda, February 18, transmitted the text of a message to this effect which Wadsworth had sent to the King. (Ibid., 786A.561/2–1856)
5. On February 24, Dulles testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on various aspects of the Arab–Israeli question. For text of the Secretary’s statement, see Department of State Bulletin, March 5, 1956, pp. 368–370.
6. Not found attached. For text of the press release, see ibid., February 27, 1956, pp. 325–326.