Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

213. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, January 30, 1956, 4 p.m.¹

ETW MC–2

Washington, January 30, 1956, 4 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• US
  • President Eisenhower
  • Secretary Dulles
  • Under Secretary Hoover
  • Ambassador Aldrich
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. Allen
  • Mr. MacArthur
  • Mr. Bowie
  • Mr. Hagerty
  • Mr. Rountree
  • Mr. Cottman
• UK
  • Prime Minister Eden
  • Foreign Secretary Lloyd
  • Ambassador Makins
  • Sir Harold Caccia
  • Sir Leslie Rowan
  • Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh
  • Mr. Ian Samuel
  • Mr. Willie Morris

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

Saudi–Arabia and Buraimi

Turning to Saudi Arabia, the President inquired how we should proceed. He hoped the respective positions had been properly prepared to narrow the discussion as much as possible.

The Secretary said the Saudi Arab question and the Buraimi dispute were matters which brought forth the greatest difference between the British and Americans. Another issue upon which there was a divergence was trade with Communist China, but he observed that the Arabian matter was far more difficult. The US had good relations with Saudi Arabia and relied heavily upon oil reserves and an American air base in that country. We considered it most important to maintain those good relations. The UK, the Secretary continued, thought its prestige in the whole Middle East and its status in the Arab Sheikhdoms, including Kuwait, depended on its ability to support the Sheikhdoms. Any indication of weakness on its part would place the British position in jeopardy.

In reply to the President’s question, the Secretary identified as the Buraimi dispute the main problem, but also mentioned other disputes including one involving Yemen.

The President remarked that surely the British would not maintain that every mile in every border line in the vast area would be a matter of British prestige.

Mr. Eden referred to the treaty arrangements which Great Britain had with the Arab Sheikhdoms. The British had had to give up many things in the world. Whether this had been wise or not might be questioned; however, the impression had been created that if the British were pushed hard enough they would “be off”. If the British should yield here they would soon be completely out of the Middle East. He observed that when Mr. Churchill and he took office in 1951 the Sultan of Muscat had been prepared to attack Buraimi, but the British had stopped this action and asked him to go to arbitration. The Sultan had done this, but Saudi bribery and corruption had rendered arbitration impossible, and the British could not reasonably suggest to him that he undertake another such effort. Mr. Eden observed the US had vast oil interests on both sides of the lines and that from the point of view of oil it thus was not a British versus an American interest. He had stated in Parliament that the British were prepared to arrive at a settlement, but the basis upon which they were prepared to talk was the so–called Riyadh line (identified on the map).

The President inquired as to the Saudi reaction, to which Mr. Eden replied the Saudis had insisted the matter go back to arbitration.

The President commented the British were in a difficult position from a public relations viewpoint in maintaining that the principle of arbitration should be denied. If this position should be retained, he thought it might encourage many people throughout the world to be recalcitrant. He inquired whether it might be possible for the British to agree to the resumption of arbitration under entirely different auspices so that there would be a fresh start.

Mr. Lloyd responded that any arbitration would involve an effort to determine local loyalties, and since Saudi money had bought so many people in the area they would be prejudiced. No arbitration tribunal could adequately weigh bribery and corruption factors to determine the true situation.

Mr. Eden said he had originally proposed arbitration himself, but that this obviously was not a workable solution.

The President inquired concerning the value of the Buraimi territory itself, aside from the fact that it was important to British prestige and as a crossroads.

Mr. Lloyd responded its main value to the Saudis would be as a vantage point from which the tribes in the whole region could be corrupted.

The President stated that Arab and world opinion should be taken into account. The general public was unaware of the history of British interest in the area. The matter should be considered not only in terms of what is legally the position but also what the world thinks. He mentioned in this connection world opinion reaction to the Goan problem.

Mr. Eden said the military action in the area had been almost entirely a local one; the British in fact had only one company of troops in the vicinity. The Sultan would not willingly go back to arbitration. He had not in the first place wanted to agree to this course but had to be pressed by the British to do so; he would now be more adamant. The Foreign Secretary said the Riyadh line was a very good one and, if accepted by Saudi Arabia, would provide King Saud with more territory than he now possessed.

Mr. Lloyd commented that he had met Mr. Follis, President of the Standard Oil Company of California, aboard the Queen Mary on the trip to New York. In conversations concerning this matter, Mr. Follis had expressed the view it was more of a question of “face” than of substance.

The President observed that if it were a matter of “face” it should be possible to find some satisfactory solution. Perhaps if the King would be willing to receive a British representative to discuss the matter the UK should be prepared to send someone of very high rank. It would be important, also, that he be prepared to be flexible in his discussions.

The President expressed his understanding that the British were acting not only for themselves but for various Sheikhs and Sultans. He inquired whether the King had ever met with them.

Mr. Eden thought he had never met the Sultan of Muscat but that he had met the others involved. He thought they were, in fact, present during the previous arbitration.

Mr. Shuckburgh commented that Muscat was an independent country of which the Sultan was absolute sovereign. There were, however, a number of British advisers employed by the Sultan.

The President inquired what had been done about the British offer to engage in direct talks with the Saudi Arabs.

The Secretary and Mr. Allen said the offer had not been passed on to the Saudi Arabs since the latter had acceded to our suggestion the dispute not be taken to the Security Council, at least until after the current talks.

The President asked how firmly the British positions would be fixed before entering talks with the Saudi Arabs. He observed that one normally did not enter such talks with positions so rigid there would be no degree of flexibility. Could the British be sure, he asked, that the Sultan would go along with a give and take attitude in defining the line?

Mr. Eden responded the British position was that the Riyadh line should be the basis for settlement with only minor rectifications.

The President expressed interest in a British statement that previous negotiations had broken down because the British could not agree to let the Saudi Arabs into certain areas near Qatar which had been demanded. If these areas were not important could not the British, by yielding them, let the Saudi Arabs save face?

Mr. Shuckburgh replied the Saudi Arabs had wanted the area in question primarily because they desired to establish a port there. He thought it not impossible to do something along the lines suggested by the President.

Mr. Eden commented, however, that the area in question might have oil deposits which would render such a decision more difficult.

The President commented that if the British should say they had reviewed their previous position and thought it might have been too rigid, and agree to give the area to the Saudis, it might be very beneficial. Essentially, he said, we were trying to save this area for the West. The American companies had maintained they were not interested in going down into the disputed areas but did so only when the King pressed them.

Mr. Hoover expressed the feeling that if the British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia should talk with the King the latter would have to start from a certain negotiating position, …. The King’s first step, he felt, would be to negotiate for either a settlement or for arbitration. Azzam Pasha, representative here of Saudi Arabia in the Buraimi matter, was in close contact with the King and had the latter’s confidence. Perhaps, it would be very helpful at this juncture, until the groundwork was cleared away, for British talks with the Saudi Arabs to take place through Azzam Pasha.

Mr. Eden while not responding directly to Mr. Hoover’s suggestion, commented a main element of the problem in Saudi Arabia was that the King was surrounded by bad elements.

The President said it was important to find some way of “breaking the log jam”. He considered the removal of this problem to be very important in creating a better situation for the Western Powers. He observed that the Saudi King and his family, the Sultan and the Sheikhs could not stand communism; there must be a line over which they would not step if they knew they would be out of their jobs.

The Secretary remarked these people were highly emotional … . No doubt the present state of UK–Saudi Arab relations was bad and oil revenues were being used harmfully and in a manner which enhanced communist interests. If this particular problem could be removed, the main reason for King Saud’s opposing the British would be eliminated. In this way the situation in the area generally might be greatly improved.

Mr. Eden commented he wished he could believe the Saudi Arabs would behave all right if there were a settlement of the Buraimi dispute. The British did not share this belief.

The Secretary responded he did not suggest the Saudi Arabs would completely renounce their intentions to dominate other areas on the Arabian Peninsula, but repeated his estimate that active Saudi efforts against the British in the Middle East would subside to some extent.

Mr. Eden observed the harmful Saudi actions in the area were not only directed at the British in the Buraimi matter but also were involved in such questions as the Hashemite–Saudi quarrel and Israel.

. . . . . . .

The Secretary said …. When the Secretary was in Saudi Arabia in 1953,²Ibn Saud read to him a letter written by President Truman in 1950 setting forth US interest in the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia and stating that no threat to the Kingdom could occur which would not be a matter of immediate concern to the US. The King had said the British were then threatening the independence and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia and should be thrown out by the US in accordance with President Truman’s assurance.

Mr. Eden reverted to another aspect of the Saudi Arab situation, the use of Saudi money for bribery and corruption throughout the area. If the money should continue to be spent in this way we would continue to be in great trouble.

Mr. Hoover expressed the view that if the Buraimi problem could be solved it might be possible to develop our influence in Saudi Arabia. It would be unrealistic to suppose that Saudi recklessness could be eliminated overnight, but the situation might be mitigated over a period of time.

The President again asked that a good plan be developed for moving ahead. The plan should appeal to us as being logical but it also should be based on the necessity of taking into account world opinion. He emphasized we were dealing with a matter in which the effect of world opinion would be great.

Mr. Eden inquired whether it might be possible for the US to encourage King Saud to get better people around him as his advisers.

Mr. Hoover replied we hoped to do so over a period of time but that this was an extraordinarily difficult problem. He recalled a recent comment by Mr. Davies of ARAMCO to the effect that one of his most difficult times in Saudi Arabia was when he was called to task by King Saud as a result of an ARAMCO official commenting upon how Saudi Arabian revenues should be spent.

Discussion of the Buraimi dispute was concluded with the Secretary’s suggestion that both sides consider the question over night and talk about it at a subsequent meeting.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 648. Secret. Drafted on February 7. No other drafting information is given on the source text.
2. For documentation on the Secretary’s visit to Saudi Arabia, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, pp. 96 ff.