Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

20. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, March 5, 1956—4 p.m.

3718. Re Embtel 3714.² Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick asked me to come and see him this morning to tell me about manner in which Prime Minister is planning to handle situation regarding Jordan in House this afternoon.³ He plans first to chide Jordanians for having treated Glubb in manner they did after so many years of faithful service. Second, it will be stated that all British officers who have executive jobs are going to be withdrawn because they must not have responsibility without authority. All other British personnel will be permitted to remain. As to continuance of subsidy and further steps govt will state matter is under study. General thinking of HMG is that subsidy will undoubtedly ultimately be withdrawn and Arab Legion will disintegrate since most of its crack regiments are Bedouins who are not in sympathy with assumption of command by officers close to King. Kirkpatrick stated that Jordanian who has now been put in command is no more capable of exercising such duties than he Kirkpatrick would be.

Kirkpatrick also said Selwyn Lloyd would take up with Secretary at Karachi⁴ question of re-study of position of HMG and us regarding entire Middle East. What British are thinking about is that Baghdad Pact must be strengthened immediately and I gathered they hope US would now consider becoming a party. I told him I thought matter equally important as strengthening Baghdad Pact was immediate settlement of Buraimi problem because it seemed to me essential to draw Saudi Arabians away from Egyptian influence. Kirkpatrick said he agreed entirely with this and that British were prepared make every effort to reach an agreement on a boundary line between Saudi Arabia and Muskat and Abu Dhabi immediately. If US Govt would express willingness to take action in UN and diplomatically to prevent violation of agreed line by Saudis it would be extremely helpful to British Govt.

He alleged that Brit had twice previously asked action this nature by US and been refused. I pointed out that earlier request (Embtel 2474 Dec 15, 1955⁵) was of quite different import and that while I could not speak definitively for US Govt I would be prepared recommend proposal that US take action diplomatically and through UN re violation of frontier once established which would in any case seem consistent obligations UN Charter.

As indication depth Brit reaction Jordanian developments, believe noteworthy Kirkpatrick remarked his thought is to effect Jordan will eventually be partitioned between Israelis, Saudi Arabs and Egyptians.⁶

Department repeat as desired.

Aldrich

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 741.551/3–556. Top Secret; Niact.
2. On March 5 the Embassy in London informed the Department that the British Government was still in the process of evaluating the significance of Glubb’s dismissal and had come to no decision on the future of British policy with regard to Jordan or on the continuance of the subsidy of the Arab Legion. The Prime Minister’s expected statement in the House of Commons later that afternoon, the Embassy noted, would be little more than a “stop-gap”. (Telegram 3714; ibid., 741.551/3–556)
3. For text of Eden’s remarks, see Hansard’will seek to minimize the dismissal ofs Parliamentary Debates, March 5, 1956, cols. 1719–1725.
4. Between March 6 and 8, Dulles attended the second meeting of the SEATO Council in Karachi. Telegram 3718 was repeated to Karachi as Tosec 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 741.551/3–556)
5. Document 146.
6. On March 9, the Embassy in London reported that Foreign Office officials were unable to find evidence that either the Saudis or Egyptians were involved in instigating the dismissal of Glubb. According to Foreign Office sources it was more likely that the dismissal resulted from internal factors, particularly Hussein’s desire to effect a “personal coup”. According to the Embassy, the British did admit that external influences such as Egyptian radio broadcasts did have some effect. Foreign Office officials also noted that the Jordanians apparently believed that they could remove Glubb and other British officers without affecting Jordan’s treaty relations with the United Kingdom. According to the Embassy, the Foreign Office was also concerned about the repercussions of anti-British developments in Jordan on the British position in the Persian Gulf. (Telegram 3834; Department of State, Central Files, 641.85/3–956)