143. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 17, 19571
SUBJECT
- Lebanon
PARTICIPANTS
- Dr. Charles Malik, Lebanese Foreign Minister
- Dr. Victor A. Khouri, Lebanese Ambassador
- The Secretary
- NEA—William M. Rountree
- NE—Stuart W. Rockwell
Dr. Malik said the situation in Lebanon is not happy.2 The opposition is the tool of Egypt and Syria and is facilitating the growth of neutralism. The Soviet earth satellite has had much to do with promoting neutralism, but the Secretary’s statement on October 16 was very helpful in rekindling confidence in the United States.3 President Chamoun must be encouraged to hold firm both by pointing out the affirmative aspects of so doing and the negative ones of not doing so.
Dr. Malik thought that U.S. economic assistance to Lebanon must be considerably increased. … In the military field, Dr. Malik appealed for quick delivery of the gendarmérie equipment and the 12 jet fighter planes desired by the Lebanese Government.4
Dr. Malik said that the opposition was pressing the Government to alter its adherence to the Eisenhower Doctrine. He had need of clarification in writing of certain questions asked by the opposition.
[Page 220]. . . . . . .
The gendarmérie equipment was going forward. The Secretary questioned the need for the 12 jet planes, and Dr. Malik said he really did not know why they were needed; his Government kept pressing for them, however. The Secretary said of course we wanted to be helpful.
The Secretary then discussed the false myth being created that the Eisenhower Doctrine seeks to force people to choose sides. The truth is that the Doctrine was designed to put us in a position to help in preserving the independence of the Middle East states. We had no objection if states desired to be neutral as long as they were truly neutral.
The Secretary gave Dr. Malik a draft of a letter from the Secretary providing responses to the questions asked by the Lebanese opposition which the Secretary offered to send if Dr. Malik desired.5 Dr. Malik expressed his appreciation and said he would study the draft and let Mr. Rountree know whether he wished to receive it.6
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/10–1757. Top Secret. Drafted by Rockwell on October 18.↩
- On October 12, the Department informed the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations that, among other things, “our reports from Beirut, based on Ambassador Heath’s conversations with GOL leaders, indicate that situation can be kept in hand. While we do not wish minimize seriousness of problem our impression is that situation might not be so grave as Malik appears to fear.” (Telegram 349 to New York; Ibid., 783A.00/10–1257)↩
- Reference is presumably to Dulles’ news conference of October 16, during which he noted that the Soviet Earth satellite success would benefit the United States by avoiding any possible complacency that might arise due to the “very marked superiority” of American military power. (Department of State Bulletin, November 4, 1957, p. 708)↩
- CX 106 from Beirut, August 22, dealt with the Lebanese Army’s request for military equipment during fiscal year 1958. Among the items requested were 12 Sabre jets. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.56/8–2157)↩
- The draft letter, October 17, is Ibid., NEA Files: Lot 59 D 582, U.S.-Lebanon Relations.↩
- After several modifications, the letter was accepted by Malik. (Instruction A–89 to Beirut, November 14; Ibid., Central Files, 611.83A/11–1457) For text of the letter as modified, see infra. ↩