Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

127. Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee¹

J.C.S. 2099/621

Washington, May 8, 1956.

REQUEST FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON FOR THE SALE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES

The Problem

1. In response to a request² by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), to review four lists³ of equipment which the Government of Lebanon desires to purchase from the United States and to recommend:

a. Whether the items concerned should be approved for sale to Lebanon.

b. Suitable substitutes where appropriate.

c. Reasons, if approval or suitable substitutes are not recommended.

d. Any other considerations concerning the transactions, the country, or the area, as deemed appropriate.

Facts Bearing on the Problem

2. The Department of State has requested² the Department of Defense to furnish pricing and availability information on four lists of military equipment which the Government of Lebanon desires to purchase from the Government of the United States.

3. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) stated² that “the current policy of the United States is to sell only those arms to the countries of the Near East, involved in the present Arab-Israel dispute, for internal security and legitimate self-defense. In addition, the over-all policy with respect to this area is under urgent review by the National Security Council.”

4. The National Intelligence Advisory Committee (NIAC) has stated⁴ that:

a. Lebanon is heavily dependent on the West because of its trade patterns and the conviction of its Christian elements that friendly relations with the West are necessary to continued Lebanese independence and to their own survival in a Moslem world. Lebanon has accordingly temporized in the present controversy in the hope that a solution will be found which will preserve some degree of Arab unity while permitting beneficial relations between Arab States and the United States and United Kingdom.

b. Lebanon will probably try to stay out of the Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia (ESS) Pact so long as the pact is not open to Iraq. Lebanon would strongly be tempted to join the pact if this appeared the best way of assuring its continued independence.

5. For additional facts bearing on the problem, see Enclosure “B”.

Discussion

6. Lebanon has a valid requirement for the weapons requested to provide for her self defense. If Lebanon cannot obtain arms from the West, she may seek to obtain arms from the Soviet Bloc or feel obliged to join the ESS Pact in order to purchase arms from Egypt. Either action would be detrimental to U.S. interests, including the maintenance of peace in the Near East.

7. For additional Discussion, see Enclosure “C”.

Conclusion

8. From a military viewpoint, the arms and equipment requested should be made available for sale to Lebanon.

Recommendations

9. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff forward the memorandum in Enclosure “A”, which reflects the above conclusion, to the Secretary of Defense.

10. No recommendation is made as to the distribution of this paper to commanders of unified or specified commands.

[Here follow Enclosure “A,” a draft memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommending that the arms equipment listed in the April 13 memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) be approved for sale to Lebanon; and Enclosure “B,” a statement of the facts bearing on the problem of the Lebanese arms purchase request.]

Enclosure “C”

Discussion

1. Lebanon is not a member of the ESS Pact but could become involved in hostilities with Israel in event of general conflict between the Arab States and Israel. However, it is believed that Lebanon will stay out of the ESS Pact and avoid war with Israel if possible. If Lebanon were to join the ESS Pact, the solidarity, and to some extent the strength, of the ESS Pact would be increased with a resultant increase in the threat of an Arab offensive against Israel. It is therefore in the interest of the United States to encourage Lebanon to maintain her independence outside the ESS Pact.

2. Providing arms to Lebanon would increase the total military capabilities of the Arab States if Lebanon subsequently joined the ESS Pact. It appears, however, that if the United States provides arms to Lebanon it probably would increase rather than decrease Lebanon’s determination to stay out of the ESS Pact. Furthermore, under the terms of the U.S.–Lebanon MDA Agreement,⁵ Lebanon has given assurance she will not undertake any act of aggression, or sell or transfer weapons received under the terms of the Agreement without the consent of the United States.

3. Lebanese military forces have no offensive capabilities and a very limited defensive capability. The weakness of Lebanon could tempt either Syria or Israel to overrun Lebanon as an avenue of attack on the other, or might lead Lebanon to join the ESS Pact in an effort to preserve her independence.

4. If the United States were to sell Lebanon the arms requested,⁶ it would increase the ability of Lebanon to maintain its independence outside the ESS Pact and reduce the possibility that Lebanon will seek arms from the Soviet bloc. It would improve U.S.-Lebanese relations and facilitate the acquisition by the United States of base rights⁷ in Lebanon.

5. While providing arms to Lebanon would involve the risk that Israel would use this as a pretext for initiating hostilities, it would have the beneficial effect of demonstrating our willingness to support moderate nations in the Near East and would serve to encourage Jordan, as well as Lebanon, to maintain a policy of moderation in the current crisis.⁸

1. Source: National Archives and Records Service, JCS Records, CCS 092 (8–22–46)(2) Sec. 29. Secret. Transmitted by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on May 8. The recommendation in paragraph nine was approved by the Joint Chiefs at their meeting of May 23, 1956.
2. Dated 13 April 1956; Enclosure to J.C.S. 2099/611. [Footnote in the source text. J.C.S. 2099/611 is not printed.]
3. Appendices “A”, “B”, “C” and “D”, to J.C.S. 2099/611. [Footnote in the source text. None printed.]
2. Dated 13 April 1956; Enclosure to J.C.S. 2099/611. [Footnote in the source text. J.C.S. 2099/611 is not printed.]
2. Dated 13 April 1956; Enclosure to J.C.S. 2099/611. [Footnote in the source text. J.C.S. 2099/611 is not printed.]
4. NIE 30–55, dated 21 June 1955; on file in Joint Secretariat. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. On file in Joint Secretariat. [Footnote in the source text. For text of this agreement, see TIAS 3147; 5 UST (pt. 3) 2908.]
6. See Enclosure to J.C.S. 2099/611. [Footnote in the source text. J.C.S. 2099/611 is not printed.]
7. See Enclosure “B” to J.C.S. 570/377. [Footnote in the source text. J.C.S. 570/377 is not printed.]

8. On May 23, in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, Admiral Radford stated:

   “It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Lebanon has a valid requirement for the weapons requested to provide for its self-defense. If Lebanon cannot obtain arms from the West, she may seek to obtain arms from the Soviet Bloc or feel obliged to join the Egypt-Syria-Saudi Arabia (ESS) Pact in order to purchase arms from Egypt. Either action would be detrimental to U.S. interests including the maintenance of peace in the Near East.

   “It is the further view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that making these weapons available under the provisions of Section 106 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, would have the beneficial effect of demonstrating the willingness of the United States to assist nations in the Near East which are oriented to the West and moderate in their actions. In addition this action should improve U.S.–Lebanese relations and facilitate the acquisition by the United States of base rights in Lebanon.” (National Archives and Records Service, JCS Records, CCS 092 (8–22–46)(2) Sec. 29)