Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

123. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State¹

Beirut, January 21, 1956—3 p.m.

813. President has informed Embassy military talks with Syria postponed at least two weeks following yesterday’s meeting Prime Minister Ghazzi.²

President told Embassy informant Lebanon not fearful Israeli attack, more concerned Syrian situation, particularly growing Communist influence Army other circles. This connection President made further plea for US arms sales at low prices. Said negative answer would be serious blow Lebanon and his own position.

Embassy reiterates recommendations special efforts be made offer GOL arms on attractive conditions through combination economic aid or other arrangements as suggested previous telegrams.

We believe mistake if we too complacent over Lebanon’s position this area. Communist offensive not without effect here in face already deteriorating position West due lack settlement Arab-Israeli problem with all that implies plus intensified Syrian-Saudi pressure.

Believe we still have opportunity here make example Lebanon as country aligned with and supported by West. However, such result is not at all foregone conclusion and will be difficult achieve. Military cooperation would produce good effect tend counteract prevalent unfortunate feeling US responds quickest most generously countries who flirt with Communists (Egypt).

In context actions other Near East countries which may be contemplated believe we should simultaneously make efforts strengthen our position here which would be relatively inexpensive and we believe completely justified. Test will be response Lebanon arms request which if negative will make efforts achieve Lebanon’s cooperation with our policies in area most difficult and will alienate President and affect his prestige in country.

Embassy believes we must regard all our programs Lebanon as political in objective. Consequently forms of aid less important than kind of result to be accomplished. Believe ICA program should be given new look in this framework. Embassy prepared make suggestions later communications.

Believe decision arms sales need not be hurried … but all avenues offering possibility favorable response should be explored.³

Emmerson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783A.56/1–2156. Secret.
2. According to Emmerson, Chamoun told him on January 6 that Ghazzi was coming to Beirut to demand that Lebanon enter into a military agreement which would effectively subordinate the Lebanese Army to Egyptian command. (Despatch 293, January 16; Ibid., 780.00/1–1656)
3. On January 23, the Department noted that it was puzzled as to the motives inspiring the Lebanese request for American arms, since Lebanon had hitherto largely used other sources of arms supplies. The Department further stated that Ambassador Khouri had said that other unnamed countries had offered lower prices than the United States for arms. It requested the Embassy to ascertain the reasons behind the Lebanese request. (Telegram 1160 to Beirut; Ibid., 783A.56/1–2156)