115. Memorandum of a Conversation, Lebanese Embassy, Washington, February 24, 19552

SUBJECT

  • President Chamoun’s Reaction to the Department’s Answers to the Four Questions Posed by Ambassador Malik on Instructions3

PARTICIPANTS

  • Dr. Charles Malik, Ambassador of Lebanon
  • NE—Mr. Hart
  • NE—Mr. Francis Allen

Ambassador Malik telephoned Mr. Hart, urgently asking that he and Mr. Francis Allen call at the Embassy to hear an urgent message he had just received from his Government. Upon arrival at the Embassy, Ambassador Malik explained that he had received from the Lebanese Foreign Office one of the strongest messages that had ever been sent him, which he, judging by its phraseology, believed had been drafted by President Chamoun himself. The message consisted of the Lebanese Government’s reaction to the Department’s [Page 171] answers to the four questions posed by Ambassador Malik on instructions which had been given to the Ambassador by Assistant Secretary Allen on February 22. The gist of the message was as follows:

The Government of Lebanon deeply regrets the “frigidity and immovability” of United States policy as regards Lebanon’s “needs” during this crucial period in the Near East. Lebanon has for years consistently acted in ways friendly to the United States and has supported United States policy to a notable extent. It has proved its desire to maintain peace in the Near East. It has gone as far as is possible in the direction of American policy in the matter of organizing the defense of the Middle East, and especially as regards the conclusion of the Turkey-Iraq pact.4 Lebanon is continuing to do what it can to ensure that the Arab states “agree” to this pact, or at least that they do not oppose it. Similarly, Lebanon has been helpful as regards the Unified Plan for the Jordan River.5 In sum, there has never been any doubt as regards Lebanon’s position “at the side of the West”, especially the United States; or about Lebanon’s readiness to offer all assistance, in case of emergency, to the Western powers.

Despite all this, and other things such as Lebanon’s constant support of the U.S. in the United Nations, the U.S. persists in granting only small quantities of aid to Lebanon. The Lebanese Government is seriously concerned that the United States insists that before it can extend military aid or significant economic aid to the Lebanon, three conditions must be met; namely, significant improvement in Arab-Israel relations; further development of the Northern Tier; and Lebanon’s joining the Northern Tier. These conditions were not made when the United States offered military aid to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In the case of Egypt, the United States did not require improvement in Arab-Israel relations; and the U.S. offered military aid to Saudi Arabia without requiring that Saudi Arabia do anything about the Northern Tier.

Ambassador Malik is instructed to take up “frankly and definitively” with the U.S. Government this matter of U.S. assistance to Lebanon, with special emphasis on the following vital point: the giving of aid by the U.S. helps to lead the Arab states “to cooperate positively with the U.S.” at this crucial stage when the refusal of the [Page 172] Arab states to cooperate “may cause their permanent withdrawal from support of the U.S.”

President Chamoun, the message continued, had been asked by Salah Salem to be the “spokesman of all the Arab states” in discussing the whole matter of Middle East defense with the Western powers. Ambassador Malik is instructed to invite Secretary Dulles to visit President Chamoun in Beirut on his return from Bangkok to discuss the question of cooperation between the U.S. and the Arab states. The message concluded with an instruction to Ambassador Malik to return to Beirut “immediately” on consultation.

In subsequent general discussion of the message, Dr. Malik expressed “personally” the following views as to the possible reasons for this unusually strong approach. The Government of Lebanon is probably under very strong pressure from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, France, local extreme nationalists, pro-Egyptian and pro-Saudi elements, leftists and communists to go along with the Egyptians, Saudis and the Syrians in opposing the Turkey-Iran agreement, the “Northern Tier” and Western ideas for the defense of the area. He had no recent information about what is going on in Lebanon, but he suspected that President Chamoun and his supporters fear that pressures may be building up similar to those in Syria which have had the effect of drastically changing Syrian policy in a way unfavorable to Western interests. The present regime in Lebanon may fear that it is “sticking its neck out” on matters of importance to Western and U.S. policy in the area against strong opposition from neighboring states and possibly from France. Elements in Lebanon hostile to the Chamoun regime, possibly supported by these outside influences, might take action against Chamoun. In this situation Chamoun, who has been notably cooperative in working with the United States may well feel irritated and isolated, having nothing whatsoever from the U.S. to indicate that we are willing in any way to give “special” help and support to Lebanon which has so consistently given support to the U.S. and U.S. policies.

Apart from Chamoun’s own personal position, the Ambassador said, Christian Lebanon as a whole now feels isolated, with the possibility of an impending break-up of the Arab League which in its “protocol” and charter guaranteed Lebanon’s independence. The Lebanese Christians are wondering whether they may not have moved from a real degree of autonomy under the Ottoman Turks, and later under the French, into a situation under the “Pax Americana” or “Pax Anglo-Saxonica” in which they will, without any effort on our part to help them, be swallowed up by the neighboring Moslem states.

[Page 173]

Ambassador Malik said regarding his instructions to return to Beirut, that it would be very awkward for him to return with nothing new to report to President Chamoun other than our “negative” policy as already reported by him following his recent conversations with Mr. Jernegan and Assistant Secretary Allen.6 He hoped that the Department could be persuaded to give a more favorable response to Lebanon’s requests for aid prior to his impending departure.

Mr. Hart replied that he was sure the Department would give careful consideration to the Government of Lebanon’s message and the Ambassador’s request, but he did not believe it likely that there would be any significant change in the near future in our policy as regards the matter of aid for Lebanon as outlined to him in recent conversations in the Department. Mr. Hart said that we would seek immediately to reply to President Chamoun’s kind invitation to Secretary Dulles to visit Beirut. (Ambassador Malik was informed on February 26 that the Secretary was unfortunately not able to accept the invitation.)

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/2–2455. Confidential. Drafted by Allen.
  2. Malik had originally put forward five questions in a meeting with Secretary Dulles on February 9. The first question, concerning the connection between United States military aid and an improvement in Arab-Israeli relations, was answered by Assistant Secretary George V. Allen in another conversation with Malik on February 9. Allen stated that while the United States could not spell out preconditions to its military aid, it hoped for a general reduction in Arab-Israeli tensions. Allen also emphasized the value of a regional defense organization to Lebanon’s independence. (Memorandum of conversation by Allen, February 9; Ibid., 780.5/2–955) Allen answered the other four questions on February 22. He told Malik that American military aid could not be extended to Lebanon until Lebanon adhered to the “Northern Tier” defense organization, and until Arab-Israeli tensions were lowered. Allen also stated that the United States did not envisage a large-scale program of economic aid to Lebanon under existing conditions.
  3. On February 24, Iraq and Turkey signed a 5-year Pact of Mutual Cooperation (the Baghdad Pact). For text, see United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 233, p. 199. The Pact was subsequently adhered to by the United Kingdom on April 5, Pakistan on September 23, and Iran on November 3.
  4. Reference is to The Unified Development of the Water Resources of the Jordan Valley Region, a plan prepared at the request of UNRWA, under the direction of the Tennessee Valley Authority, by Charles T. Main, Inc. (Boston, 1953).
  5. Malik met with Jernegan on February 4; a memorandum of conversation of that date by Francis O. Allen is in Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/2–455.