Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

107. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State¹

Amman, November 13, 1957—2 p.m.

975. References: Deptels 1136² and 1143,³ London 2985⁴ to Department 13 to Amman.

Have had several talks with British Ambassador on topics above telegrams. We had at first agreed to jointly defer eliciting news King Hussein until return Ambassador Mallory tomorrow. However, UK Ambassador now has instructions from London to proceed, and is seeing King Hussein noon today. Although my relations with Hussein good, … I feel best have US contact with King on this subject wait his return.

Our estimate consequences various types US–UK military intervention in Jordan will go forward tomorrow. In this connection Ambassador Johnston now thinking in part along following lines:

(1) Crisis in Jordan probably exaggerated. Country outwardly calm and although dissatisfaction with composition Hashem-Rifai Government and some its policies growing, situation only little more fragile than has been case since Communist successes in Syria. Report of growing dissatisfaction in Jordan Arab Army apparently largely confined to individual officers on west bank previously associated with free officer movement. (USARMA has nothing to confirm such reports.)

(2) Main threat to stability in Jordan is now, as it has been since April, possibility King Hussein be assassinated. Likelihood this increased by provocative Egyptian-Syrian broadcasts but at same time unusual precautions being taken to safeguard King.

(3) Second threat comes from possibility of uprising in Army. This not likely however and Royal Guards regiment under command Sherif Nasser with best equipment and most loyal elements in Army now stationed in and around Amman designed to prevent coup of type attempted by Nuwwar Saturday, April 13.

(4) Ambassador Johnston feels that if King assassinated it should be possible form regency council around King’s younger brother Mohammed with mother Zein in background, and strong hand such as that Samir Rifai at helm. He feels such government could take care of internal disorders.

(5) If group sometimes referred to as Jordanian Government in exile should move into Jordan with limited support from Syrian military, British Ambassador believes Iraqis and Saudis with Iraq playing leading role, should be able to handle situation.

(6) If Syrians throw in more substantial forces he feels Iraqis and Saudis would probably need logistical support from UK and US which he thinks would be sufficient to turn tide. British Ambassador however feels if this not enough pro-western air support might be needed, and that this should be provided jointly by UK-US.

Ambassador Johnston noted that in case of rapid outbreak civil war here it might be necessary to bring in some UK paratroopers to protect the British community. He felt worth exploring the possibility that such troops, along with any US Marines which might have been brought into Jordan to protect US citizens here, might be used in limited support of Jordanian forces in Amman area. Other than this he felt no western ground support should be deployed here.

In conclusion he felt that successful coup now in Jordan would be sure to result in Nabulsi type government run by Rimawi, Irshaida and Nuwwar, with Nabulsi as spokesman. It would be strongly anti-western, pro-Syrian and pro-Russian.

Sanger

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/11–1357. Top Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Repeated to London.
2. Not printed.
3. In telegram 1143 to Amman, November 12, the Department informed the Embassy that the British Embassy had inquired whether the approach contained in telegram 1136 should be postponed until Mallory returned to Amman or whether the British Ambassador should make it on behalf of the United States and the United Kingdom. The Department added that it had suggested that in view of the urgency of the subject the British Ambassador should proceed. (Department of State, Central Files, 785.00/11–1257)
4. In telegram 2985 from London, November 12, the Embassy informed the Department, among other things, that Lloyd had expressed serious concern about the possibility of an Egyptian-Syrian coup in Jordan. (Ibid.)