Office of the Historian

103. Letter From the President to the Secretary of State1

Washington, August 7, 1957.

DEAR FOSTER: I notice in the Department of State’s summary of August sixth a statement to the effect that we have a reluctance to allow the Jordan government so-called “offensive weapons.”2

I have little faith in distinctions of this kind. A weapon can probably not be classed as defensive or offensive except upon the basis of the identification of the original aggressor. I have a feeling that we can frequently destroy some of the value of our aid by being too restrictive as to quality and type.

Of course I do most heartily approve our restriction that weapons provided by us may be used only for defensive purposes; so if the receiving nation becomes identified as an aggressor, we will support the other side.

In any event, to be specific, I certainly do not blame King Hussein for wanting some modern tanks.

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I tried to call you on the phone but they reported you had gone out to Walter Reed. We can talk about the matter at your convenience.3

D.E.
  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memos. Personal.↩
  2. On August 2 a joint State-Defense message informed the Embassy at Amman that the United States was unable to furnish the heavy offensive weaponry which the Jordanians were requesting. U.s. supply of M–47 tanks and 155mm. guns, the Department added, would produce “seriously unfavorable” Israeli reaction; generate demand for a continuous supply for spare parts and other new U.S. equipment; and would be extravagant in view of Jordan’s present financial condition. (Telegram 230; Department of State, Central Files, 785.56/8–257) On August 5 Mallory, replying to telegram 230, informed the Department, among other things, “For army to be left begging while everyone around is getting new and better weapons creates severe problems of morale and professional pride within the forces especially the officer group. We must be most careful not to trigger a change in political line-up of the Arab states by restrictions on particular kind of hardware. If Jordan doesn’t get the tanks we can surely expect a very severe reaction.” (Telegram 203 from Amman; Ibid., 785.56/8–557)↩

  3. On August 7, during the course of a telephone conversation with the President, Dulles raised the question of military equipment for Jordan. The transcript of the telephone conversation includes the following:

    “Sec. said he had received his note of today about arms for Jordan. The Sec. said that the cable summary was a little misleading. What we don’t want to do is to give heavy tanks to Jordan. If we do that it will raise complete hell with Israel and we will have to send a lot of heavy equipment that in turn will make more trouble with the Arab States. The Pres. said that made sense. You don’t want to do it for Jordan because of the Syrian trouble. Sec. said we had taken the position with Israel we would not give heavy equipment to her Arab neighbors. Sec. said we don’t think they have anything as heavy as these tanks. Pres. said he didn’t want to put this fellow in a hole who so far had shown courage and was on our side.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)

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