101. Editorial Note

On July 12, during the course of a meeting between Prime Minister Suhrawardy of Pakistan and Secretary Dulles, Dulles raised [Page 153] the subject of the Prime Minister’s forthcoming visit to Jordan. The discussion then turned to the overall situation in the Hashemite Kingdom. The memorandum of conversation includes the following discussion:

“The Secretary observed that we attach much importance to the Prime Minister’s prospective visit to King Hussein and the Prime Minister asked what he should tell Hussein. He stated that President Eisenhower had told him we had had difficulty in finding money for Jordan. According to Mr. Suhrawardy, Jordanian representatives had been telling him that Jordan would look to the US for money.

“The Secretary agreed that the situation of the Jordanians was serious. The US would not wish them to fall back into the clutches of Egypt. Neither could we give them money indefinitely. The British had withdrawn their subsidy partly because it represented a drain upon their resources. The US simply could not try to balance the budget of every country with financial difficulties.

“Jordan had never been a viable state, the Secretary continued. Ernest Bevin had told him with much satisfaction of the creation of Jordan; it was to be a British base to remain useful after Suez had gone. Clever plans such as this one sometimes failed to work out. People got independence-minded. Jordan’s only source of income was the rental of its real estate for military bases.

“Mr. Suhrawardy observed that the Jordanians could rent their real estate to Russia or Egypt, to whom it would be most useful.

“The Secretary declared that the fact that the US had found $30 million for the Jordanians showed that we were serious about Jordan but that we could not supply funds indefinitely.

“The Secretary suggested that Mr. Suhrawardy tell Hussein he had acted with courage and skill and with good judgment in his choice of people to rely on. We showed our sympathy at a time Hussein was afraid of foreign intervention by sending our fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean. But neither a fleet nor money constituted a permanent solution of Jordan’s problems and the US would welcome suggestions from Mr. Suhrawardy and from King Hussein as to what the future of Jordan should be. The Prime Minister put forward the thesis that there should be a federation of Jordan with Iraq to form a ‘greater Iraq’. Faisal and Hussein might rule jointly.

“The Secretary asked how King Hussein sees his own future and emphasized that he would like to have Mr. Suhrawardy’s conclusions after his visit to Amman. Mr. Suhrawardy said he would ask King Hussein for his views concerning the future. The Secretary urged that the US and Pakistan work together in the matter.

“The Secretary said that Jordan is wretchedly poor. Perhaps development of water resources or settlement of refugee problems would help. Mr. Rountree concurred, noting that with less population Jordan could be made viable but that there did not seem to be the possibility of enabling Jordan to support its present population, including refugees. The Secretary observed that the refugees were a continuing menace to the stability of Jordan. Mr. Suhrawardy responded that the refugees lived on the hope of returning to Palestine. The US position had been set forth in an August 1955 address [Page 154] made by Secretary Dulles, a copy of which was made available to the Prime Minister.”

In addition to the subject of Jordan, the conversation touched on the Baghdad Pact, the Arab-Israeli question, and the problem of Aqaba. (Memorandum of conversation, July 12, by John M. Howison and Charles D. Withers of the Office of South Asian Affairs; Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 890)