Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

51. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 24, 1955¹

Washington, June 24, 1955

SUBJECT

• Middle East Defense

PARTICIPANTS

• The Under Secretary
  • Mr. Murphy
  • Mr. Elbrick, EUR
  • Mr. Mathews, S/P
  • Mr. Dixon, NEA
• Observers:
  • Mr. Roger Ernst, Defense
  • Col. George T. Powers, 3rd, JCS
• The British Ambassador
  • Mr. Ronald Bailey, British Embassy
  • Col. Fitzgeorge-Balfour, British
  • Representative, NATO

As the Under Secretary was delayed by other business Mr. Murphy opened the meeting at 2:40 p.m. and suggested that the Ambassador continue his exposition of UK views.

Agenda Item 3: The Political Factors in the Establishment of a Defense Organization (Continued)

The Ambassador referred to the problem of Turk-Iraqi relations, pointing out that the Iraqis still had lingering suspicions of the Turks. [4½ lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (3½ lines of source text) not declassified] The Ambassador then turned to Syria. Opinions concerning the Turco-Iraqi Pact in that country are divided. Leftist elements and the Army are opposed to the Pact, the Army because of its fears of a Syrian-Iraqi union and of a weakening of Arab concentration on the Israeli issue. The UK would like to see Syria in the Pact but considers that there is not much chance of this now. [1½ lines of source text not declassified]

In order to reduce Syrian opposition to the Pact it will be necessary for Iraq to give Syria assurances that it has no designs on the latter country. The UK has already passed on to Syria assurances which it has obtained from the Iraqis, but direct assurances from Iraq to Syria are necessary. The UK is continuing efforts to persuade Iraq to give these assurances.

The French have been intriguing in Syria against the Turco-Iraqi Pact and against the UK. The situation has improved recently and the French have assured the UK that they are working with and not against the Pact in Syria. The UK will continue to press France to show a positive attitude toward the Pact and hopes that the US will do the same.

The Ambassador next discussed Lebanon, which was originally favorable to the Turco-Iraqi Pact but has since cooled off owing to pressure from Egypt and Syria. However, if the US and UK were to urge Lebanon to enter the Pact it would probably do so. As there would, however, be little military advantage in Lebanese adherence, the UK is not disposed to pressure Lebanon. It considers that what is needed is a holding operation to insure that Lebanon does not cool off even more.

As regards Jordan, the Ambassador said that its reactions to the Pact had been lukewarm at the outset. There had been some criticism of Iraq for getting out of step with the other Arab states. Jordan has taken the position that although it remains faithful to its existing alliances with Iraq, the Arab League and the UK, it does not wish to make a choice between Egypt and Iraq. The UK has not pressed Jordan to adhere but has indicated that if it did so the UK would be prepared to replace the present Anglo-Jordanian Treaty with a new agreement under the Turco-Iraqi Pact.

In summary, the UK considers that pressure should not be applied on Syria, Lebanon and Jordan to adhere to the Turco-Iraqi Pact at least until Pakistan has joined the Pact. The Ambassador said that this does not mean that the UK considered it necessary to press these three countries immediately after the Pakistani entry. The important thing was to prevent the growth of further opposition to the Pact. It should also be borne in mind that if the momentum behind the Pact fails the US and UK may have to press Lebanon and Jordan to join.

The UK considers the Egyptian situation to be very difficult and complex, but continues to regard bases in an Egypt friendly to the West and committed to Middle East defense as useful. It assumes that the US holds the same view and would like to have this confirmed in the present talks.

Egypt is working against the Turco-Iraqi Pact. The UK ascribes this in part to wounded vanity but a more important factor is that Nasser had wanted to move slowly in bringing Egypt into closer association with the West and the creation of the Turco-Iraqi Pact was premature in terms of his timetable. He considers that the Arabs are not yet prepared for the type of close association with the West implicit in the Turco-Iraqi Pact. A further factor is that the neutralist point of view to which, Nasser was exposed at Bandung has had some effect on his attitude.

ESS has been the Egyptian reaction to the Turco-Iraqi Pact. The UK is not disposed to waver in its support of the Pact because of Egypt’s attitude. It would like Egypt to accede to the Pact and would contemplate giving Egypt a role commensurate with its position in the Middle East and its desire for prestige. The UK would not, however, weaken its support of Iraq to obtain Egyptian accession. In conclusion, the Ambassador pointed to the obvious importance of Israeli-Arab relations in determining the Egyptian position and emphasized the UK desire to maintain the Nasser regime in power.

Mr. Murphy inquired whether the UK thought that the Egyptians are now pushing ESS gently. The Ambassador and Mr. Bailey responded in the sense that difficulties have arisen with respect to ESS, particularly as Syria is demanding economic benefits which Egypt does not wish to give.

The Ambassador pointed out that despite Israel’s good military capability, it was obviously impossible for Israel to join the Turco-Iraqi Pact unless and until Arab-Israeli relations were much better. A minimum difficulty is the lack of diplomatic relations with Iraq. In any case the Israelis do not like the Pact and want the US and UK to enter defense arrangements with Israel. The UK has endeavored, without much success, to persuade the Israelis that the Pact is in their interest as it focuses attention on the USSR and away from Israel. The US and UK are currently working together on the basic problem of trying to improve Arab-Israeli relations. In the meantime it is the UK view that both the US and the UK should stay away from any defense arrangements with Israel.

Mr. Murphy commented that the US had been struck by indications that France was shifting its favors from the Arabs to the Israelis and asked how far, in the UK view, this was going. The Ambassador said that France was making quite an effort in Israel. It was supplying jet planes and tanks to the Israelis. In the UK view this was simply another attempt to bolster French presence in the Middle East. The French had apparently been able to move closer to Israel without damaging their relations with Syria.

In discussing the UK role in Middle East defense the Ambassador pointed out that the main responsibility for area security had in the past fallen on the UK. It had no desire for an exclusive position in this field and it was a central point of UK policy to enlist US support. Increased US interest in Middle East defense was welcomed. The fact remains that the UK is at present the only Western power with binding defense commitments in the area and combat personnel on the ground. In response to a query from Mr. Murphy the Ambassador and Col. Balfour indicated that at the present time the UK had in the general Middle East area one and one-half divisions plus two brigades and odd bits and pieces of ground forces. These would, over the next year or so, phase down to about one division. The UK also maintains air and naval forces in the area.

As regards the US, the Ambassador said that the UK would welcome a US sharing of UK commitments through adherence to the Turco-Iraqi Pact. The UK recognizes the difficulties for the US but considers it important that the US eventually accede to the Pact so as to play a greater part in the defense of the Middle East in peace and in war. As long as the US is not in the Pact, and despite existing US bilateral arrangements with certain of the area countries, there will exist a serious gap in the defense structure.

The French, the Ambassador said, are now standing aside in contrast to their past opposition to the Turco-Iraqi Pact. In principle, France supports the concept of collective defense in the Middle East but it has disliked the repercussions caused by the Pact. Moreover, it is the UK view that the French have subordinated their “support in principle” to narrower French interest in the Levant. Turkey and Iraq do not favor French accession to their Pact. The Turks have said that French accession should be conditioned on prior adherence by Syria and Lebanon. In response to a query by Mr. Murphy, the Ambassador said that he assumed that the Iraqi opposition to French adherence was based upon the fact that France was too far removed from the area and that French North African policy was distateful. The Ambassador had no definite information as to the basis of the Turkish attitude but assumed the Turks felt that France had little to offer a Middle East defense organization in the way of forces.

It is the UK view that the US and UK should take no initiative to bring France into the Turco-Iraqi Pact. In the long run, and should Syria and Lebanon adhere, the UK would not wish to keep the French out, although this attitude is based more on the need for Western solidarity than on any anticipation that the French would make a significant contribution to Middle East defense.

In response to a query by Mr. Dixon as to the UK view on the participation of certain other countries, the Ambassador said that the UK does not cast Saudi Arabia for a role in the Turco-Iraqi Pact in view of its anti-Hashemite bias and the fact that it is very much on the periphery of the Middle East defense area. The accession of Greece or Italy to the Pact would add nothing. South Africa was more interested in the defense of the area south of the Sahara than of the Middle East. In any case the UK saw no object in pursuing South African participation in the Turco-Iraqi Pact at this time.

Agenda Item 4: Type of Organization Required, Including Its Relationship to NATO

The Ambassador stated that he was giving the US tentative UK views as to the type of organization required for Middle East defense. He emphasized that these views had not been disclosed to any other country. He said that the UK would like in the course of the presentconversations to reach some broad understanding with the US as to the type of organization that would be appropriate, even though the US might not contemplate its own membership in the organization in the near future.

Although the Turco-Iraqi Pact refers to a permanent ministerial council, and the UK had given its blessing to this concept when consulted by the Turks in the drafting stage of the Pact, the UK assumes that there would be no objection by the participants to deputies, presumably at the ambassadorial level, sitting for the ministers. Ministerial meetings might be held occasionally. The UK had thought that the permanent council might have its seat in Baghdad, although ministerial meetings might rotate among the area capitals.

Subordinate to the council would be a military planning organization located in Baghdad with representation from each Pact participant. The main function of the Planning organization would be to draw up war plans. The type of war planning desirable remains unforeseeable, but it could develop later as circumstances dictate. A small international secretariat to service the council and the military planning organization would presumably also be required. The UK had considered letting the Iraqis provide the secretariat but had concluded that an international group would be better. In the event that US adherence to the Pact were to be appreciably delayed, the UK would hope that some informal US affiliation with the military planning organization could be arranged.

The UK foresees no need for a formal connection between the defense organization under the Turco-Iraqi Pact and NATO. It believes that the overlapping of membership (Turkey, the UK and possibly the US) should be sufficient to provide liaison between the two organizations. At the military level the UK contemplates planning and intelligence liaison between the military planning organization under the Pact and the NATO Ground Force headquarters at Izmir.

Mr. Murphy inquired whether the Turco-Iraqi Pact had any economic aspects and referred particularly to infrastructure. The Ambassador replied that there were no economic clauses in the Turco-Iraqi Pact and that infrastructure matters would be handled by the council and the military planning organization and might be the subject of subsidiary agreement under the Pact.

Mr. Ernst inquired concerning the scope of activities of the military planning organization. The Ambassador replied that the UK had nothing specific thought out at this stage but he assumed that the organization would cover the usual range of military planning subjects.

Mr. Dixon asked the British view with regard to the type of commitment in the Turco-Iraqi Pact. The Ambassador replied that it was less binding than SEATO. The Pact was very flexible and the real meaning of the commitment would depend on the special arrangements made under the Pact. As far as Iraq is concerned he believed the nature of the commitment from the UK was satisfactory. The existing relationships with Turkey and Pakistan were such as not to raise the nature of the commitment in the Turco-Iraqi Pact. As regards Iran he believed that it might be necessary to enter into some sort of special agreement in the nature of guarantees should they join the Pact.

The Under Secretary referred to the provisions of the SEACDT Pact relating to the control of subversion and asked whether in the UK view the Turco-Iraqi Pact would provide a framework for such activities in the Middle East. He said that it would be to both US and UK advantage to maximize the peacetime utility of the Middle East defense arrangement even though its predominant aspect was military. The Ambassador expressed the view that although there were no references in the Pact to the problem of subversion and despite the existence in the Pact of a clause against “any interference whatsoever” in internal affairs he thought that subordinate special agreements concerning the control of subversion could be negotiated under the Pact. He believed, however, that it would be necessary to move very slowly and softly in this direction. The most important thing was to get Pakistan and Iran into the Pact and then make careful efforts to accomplish such an end as this.

Agenda Item 5: A Concept of Operations

The Ambassador recapitulated briefly the concept of operations set forth in the US-UK-Turkey Military Report prepared in London in February, 1955. He placed particular stress on the need for providing early warning facilities in the Middle East.

Agenda Item 6: Requirements for the Development of the Operational Concept into a Realistic Plan Including the Following:

(a) Command Organization for the Area

The Ambassador stated that the UK sees no need to create a command structure under the Turco-Iraqi Pact at the present time or even in the immediate future after the fourth member has adhered and the Pact organization begins to be formed. There are various factors which militate against such a step. The countries of the area are not yet disposed to put their forces under international command. There is no immediate prospect of stationing troops of one area member in the territory of another area member. Finally, there are differing commitments as between the Pact members.

(b) Contribution Required from Middle East Countries, the United Kingdom, other Commonwealth Countries Directly Concerned and the United States.

The Ambassador’s exposition under this agenda consisted in the main of a recapitulation of requirements, availabilities and deficits as set forth in the US-UK-Turkey Military Report prepared in London. He supplemented this with certain UK Chiefs of Staff comments on the report which are summarized in the following paragraphs.

Ground

1. The UK has some reservations as to the military value of an Iranian division.

2. The availability of a Pakistani division depends upon a number of extraneous factors such as a settlement of the Kashmir dispute with India.

3. The Jordanian Arab Legion would be available only if Jordan-Israel relations were improved.

4. It is doubted that Turkish divisions even if equipped could be made available for the defense of the Zagros Line.

5. A very considerable time would be required to provide an effective defense in the Middle East, and the effort would be dependent on US-UK assistance.

6. Serious deficiencies in lines of communications and administrative units would have to be overcome.

Mr. Ernst inquired whether the UK contemplated that more than three divisions could be raised in Iraq. The Ambassador and Mr. Bailey responded in the sense that the UK thought not as the age distribution of the Iraqi population would make it difficult to raise more than three divisions.

Air

[3 paragraphs (19 lines of source text) not declassified]

With respect to defensive air capabilities the Ambassador stated that the UK was going to make a determined effort to build up the Iraqi air force. It doubted that much could be done in the other Middle East countries excepting of course Israel which was ruled out on political grounds. Agreement has been reached in principle in Anglo-Iraqi staff talks for the development of early warning facilities. This would be undertaken under the recent Anglo-Iraq agreement.

Sea

The UK Chiefs of Staff consider that the most serious deficit on the naval side is in minesweepers which are essential to the maintenance of the line of communication to the Persian Gulf. Within the Gulf it might be an acceptable risk not to attempt to fill the deficit. However, the UK, the Ambassador said, will make every effort to build up the minesweeping capability of Iraq within the framework of the Anglo-Iraq agreement.

Standardization

The UK Chiefs of Staff place particular emphasis on the comment in the Tripartite Report that in peacetime arms should be supplied to the area states from the country which will supply arms and provide logistic support, maintenance, etc. in war.

In conclusion the Ambassador inquired whether the US JCS had made a review of the Tripartite Report similar to that of the UK Chiefs of Staff. The Under Secretary replied that the JCS had been examining the Report and would be much interested in UK views. The Ambassador said that he would arrange to have provided to the JCS on June 27 a summary of the important UK Chief of Staff comments.

(c) Supply of Arms, Equipment and Training Facilities for Middle East States

The Ambassador stated that UK policy with respect to the supply of arms to the Middle East states is based upon the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. He made the following comments with respect to individual countries:

• Egypt. The UK has agreed to supply only about one-half of the outstanding arms requests at the time of the embargo in 1951. It is now under pressure to meet the balance of these outstanding requests and new requirements. It believes it should go some way to meet Egyptian demands in view of Egypt’s weakness vis-à-vis Israel and the Western interest in the defense capability of Egypt. The UK considers it necessary to supply a sufficient amount of arms to Egypt to maintain the morale of its armed forces.
• Syria. There is very little advantage in providing any considerable quantity of arms to Syria. The UK is, however, interested in maintaining its connection with the Syrian air force, a connection which is opposed by the Egyptians and some Syrians. The UK intends to provide some obsolete aircraft to Syria and to continue its training program.
• Lebanon. Lebanon is of little military importance. The UK has provided some 25-pounders and will in the future consider similar small requests in order to keep the Lebanese happy.
• Jordan. The UK has no problems as regards Jordan. It can continue to meet Jordanian needs pursuant to the Anglo-Jordan Treaty from UK resources.
• Israel. The Israelis clearly have a decisive advantage in air, sea and land forces over any possible combination of Arab states. Despite this, the French are supplying jet aircraft and tanks to Israel. The UK policy is to be restrained in authorizing arms shipments to Israel. It is holding Israeli applications for tanks, day and night fighters and destroyers. The UK has no immediate intention of releasing any of these items but if it should release destroyers for Egypt it might also release destroyers for Israel.

The Near East Arms Consultative Committee is, in the UK view, functioning as well as could be expected and there is no apparent need to change it radically. The US and UK should, however, try to bring France into line on the supply of arms to Israel.

In response to a query by Mr. Dixon concerning UK views on arms for Saudi Arabia, the Ambassador said that the UK did not consider that Saudi Arabia properly comes into the Middle East defense concept. It is not directly threatened by either the USSR or Israel. Moreover it is stirring up trouble in the area within and with Egypt and Syria. The UK considers that Saudi Arabia is pursuing an expansionist policy against the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms for whose protection the UK is responsible, and accordingly views with a jaundiced eye some of the arms which the US has recently supplied to the Saudis.

In an informal exchange with Mr. Ernst, Col. Balfour indicated that the UK had made no estimate of the cost of removing existing deficits in defense requirements.

In turning to Iraq, the Ambassador stressed that he was bringing up a problem of immediate and considerable importance to the UK. It had been agreed in the London Tripartite military talks that in time of war Iraq should be supplied by the UK. It followed that Iraq should be provided UK equipment in time of peace. The difficulty is that the US is in a position to supply arms free but the UK is not. The Iraqis naturally prefer to receive arms as a gift rather than to pay for them.

In February 1954 the US and UK concluded a memorandum of understanding² with respect to the supply of equipment to Iraq. This memorandum was based on the old Anglo-Iraq Treaty which has since been replaced by an Anglo-Iraq Agreement under the Turk-Iraq Pact. The memorandum provided inter alia for the supply to Iraq of certain UK equipment to be procured under OSP procedures. Since then the US has been or is supplying the items earmarked for procurement in the US, but equipment to be procured in the UK has not been going forward and only one OSP order has been placed. The position is becoming acute and the Iraqis are becoming restive. The Iraqis want Centurion tanks, the UK would like to supply them, but there is an absence of OSP orders for tanks.

The existence of the US–UK memorandum of understanding has not been disclosed to to the Iraqis. The UK considers that the time has now come to inform the Iraqis. The UK accordingly requests that the policy in the memorandum of understanding be reaffirmed and that agreement be reached in the course of the present talks to let the Iraqis know in a general way of the US-UK understanding. This is a matter of urgency as it can become a crucial factor in UK-Iraqi relations and can hinder effective development of the Turco-Iraqi Pact.

The Under Secretary said that he was not familiar with the February 1954 memorandum of understanding. He would review it and discuss the problem raised by the Ambassador with Defense. With respect to the Centurion tanks, it was his recollection that the US had assured Israel that there would be no heavy build-up in Iraq. The Ambassador pointed out that they had been training the Iraqis in the use of tanks for some time. While there were a few tanks in Iraq the time had come when more could be absorbed and were needed. Mr. Dixon commented that there were no tanks in the US military program for Iraq, which is a very modest program.

The Ambassador said that the position with respect to Pakistan was analogous to that of Iraq although the UK did accept that a much larger proportion of Pakistani equipment will come from US sources than in the case of Iraq. The UK is not asking specifically for large assistance through the OSP mechanism. A difficulty has arisen, however, because Pakistani forces have in the past always been trained and equipped on UK standards and from UK sources. It is important to avoid disruption of the pattern of the Pakistani forces and to this end there should be close coordination between US and UK activities. This coordination has been lacking. The US has not disclosed its intentions with respect to the equipping of Pakistani forces to the UK, and the latter is concerned at being left in the dark. The UK asks that the US disclose its intentions in the course of the present talks.

Under present plans, Pakistani forces would operate in the Middle East alongside the UK and other Commonwealth forces, utilizing UK lines of communications and workshops. If all of these forces were using the same equipment, the effort would obviously be facilitated. As far as practicable, therefore, Pakistani forces should continue to have and use UK equipment.

The trouble is that countries such as Pakistan, seeing two sources of arms supply, naturally tend to play one off against the other. The Ambassador said that his brief indicated that the Pakistanis had said they would like UK equipment. He was quite sure that the US brief reported a Pakistani preference for US equipment. This situation is generating bad feeling and friction between US and UK personnel in Pakistan and also in Iraq and the Ambassador considers it important that steps be taken to remedy the situation. Collaboration between the US and the UK he strongly believed was very much in the interest of both our governments.

The Under Secretary said he would discuss this problem with Defense.

(d) Political and Financial Aspects of Infrastructure and Stockpiling

The Ambassador dealt briefly with this agenda item pointing out that it was apparent from the Tripartite Military Report that there were major deficiencies of infrastructure, stockpiling and lines of communication in the Middle East. Its treaties with Iraq and Jordan enable the UK to relieve some of these deficiencies and the UK is talking to these two countries and to Lebanon concerning arrangements for stockpiling. It is the UK view that there should be some movement with respect to infrastructure as this would show support for the Turco-Iraqi Pact and would encourage further adherence and possibly a South African contribution. The UK is, unfortunately, already heavily committed in Cyprus, Iraq and Jordan and cannot readily increase its efforts in this field. The question of the US role accordingly becomes important.

The Ambassador stated that he had now completed his presentation, as Agenda Item 7 could not be dealt with until the US position was determined.

The Under Secretary said that it would be about a week before the US could resume the discussions. He assumed that the Ambassador’s exposition had provided the general framework of the UK position but hoped that the US could request further information on specific points which might arise during its consideration of the problem. The Ambassador said that he would be available and would be glad to come to the Department for interim talks if that appeared desirable.

The Under Secretary said that the Embassy would be informed when the US was ready to resume talks, and the meeting adjourned at 6:15 p.m.

1. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 70. Top Secret. Drafted by Mathews.
2. Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 2, p. 2371.