Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

50. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State¹

Amman, June 23, 1955—9 p.m.

461. Appreciate Ambassador Byroade’s thoughtful search for usable formula. From perspective Jordan have following comments on Cairo’s 1929.²

1. For immediate future it seems HKJ will try to play mediator role, stressing need for Arab unity and avoiding joining either pact. Believe Jordan leans to Turco-Iraqi pact at royal level and would welcome later opportunity to join without stigma and possibly with profit in arms assistance.

2. I doubt the long term usefulness of any formula by which states other than Iraq indicate they do not contemplate joining Northern Tier. For Jordan to give a commitment never to join would be embarrassment for Iraq, Turkey and the UK. Britain believed counting on Jordan adherence Turco-Iraqi pact to ease the Anglo-Jordanian treaty position in somewhat same fashion she did with Iraq.

3. Agree that US placed in position of opposing symbol of Arab unity but believe Egyptians are the ones chiefly to thank.

4. Do not believe US can do much either to hasten or delay deal as contrasted to sentimental Arab unification. Former must start with some combination of Syria, Jordan, Iraq. Egypt and Saudi Arabia oppose and in so doing oppose reality of Arab unity while posing as champions of the sentiment. Such championship has been of little help so far as Jordan concerned.

Mallory

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/6–2355. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Paris, Damascus, London, Beirut, Tel Aviv, and Jidda.
2. Document 45.