Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

416. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, December 18, 1957—3 p.m.

1195. Initial relatively mild reaction Shah to US position on budgetary assistance (Embtel 1164)² may have stemmed in part from fact Shah’s personal interest primarily in field military rather than economic assistance. With BP Council meeting upcoming we can expect repeated requests from Shah for greater military assistance.

Important factor is Shah’s strong feeling he has not received degree military assistance which he believed he was assured he would receive by reason his entry BP. Conversations between Yazdanpenah and Byroade,³ Shah and Allen,⁴ and my remarks under instruction when presenting credentials 1955,⁵ were susceptible interpretation by Shah as assurance his military forces would be built up by US. Whether or not these statements actually constitute “clear assurance”, they have from outset been taken by Shah as promises of major buildup for his forces.

The British have not been completely helpful on this score. UK representatives Iran cannot help regret to some degree their past power and prestige in this country. This leads them sometimes to statements which are not malicious but are irresponsible. I have reason to believe that from time to time certain British have given Iranians idea that UK felt Iran was not getting from US the degree of military assistance it deserved.

Iranian military forces are of course necessary for internal control but Shah admits present level of forces more than adequate this purpose. There is also legitimate basis for Shah’s desire for modern equipment and aircraft to maintain his domestic and international prestige. There is some merit in position that Iran should not be too clearly differentiated against in comparison with Turkish and Pakistan neighbors, although Shah’s frequently reiterated conviction that his forces should be as strong as Turks clearly unwarranted.

Situation complicated by fact that Shah’s interest in military forces is in part emotional rather than logical. We can never really hope to convince Shah that any given level military forces will be adequate to what he imagines are his requirements. His personal psychological bias renders him immune to logical persuasion in this field.

Since it is probable US will not be able increase military assistance Iran and since any level of increase military assistance would not completely satisfy Shah’s appetite, we must look for other ways persuade Shah of constancy of US support, while at same time attempting disabuse him of notion that US has not lived up to its promises. Shah’s present attitude might, therefore, providing other factors were propitious, suggest that time is opportune for US adherence BP. I repeat therefore the recommendations made in Embtel 922.⁶

Chapin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 888.10/12–1857. Secret.
2. Document 414.
3. No record of the conversation between Lieutenant General Morteza Yazdanpenah and Henry A. Byroade, former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, has been found.
4. Apparent reference to a discussion between the Shah and Assistant Secretary Allen in New York, February 7, 1955. No memorandum of conversation has been found, but see Document 296.
5. See Documents 320 and 321.
6. In telegram 922, November 9, the Embassy recommended that the United States adhere to the Baghdad Pact as the only way to correct the current unfavorable trend in U.S.-Iranian relations. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/11–957)