296. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Baxter) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen)1

SUBJECT

  • Background Information for your Conversation with the Shah on February 7

You will see the Shah at 5:00 p.m. on February 7 in New York.2 He will probably take the occasion to discuss with you his impressions of his visit to the United States and aspects of the following questions:

  • Tab A—Iran’s Role in Middle East Defense
  • Tab B—Adherence to Regional Defense Arrangements
  • Tab C—Increase in Military Aid to Iran

The responses suggested in the attached memoranda are all based on the assumption that Iran’s primary problem during the next three years is essentially one of economic development in order to improve political and social conditions. The Shah must be warned against seeking to develop a military establishment which will become an undue burden on Iran’s economy or which would disrupt economic development plans in the immediate future.

[Tab A]

IRAN’S ROLE IN MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE

The Shah is anxious to know what role we would like Iran to play in Middle East defense. We are, in fact, awaiting an opinion from the Defense Department, which in turn is awaiting results from the US–UK–Turkey military talks now in progress in London. We have avoided mentioning these talks to the Shah, although it has been indicated that following the settlement of the Suez dispute and in view of new concepts of atomic war, an overall review of our strategy in the Middle East is being conducted. Also, Defense Department officials, in their talks with the Shah, laid great stress on training exercises which can give a better basis for evaluation of Iran’s military potential.

[Page 704]

It is possible that the Shah has heard through newspaper reports of the US–UK–Turkey talks. If he should mention them, it is suggested that you deprecate the importance of these talks and emphasize that they are concerned primarily with logistical requirements.

The President told the Shah in Washington that he knew of no officer “on his staff” who did not recognize the strategic significance of Iran. He also said that we are prepared to help develop in the Iranian armed forces defensive delaying capabilities which would make a useful contribution to defense of the Zagros Mountains line. These mountains lie almost entirely within Iranian territory and are considered the first line of defense in the Middle East. The Shah has discussed with General McClure in Iran and with General Ridgway here his willingness to prepare defensive positions in the Zagros Mountains [3 lines of source text not declassified].

You may wish to emphasize the following points:

1)
We want the Iranian Army to be more than a police force and are prepared to help it make a useful contribution to area defense.
2)
We consider training to be the first step in the development of such defensive capabilities and are sending special teams for this purpose.
3)
We recognize the strategic significance of Iran and will want to work out with the Shah, as training progresses and regional defense arrangements develop, the role his armed forces should play.

[Tab B]

ADHERENCE TO REGIONAL DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS

The Shah and many Iranian leaders would like to participate in a regional defense arrangement backed by the West, and they will probably continue to advance the idea both for motives of prestige and as a means of securing maximum US military aid and defense support. The President told the Shah when he was in Washington that we would welcome Iran’s adherence to a regional defense arrangement. The Shah has also been encouraged to respond favorably to known Iraqi desires to commence military staff talks.

This question has, however, not been discussed in detail with the Shah. He was told and Iranian Government leaders were assured that no commitments would be asked of him while he was in the United States. At the same time, he was advised not to expect to obtain, during his visit, US Government decisions on such questions as Iran’s role in Middle East defense, commitment of Iran to regional defense arrangements or increase in military aid.

[Page 705]

It is likely that the Shah, upon his return to Iran, will be willing to commence staff talks with the Iraqis. Nuri3 is known to want this, but there may be some hesitation as to who initiates such talks. It would be useful to give the Shah another nudge of encouragement in this direction before he leaves the United States.

Although we have no definite information, there have been indications that the Turks and Pakistanis might also approach the Shah, following his return, with suggestions for military staff talks or visits of high civilian officials designed to advance the proposition of joining Iran to a regional defense arrangement with Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan. In line with the President’s views we would welcome such moves, and the Shah should be encouraged in this direction. There are certain considerations, however, to be borne in mind.

1)
Iranian Opinion—Before joining regional defense arrangements, the Shah (and we too) should be confident that such a move would not encounter serious opposition within Iran. Despite the increasing enthusiasm of the controlled press and radio for joining with anti–communist nations in an open defensive agreement, it is not certain that the Iranian people or at least the articulate city group have given up their traditional fears of joining sides in big power rivalries. While it is, of course, important that firm leadership be demonstrated, it would be unwise for the Shah to take a step which would not have some degree of public confidence.
2)
Indigenous Character—Iran’s adherence to a regional defense arrangement would probably not be permanent unless the Iranians themselves are satisfied that it is to their advantage and was not prompted by foreign interests. The Iranians are traditionally suspicious of foreigners. They are aware of US support for the Turkey–Pakistan and Turkey–Iraq agreements. They know that the British have commitments to Turkey (Treaty of Mutual Assistance, 1939 and NATO), Iraq (Mutual Defense Treaty) and Pakistan (Commonwealth). The Iranians have a heritage of fear of Turkish expansion and realize that Turkish military power far outbalances their own. There are religious, racial and historical differences between the Iranians and their Moslem neighbors which would affect any formal relationship. Therefore, it is extremely important that regional defense arrangements be viewed in the area as having an essentially indigenous character.
3)
Soviet Reaction—It is believed there will be a strong Soviet reaction to Iran’s joining a regional defense arrangement, although its exact nature cannot be perceived now. It is certain that heavy pressures will be brought upon Iranian leaders to remain neutral, possibly including threats to have recourse to the Treaty of 1921.
4)
British Reaction—The UK Government has agreed with us that Iran’s military establishment should be more than a police force and that Iran should eventually join Middle East defense arrangements. However, the British military are known to have grave suspicions [1 line of source text not declassified] concerning the dangers of overcommitting British resources for a defense of Iran. British civilian authorities [Page 706] suggest giving priority to Iran’s economic problems, and wonder if the Shah is sufficiently determined to be relied upon to carry through a positive and somewhat dangerous foreign policy. It may be expected, therefore, that the British will not be very encouraging to the Shah when he visits London, although they will apparently not object if Iran should open staff talks with the Iraqis or if we increase our military aid to Iran.
5)
Turk–Iraq Agreement—Although the exact text is not available, it is believed that the Turk–Iraq agreement will provide for staff talks, exchange of information, transit facilities and possibly assurances of mutual assistance in the event of attack. This agreement is better than the Turkey–Pakistan agreement, although not so strong as the Balkan Pact. It will probably be viewed as the main agreement to which Pakistan and Iran would adhere. This is another reason for encouraging the Shah to open talks with the Iraqis.
6)
US Security GuaranteesNuri reportedly would like to see the US and UK join in a regional defense agreement. The question of the form and extent of any US participation has not been resolved. However, the Secretary has said informally that he could envisage some type of Manila engagement for us in the “Northern Tier”, but not if it upset Arab–Israeli relationships. Should the Shah inquire about this matter, it would be necessary to reply in general terms about UN arrangements and our general interest in the area.
7)
Iranian Concern About Afghanistan—When Mr. Hoover talked to the Shah in Washington, he asked him on two occasions what part could be played by Afghanistan in regional defense arrangements. In each instance the Shah appeared troubled and abruptly changed the subject without answering. Subsequently, an Iranian Embassy official again raised the question of how Afghanistan might fit into the regional defense pattern. It would probably be desirable, therefore, for you in a general way to reassure the Shah that we do not expect him to await an establishment of Afghanistan’s position in regional security arrangements before he goes ahead.
8)
Pakistan’s Attitude—Although the Pakistanis were not directly involved in the negotiations on the Turkey–Iraq treaty, they are known to be pleased with the course of events. They are also known to be favorably disposed toward the adherence of Iran to regional security arrangements. It can be assumed, therefore, that so long as they are kept informed they will not object to Iran’s opening discussions with Iraq with the intention of joining in the Turkey–Iraq agreement.

[Tab C]

INCREASE IN MILITARY AID

The Shah knows that General McClure asked last summer for a tremendous increase in military and defense support aid in order to improve the Iranian Army and prepare defensive positions in the Zagros Mountains. The Shah constantly talks about the immense quantity of aid given to Greece and Turkey. He is also aware of the general nature of the new military program in Pakistan.

[Page 707]

During the past year, the Shah has held generally to the line that he could not join regional defense arrangements unless he was assured that his armed forces were to be given real defensive strength. He feels there must be some balance between the forces of the partners in a defensive arrangement. He tends, however, to think in terms of comparative figures, and it is important to emphasize again on this point that training is the first requirement before his forces can absorb additional equipment.

Secretary Anderson assured the Shah when he was in Washington that we would provide support for the training program. He spoke of the 200 officers and men who are being sent to Iran, without dependents, as special training teams to work with units in the field as small as brigades. Some of these teams have already arrived, and by the end of June all six will be in operation. We have asked the field for specific recommendations as to the type and amount of support required this fiscal year in order to make full utilization of this training offered. The Country Team has replied in some detail (classrooms, firing and other training ranges, ammunition, storage places, training aids, POL and clothing necessary to allow troop maneuvers). This would require approximately $4 million.

Major General Harkins, Deputy Army G–3, has an appointment to see the Shah on February 8 at which time he will discuss in detail the training program and what we are prepared to do.5 He will not, of course, mention specific figures. When you talk to the Shah, it is suggested that you inform him that, since his discussions in Washington, the US Government has proceeded to prepare itself to support the training program as required and that General Harkins will go into the details with him during his conversation.

FYI a total of $124 million of military aid has been programmed for Iran since 1950. Roughly 70% of this has been delivered. By comparison, Turkey has received roughly a billion dollars in the same period; $50 million has been programmed for Pakistan and $10 million for Iraq of which very little has yet been delivered.

The question whether there will be a substantial increase in military aid for Iran next fiscal year still has not been resolved. Therefore, you will not be able to be completely responsive to the Shah’s expected inquiry about increased military aid, even if he announces a willingness to join in regional defense arrangements. However, you can point to the major effort being made to train Iranian troops, and you can, of course, remind him of the President’s statement that we are prepared to help develop in the Iranian armed forces defensive delaying capabilities which would make a useful contribution [to defense] of the Zagros Mountains line.

[Page 708]

In this connection, it is interesting to note that the Shah has asked retired General Van Fleet to visit Iran soon, apparently hoping to get some benefit from his experience in training Greek and Korean troops, and possibly to serve as public evidence of the Shah’s intention to move forward on military development.

  1. Source: Department of State, GTI Files: Lot 58 D 338, Military Aid—1955. Secret. Drafted by Stutesman.
  2. No record of this meeting has been found.
  3. General Nuri Pasha al–Said, Prime Minister of Iraq.
  4. See infra.