396. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Richards) to the Department of State1
1489. From Richards. Had satisfactory initial meeting 24th with Prime Minister Ala and other key Iranian officials. Good feeling prevailed with no expression disappointment over limited prospects new aid from Mission. Following present besides Prime Minister: Foreign Minister Ardalan, Minister War Vosuq, Minister without Portfolio Taleqani, Minister Interior Alam, Minister Roads and Comm. Ansari, Minister PTT Eshraqi, Treasurer General Pirnia, Deputy Minister Health Amuzikar, Prime Minister Aide Ansari.
In opening remarks Prime Minister expressed special pleasure at news US would join Military Committee Baghdad Pact and hoped it meant early US adherence Pact. Prime Minister recalled Iran’s statement approval American Doctrine at time declaration and said Iran had for some time before that endeavored obtain firm assurance security such as Turkey had from NATO membership, but Iran had never before received guaranty as strong as now received under American Doctrine. With new sense security and confidence in future Iran leaders could dedicate themselves not only to defense but to peaceful economic and social development Iran.
In response Prime Minister’s remarks I recognized Iran had lacked guaranty equal NATO membership and stressed central importance in American Doctrine of assurance US would come to aid any country [Page 923] requesting aid to resist attack by international Communism. This evidenced also in US readiness to join Military Committee of Pact. If Iran were attacked, US would be at its side; US had “put its hand to plow” and did not intend to turn back.
Re aid, I said US responsibilities world-wide and resources spread thin; new aid Iran from Mission would be small; Mission funds limited and 18 countries to consider. Described limitations applicable Mission funds and our purpose primarily meet exigencies immediate situation. Indicated possibility small amounts new aid in support for projects of regional interest to Pact economic experts, such as railways, roads, communications; also some addition to military construction program and small increment military end-items. Pitts added US would take small arms requirements under consideration.
Prime Minister made formal presentation Iran aid request based on memo which he handed me at end presentation. Reviewed events recent years leading to present economic position, expressed Iran’s attitude American aid so far, expressed confidence Iran’s future, but stated need for further present aid in support Iran’s own efforts. In many fields Iran had relied on technical cooperation which had done good job here. Asked help to undertake essential projects government had omitted regular budget in order achieve balance.
Prime Minister asked aid for following: railway link with Turkey and Pakistan to provide route to Europe alternate to present routes through Persian Gulf and Soviet Union; construction telecommunications net; construction airports at Qom, Kermanshahr, and improvements Abadan and Shiraz; port improvements Bandar Abbas, and possibly additional gulf ports; technical survey Qom-Iskenderun pipeline. Prime Minister estimated total aid requirement projects $102 million in four years with $33 million needed first year. Re regional highway, Prime Minister and Taleqani explained Iran intensely interested in completion railway link Turkey and Pakistan, believed undertaking highway at this time would hamper railway project. Iran of course interested in highway but at later date. Agreed refer discussion of US aid to subgroups and meet again on results.
I said US interested strengthening whole region. Believed Iran would recognize that countries in rear of tier contiguous Soviet Union needed strengthening and that US funds so spent would be spent in interests Iran also. Therefore we especially desirous furthering projects in Iran having regional aspects.
I believe Iranian sense importance pleasantly augmented by my request for views on other countries; e.g., Afghanistan, Syria, Egypt which may take some of bite out of any disappointment on aid results. Some interesting sidelights developed which reported separate [Page 924] telegram.3 In general Iran leaders concede US should endeavor consolidate positions other ME countries on side West, but Ardalan took opportunity Afghan discussion to make almost vehement statement that Pact countries had to justify policies to peoples and Parliaments and were entitled to privileged position. See also separate telegram. In sum, US should help Afghan but not too much; no hope in Syria until military clique defeated; Arabia coming around and Saud solidly on side US and could be helpful in Syria; no US aid for Egypt unless Nasser accepted Suez Canal settlement roughly equivalent Menzies Committee proposals. Iran was really concerned over Afghanistan, owing favorable impression Russians making on people, especially in villages; danger long term.
I said US would not submit blackmail by wavering or neutral countries, or trade old friends for new; but would try acquire additional genuine friends to strengthen area where possible; US did not believe friends could be purchased in any case.
Agreed to have communiqué to be jointly drafted by working party.
Meeting again with Prime Minister late this afternoon and proceeding tonight by rail and road to see Shah tomorrow at Babol.
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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3–2557. Secret. Repeated to Karachi, Kabul, London, Paris, Amman, Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Tripoli, Jidda, Beirut, Athens, Rabat, Tunis, Addis Ababa, Aden, Khartoum, New Delhi, Rome, and Tel Aviv.
Ambassador James P. Richards was sent as Eisenhower’s Special Assistant to 15 Middle East nations between March and May 1957 with the task of explaining the Eisenhower Doctrine. Richards visited Iran March 23–27. (Despatch 936 from Tehran, April 16; ibid., 120.1580/4–1657) See also Document 214. For additional documentation on the Richards Mission, see Document 184 ff.
↩ - Reference is to telegram 1495 from Tehran, March 25. (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/3–2557)↩