Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII

247. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Henderson) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, June 20, 1957.

SUBJECT

• US–UK Talks on Middle East, June 12–14, 1957

In accordance with your instructions, I met in London from June 12 to 14, 1957 with Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, representing the UK Foreign Office, to complete the US-UK review of Middle East problems bearing upon the supply of oil initiated at Bermuda. The heads of the African, Eastern and Levant Departments of the Foreign Office participated with Sir Humphrey, and I had with me Mr. Mathews of S/P, Mr. Wilkins, Director of NE, and Mr. Wilson of our London Embassy.

Sir Humphrey and I reached agreement on the attached conclusions and recommendations (Tab A) for submission to our respective Secretaries. It was understood between us that this paper had no standing unless and until it was approved by you and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. You will observe that this paper closely parallels the draft conclusions and recommendations which you approved on June 5, 1957 (Tab C).²

The complex of problems arising from relations among Saudi Arabia, the UK and the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms was inevitably the major subject of our discussions. As will be apparent from Recommendation 1 and the related US and UK comments, the British took the position that they could do no more to ease the Buraimi situation than seek to arrange an early meeting between King Saud and the Sultan of Muscat. The British position rested on three basic propositions. First, the US had had marked—and welcomed—success in re-orienting King Saud, [1½ lines of source text not declassified] despite his dissatisfaction with the Buraimi situation. Second, the Sultan of Muscat and the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi considered that the Buraimi issue had been resolved by their reoccupation of the oasis and were not willing to enter into negotiations on a closed issue. Third, British attempts to persuade them to do so would damage UK relations with these two states and arouse doubts as to the value of British protection throughout the Persian Gulf area.

The British did, however, agree with us on the general desirability of settling frontier disputes and defining boundaries on the periphery of Saudi Arabia, and Recommendation 1 was cast in these terms. You will recall that at Bermuda the President and Prime Minister Macmillan discussed an early definition of frontiers which might be accompanied by some type of US guarantee. Despite this background, at our first meeting in London Sir Humphrey stated (1) that the UK doubted that any boundaries fixed in agreement with Saudi Arabia would be viable and (2) that this British appreciation would not be significantly altered by a US guarantee of such boundaries. With a view to clarifying the British position, I gave Sir Humphrey an illustrative draft of a possible statement which the US might make on boundaries (Tab D),³ emphasizing that I was handing it to him on a provisional basis and that it had not been seen by the Department. After considerable discussion, the British subsequently appeared to return to their Bermuda position and again expressed an interest in a US public declaration on boundaries (see fourth sentence of the UK comments on Recommendation 1).

It was clear, however, that the UK was unwilling to suggest negotiation of the Buraimi issue to the Sultan of Muscat or the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi. I would go so far as to say that the British would be unwilling for the foreseeable future to bring about any arrangement regarding Buraimi which could be described as a further British retreat in the Middle East. In the circumstances it seemed wise to concentrate upon an early meeting between King Saud and the Sultan of Muscat— first proposed by the US side in the Rountree–Coulson talks. Once this meeting is brought about and new friendly relations between Saud and Muscat have developed, the possibility for substantive discussions on the Buraimi issue may arise. This prospect should be of some interest to King Saud although it falls far short of his present expectations.

In discussing relations with Egypt (Recommendation 6), Sir Humphrey emphasized that the UK Government wanted to remove any doubts that the UK-Egypt financial talks might have occasioned as to the firmness of the UK’s anti-Nasser position. Those talks had been entered into in order to make the necessary arrangements for the use of the Suez Canal by British shipping. When the talks were resumed, the UK would maintain a hard position and would insist upon a firm and equal quid for any quo that Nasser might desire.

Although the London discussions resulted in no immediate concrete progress toward the solution of specific problems, I am convinced that the exercise was worthwhile. We had a very free and frank exchange of views. As one result, I believe that the British were more persuaded that we are sincerely trying to find objective solutions of Persian Gulf problems and less fearful that we are acting merely as protagonists for Saudi Arabia or Aramco. As another result, my associates and I were satisfied that UK influence on the Persian Gulf rulers is limited; the limitations are probably not as severe as the British allege, but they do exist and they are substantial. At the conclusion of the talks both sides had a better understanding of the other’s position, and these positions were, I believe, less rigid than at the beginning of the discussions. For this and one other reason, I agreed with Sir Humphrey on the desirability of periodic meetings of senior US and UK representatives to discuss the Middle East (Recommendation 9). The other reason is that the British obviously derive great satisfaction and comfort from intimate consultation with us on an area of such vital importance to them. Our investment of time and funds in periodic meetings promises large dividends in terms of British willingness to accept our leadership and to support our policies in the Middle East.

Recommendations:

1. That you approve the paper at Tab A.⁴

2. That you sign the letter at Tab B⁵ informing Mr. Lloyd of our action.

[Tab A]

MEASURES TO ENSURE CONTINUED ACCESS TO MIDDLE EAST PETROLEUM RESOURCES⁶

I. Conclusions

1. Access to Middle East petroleum supplies will, for at least the next ten years, be vital to the security of Western Europe.

2. The most vital section of the area is that comprising the four principal producing states: Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.

3. Continued access to the resources of these states depends on the maintenance of friendly and influential relations with those countries. In this connection, the following assets are important:

a. The Baghdad Pact

b. The American Doctrine

c. The British position in Kuwait and the Persian Gulf in general

d. U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia.

4. It is desirable that close relations be established between the U.K. and Saudi Arabia and between Saudi Arabia and Muscat.

5. Continued access to the resources of the oil-producing states requires the establishment and maintenance of secure means of transit. The principal present transit routes of importance are:

a. The sea route through the Persian Gulf

b. The Suez Canal

c. The Trans-Arabian Pipeline

d. The Iraq Petroleum Company Pipelines.

6. These means of transit are currently threatened by:

a. Soviet activity and influence in Syria, Egypt and Yemen

b. Egyptian and Syrian subversive political activity in Lebanon, Jordan and the Persian Gulf states

c. Tensions arising from the continuance of the Arab-Israel dispute.

II. Recommendations

1. Efforts should continually be made to achieve a settlement of outstanding frontier disputes between Saudi Arabia and the peripheral States beginning with Qatar and extending through the Aden Protectorate and to define the frontiers. Hitherto it has been found impossible to obtain a settlement of these disputes which would be acceptable to all the states concerned.

U.K. Comments: The U.K. does not know of any change in the views of these states which would materially alter this situation. The U.K. is always ready to discuss frontier problems (which include the Buraimi problem) with Saudi Arabia. U.S. help in working towards a settlement of these problems will be most useful. A public declaration by the U.S. Government supporting a frontier settlement would materially contribute to the stability of the area. The U.K. considers that the most hopeful way of improving the situation in the areas of dispute between Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf States in the near future is likely to be the arrangement of an early meeting between King Saud and the Sultan of Muscat, with a view to the mutual grant of concessions which will reduce tensions between Saudi Arabia and Muscat and lay the basis of a friendly relationship which is a prerequisite for the settlement of the border problems. The U.S. and U.K. Governments should consult on the method to be adopted to arrange such a meeting. [3 lines of source text not declassified] The meeting would require careful preparation.

U.S. Comments: The U.S. welcomes the continued willingness of the U.K. to discuss frontier problems (which include the Buraimi problem) with Saudi Arabia. It considers a solution of these problems important to furthering the common interests of the U.S. and the U.K. in the Middle East. The U.S. is of the opinion that the present moment is particularly propitious for attempting to bring about a frontier settlement and is inclined to believe that it may become progressively more difficult with the passage of time to obtain the kind of settlement which would preserve the Western position in the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, it stands ready to consult on the method of arranging a meeting between King Saud and the Sultan of Muscat as proposed by the U.K. and to discuss with the U.K. suggestions for bringing about an eventual settlement of border disputes. The U.S. is prepared to give sympathetic consideration to making a public declaration at the appropriate time supporting a frontier settlement accepted by the parties concerned.

2. There should be an early reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and the U.K. American assistance to this end will be welcomed by the U.K.

3. The U.S. and U.K. should cooperate to preserve beneficial U.K. relationships with the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea principalities of special importance to the supply of oil to the free world, including especially Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Sharja and Muscat.

4. The U.S. and the U.K. should consider steps to be taken to promote settlements of the various claims to islands and sea bed of the Persian Gulf. Officials, including legal experts, of the two Governments should discuss as soon as possible how progress can be made to this end and what principles the two Governments should seek to have recognized by the States concerned in order to assist the settlement and prevent the inflammation of disputes and to minimize difficulties likely to arise in the grant of oil concessions.

5. U.S. and U.K. efforts should continue to strengthen Jordan and Lebanon to resist threats to their independence and territorial integrity from Soviet and Egyptian activities. Iraq and Saudi Arabia should be encouraged to assist these efforts. There should be further U.S.–U.K. discussions at an early date on the future of Jordan, in the light of the joint assessment of the situation by the U.K. and U.S. Ambassadors in Jordan, which is expected.

6. The U.S. and the U.K. should be prepared to restore tolerable relations with Egypt and Syria, once the acts of these states firmly indicate a will to reestablish and maintain such relations with the West and to moderate anti-Western policies. In the meantime, neither Government should, without consultation, take any action which would strengthen Nasser or the present Syrian leadership internally or their influence externally. Both Governments should inform each other before considering unblocking blocked Egyptian balances. The U.K. will inform the U.S. before taking any action towards the resumption of diplomatic relations with Egypt.

7. The U.S. and the U.K. should pursue urgently through established machinery discussions of measures to ensure against interruptions of the flow of Middle East oil.

8. The U.S. and the U.K. should continue efforts to maintain peace and tranquillity in the area, particularly in those parts affected by the Arab-Israel dispute, working directly as well as through other countries and through the United Nations.

9. In order to assure close cooperation in the Middle East, senior representatives of the U.S. and U.K. Governments should periodically exchange visits of the kind now concluded.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.41/6–2057. Secret. Sent through the Executive Secretariat and Rountree.
2. Not printed. Tab C is a draft of the memorandum attached at Tab A. It bears a notation that it was approved on June 5.
3. Not printed.
4. Robert Murphy initialed his approval on the source text and added the notation: “on the basis of signed ltr, 6/24/57”. Loy Henderson’s initials also appear below Murphy’s note.
5. Not printed. Attached at Tab B is a carbon copy of a letter from Secretary Dulles to Foreign Secretary Lloyd that informs Lloyd of Dulles’ approval of the conclusions and recommendations prepared by Sir Humphrey and Loy Henderson, and reaffirms the importance the United States attached to the improvement in relations between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia.
6. Secret.