Office of the Historian

127. Draft Paper by the NSC Planning Board Assistants1

Washington, May 2, 1956.

IMMEDIATE U.S. ADHERENCE TO THE BAGHDAD PACT

Advantages

1.
Would make continued public acceptance of the Pact in the Middle East member countries more certain by:
a.
Removing doubts concerning U.S. support which our present relationship to the Pact appears to engender;
b.
Lessening the criticism of the Pact throughout the Middle East on grounds that it is essentially a British plan.
2.
Would enable the U.S. to exercise greater influence in development of Pact activities by permitting formal participaction, with the full weight of membership, in Council meetings and Council deputy meetings. This would:
a.
Facilitate and accelerate military planning in consonance with U.S. interests.
b.
Give the United States a more authoritative voice in political deliberations.
3.
Would strengthen the position of Nuri Said and other pro-West elements in Iraq, and the Shah and other pro-West elements in Iran.
4.
Would help to stem growing criticism and dissatisfaction within Pakistan of that government’s policy of alignment with the West.
5.
Would strengthen the Pact’s appeal to pro-Western elements in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, and might increase the chances of accession to the Pact by Lebanon and Jordan.
6.
Would demonstrate the firm, consistent and continued support by the U.S. of the concept of collective security, which the U.S. has promoted and encouraged throughout the world to counter the Soviet-Communist threat.
7.
Would strengthen NATO’s southern flank and facilitate coordination of planning between NATO and the Baghdad Pact.
8.
Would increase the possibility of developing adequate capabilities to resist aggression with a minimum expenditure of U.S. resources.
9.
Failure to adhere could well result in:
a.
The collapse of the Pact and the victory of neutralism in the area [thus confronting the U.S., in the event of hostilities, with the necessity of undertaking military operations in a neutral or hostile environment].2
b.
The collapse of the southeastern flank of NATO.

Disadvantages

1.
Would provide Israel with a pretext for renewed demands for a U.S. security guaranty and for armaments.
2.
Would cause Nasser and possibly Saudi Arabia and Syria to seek greater support from the USSR.
3.
Would stimulate the USSR to give even greater support to the Egypt-Syria-Saudi Arabia axis.
4.
Might provide a pretext for a coup d’etat in Jordan that would take Jordan firmly into the Egypt-Syria-Saudi Arabia camp.
5.
Would provide a pretext for increased attacks on the Baghdad Pact in some of the Arab States and Israel.
6.
In the absence of an Iraqi-Saudi rapprochement, would cause possible complications in Saudi-U.S. relations and in forthcoming negotiations for the extension of air base rights.
7.
Might involve the United States more directly in the Hashemite-Saudi and Iraqi-Egyptian disputes and would complicate U.S. relationship to the Arab-Israeli dispute.
8.
Would bring a new wave of dissatisfaction with U.S. policy in India.
9.
[Would increase expectations and demands of Pact members for increased U.S. military and economic aid.]3
10.
Would further exacerbate U.S.–USSR relations.
11.
Might lend some color to charges of U.S. imperialism in a new form.
12.
Would tend to give the impression that the United States continues to place priority emphasis on military pacts in the face of the new Soviet economic diplomatic offensive.

[Here follows the text of the Baghdad Pact.]

  1. Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 66 D 487. Secret. This draft statement, marked “for NSC Staff consideration only”, was forwarded to the NSC Planning Board under cover of a memorandum by Lay on May 2. The paper was based on drafts prepared by the Departments of State and Defense in accordance with a decision by the NSC Planning Board at its April 16 meeting to request the State and Defense members each to prepare statements of the advantages and disadvantages of U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact. (Memorandum from Lay to the NSC Planning Board, May 2; ibid.; Record of Meeting of the NSC Planning Board, April 16; Ibid., S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1)

    The Department of State contribution, completed on April 25, was similar to the May 2 draft in most respects. It was drafted by Mathews (S/P) and by Wilkins and Newsom (NE). According to a covering memorandum of April 25 from Wilkins to Schwartz (S/P), the paper was cleared with SOA, BNA, GTI, NEA, and NE, and was revised in accordance with comments received from these various offices and bureaus. (Ibid., NEA Files: Lot 58 D 460, Baghdad Pact, 1956)

    ↩
  2. Defense proposal. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]↩
  3. Defense proposes deletion. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]↩