126. Letter From the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)1
Dear Mr. Secretary: I refer to your letter of April 5, 19562 informing me that you consider that action should be initiated which would facilitate United States adherence to the Baghdad Pact at the earliest feasible time.
I share the view expressed in your letter that disintegration of the Baghdad Pact organization would have serious consequences. I am also aware that early American adherence to the Pact, or an indication of our intention of adhering some time in the future, would do much to bolster the Pact and would give substantial encouragement to its present members.
Subsequent to the date of your letter, on April 9, I had an extensive conversation with Admiral Radford during which I set forth a number of considerations which in my judgment made it inadvisable at this juncture for the United States to join the Pact. Among the factors of primary concern to me are the following:
While the original Northern Tier concept envisaged a regional grouping to resist Soviet penetration, and the Pact in fact serves this purpose to some extent, it has become deeply involved in Arab politics and intrigue. Until this situation is changed, American adherence would be widely interpreted in the Arab world as a move against Arab unity and the action would thus seriously undermine our position in several states where we are endeavoring to exert useful influence in solving the area’s basic problems.
Our signature to the Pact would give rise to almost irresistible pressures to extend to Israel a security guarantee; I doubt that Senate ratification could be obtained for protecting Iraq without also protecting Israel. If this should happen, the net result would not benefit Iraq or the Pact.
I have discussed this matter privately with certain Congressional leaders who have expressed the belief that the injection into Congress of the question would create a major issue. If the Administration should propose joining the Pact and the proposal were rejected by the Senate, the effect upon the Pact itself would be far more serious than our failure to indicate at this time our intention of adhering.
[Page 295]I am keeping the matter under constant study. It may be that a situation will develop in which our membership would be practicable and advisable, but at present I believe it would be a mistake to proceed along the lines you propose. As you are of course aware, we have been working closely with the Department of Defense and other agencies in planning and implementing other ways of demonstrating to the member countries and to the world in general our solid support for the Pact.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/4–556. Top Secret. Drafted by Rountree.↩
- Document 109.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.↩