Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume XI

229. Despatch From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

No. 355

Taipei, December 23, 1955.

SUBJECT

• China’s Veto Of Outer Mongolia For United Nations Membership

Note: The present despatch is not intended as a definitive account of the episode which involved the veto of Outer Mongolia for United Nations membership on December 13, 1955, nor does it cover in detail the numerous telegraphic exchanges between Washington and Taipei in this connection. Rather, it endeavors to fill in certain gaps which may help in an understanding of the position taken by the Chinese. Their actions were based in considerable part upon a belief that, in this case, much had been done by other countries without consulting the Government of the Republic of China. In retrospect this feature may seem of secondary importance, but during a period when events are moving rapidly, what information is currently available and what is believed to be true at the time may be more significant than actual facts which become known only after decisions have been taken and acted upon.

On November 11 the Canadian representative at the United Nations, Paul Martin, reportedly told T.F. Tsiang about the 18-nation membership “package”. Tsiang understood that a deal had been made in Moscow last October by Molotov and Pearson. The latter then appears to have obtained Whitehall’s blessing and to have turned the project over to his United Nations representative for implementation. Martin told Tsiang that 25 nations would back the scheme, which led the Government in Taipei to assume that the United States must have been privy to it. Tsiang informed Martin that his standing instructions to veto Outer Mongolia “if necessary” were so definite as to require no removal, but that he would ask Taipei about the other satellites concerned.

Two days later, on November 13, Ambassador Lodge issued a public statement in New York which included the assertion, “it is obvious that Outer Mongolia cannot make the grade,” with reference to the latter’s application for United Nations membership. On November 16, the Japanese Ambassador at Taipei called on the American Ambassador to say that he was under instructions to see the Chinese Foreign Minister about the possibility of a veto of Outer Mongolia. (See Taipei despatch No. 326 of December 8.² Presumably the text of the Aide-Mémoire which he delivered was that given in Embassy Tokyo’s telegram of December 1.³) On the following day, November 17, V.V. Kuznetsov was quoted as having stated at a press conference, “The Soviet Union will vote for 18 candidates with one condition, that all be admitted. We categorically refuse to consider any other proposal.”

Meanwhile, the Chinese Foreign Minister telegraphed to Ambassador Koo, instructing him to seek United States support for a position involving abstention in the voting on all of the Soviet satellites except Outer Mongolia, which China would veto if necessary (Embassy Taipei’s telegram of November 17⁴). The resulting Robertson-Koo conversation, at a later hour on November 17,⁵ indicated that the American position toward a possible Chinese veto of Outer Mongolia had not been finally determined, since it was still hoped that other means might be found to exclude that particular satellite from the United Nations. On November 21 (Robertson-Tan conversation,⁶ of which a memorandum was received by the Embassy in Taipei on December 7), the American position was made definite in that China was strongly urged to refrain from a veto.

A telegraphic report of the November 21 conversation in the Department reached the Chinese Foreign Ministry on the following day, and President Chiang asked the American Ambassador to see him, with the Foreign Minister. The President restated the Chinese position, which was reported in an Embassy telegram of November 22.⁷ Up to this time no instructions had reached the Embassy in Taipei from the Department.

On November 23, three “niact” telegrams arrived in the Embassy from the Department, the first two of which were personal messages from President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles,⁸ both addressed to President Chiang and strongly advising against a veto of Outer Mongolia. The President was about to leave Taipei for Sun Moon Lake for a few days rest, but through the Foreign Minister the two messages were translated to him on the day they arrived; he left Taipei on the morning of November 24. President Chiang remained at Sun Moon Lake until December 14, when he returned to Taipei in order to receive Secretary of the Army Wilber M. Brucker. During this period numerous telegrams were received by the Embassy from the Department dealing with the present subject. These messages were discussed in detail with the Chinese Foreign Minister, whom the American Ambassador saw nearly every day. The Minister, in turn, was in frequent touch by telephone with the President regarding United Nations developments, but evidence was not lacking that President Chiang prolonged his holiday in order to avoid further direct involvement in the matter of Outer Mongolia, and to meditate undisturbed on all of its implications. The Foreign Minister’s initial reaction to the messages from President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles was telegraphed to the Department on November 23.⁹

Through the Chinese Embassy in Washington, President Chiang replied on November 25 to the two American messages.¹⁰ Although courteous and restrained, he was adamant in maintaining the position that Outer Mongolia would be vetoed if necessary to keep it out of the United Nations. The Embassy at Taipei then telegraphed certain suggestions to the Department (on November 28) as to how the Chinese Government might be offered offsetting advantages which conceivably would persuade it to forego the veto.

On November 28 President Eisenhower sent a second message to President Chiang; it was received in Taipei and relayed to the President on November 29.¹¹ Also on November 29,USIA issued a release in New York which criticized the Chinese Government’s attitude and suggesting that it desired to “commit suicide” as far as the United Nations was concerned. This departure from the established policy of recent years, under which United States-Chinese differences have been dealt with discreetly, was highly annoying to the Foreign Minister and other Chinese. If anything, it further stiffened their position (Embassy Taipei’s telegram of November 30¹²). On December 3 President Chiang replied to President Eisenhower’s second message, with no change of position.¹³

Secretary Dulles also sent a second message to President Chiang (December 6)¹⁴ which was transmitted to Sun Moon Lake on December 7. That evening the Foreign Minister intimated that if the American Ambassador wished, President Chiang would see him at Sun Moon Lake. The next morning, the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador flew to Taichung, motored to Sun Moon Lake, spent about three hours with President and Madame Chiang, and returned to Taipei the same day. The conversation was summarized in a telegram to the Department that evening (a more detailed Memorandum of Conversation is enclosed with the present despatch¹⁵). Again, President Chiang maintained his position, and five days later China vetoed Outer Mongolia. Subsequent events, including the admission of 12 qualified countries out of the original package, brought measurable relief to the Chinese Government in its difficult position.

Comment: It may be noted that from the Chinese standpoint most of the factors which might have permitted a change of front were lacking in this case. These missing ingredients included (1) early information on the precise nature of the “package deal”, with consequent lack of time to prepare public and official opinion for a possible shift of position, (2) a quid pro quo, which is so essential to a small, weak nation when it is called upon to make a sacrifice, (3) any threat of sanctions other than eventual ejection from the United Nations, which the Chinese have come to regard as almost inevitable in any case, (4) any “out”, or “steps to come down” as the Chinese say, which might have saved face for them in the absence of either carrot or stick. In brief, the Chinese took what they regarded as a sound moral (and legal) position, which happened to coincide with their previous policy and basic inclinations; in this they were impelled by a horror of taking any action which might appear as weakness in the eyes of their own public or of the world at large. Only the strong are likely to feel that they can afford the luxury of yielding unless actually forced to do so.

Throughout this episode matters were made increasingly difficult by excessive publicity, including strenuous efforts by the world press to publish all of the news before it happened. Moreover, the atmosphere was clouded by Chinese suspicion that the United States and others had made a deal behind their backs. The Department’s categorical denial (telegram of December 4¹⁶) was conveyed immediately to the Foreign Minister and repeated subsequently. This was received with incredulity, which appears to have persisted until December 14, when the Foreign Minister told the Legislative Yuan that the United States “did not learn about the package deal very much earlier than we.” Until that time, it had been inconceivable to the Chinese that the Canadians (and British) could have made a deal in October about which the United States was not informed until about November 22. While not accusing the United States directly of having reached an understanding with other countries, while not informing China, President Chiang on December 8 described the package deal as a British project, with the clear implication that perfidious Albion was once more leading the United States down the primrose path toward acceptance of the Peiping regime and a consequent “solution of the problem of Taiwan.” Soviet insistence on Outer Mongolia in the present instance was regarded in the Taipei Foreign Ministry primarily as a move to facilitate Peiping’s entry into the United Nations. The Red maneuver would seem to have been calculated to further this purpose whether the Government of the Republic of China abstained or vetoed. Accepting their eventual ejection from the United Nations as almost inevitable in view of existing trends, therefore, the Chinese Government felt compelled to take the course of resistance rather than acquiescence.

Department please pouch copies to Hong Kong, Tokyo, London, Ottawa.

K.L. Rankin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12-2355. Confidential.
2. Despatch 326 summarized press accounts of meetings between officials of the Government of the Republic of China and ambassadors of various nations seeking U.N. membership. It also mentioned that retiring Japanese Ambassador Kenkichi Yoshizawa had called on Rankin on November 16 to inform him that the Japanese Government was one of those seeking Chinese support for Japan’s admission to the United Nations. (Ibid., 310.2/12–855)
3. Document 193.
4. See footnote 2, Document 168.
5. Document 168.
6. See Document 175.
7. Document 178.
8. Documents 176 and 177.
9. Document 181.
10. Document 185.
11. Document 188.
12. Reference is presumably to telegram 507, see footnote 2, Document 191.
13. See Document 200.
14. Document 206.
15. Not found, but the reference conversation is summarized in Document 208.
16. Not further identified.