Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume XI

208. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, December 8, 1955—8 p.m.

533. Department pass USUN. Department’s 335, 340, 341, 342 and 347.² Substance of Department’s 335 and 341 re Outer Mongolia membership in UNO discussed with Foreign Minister and Secretary’s message (Department’s 340) was translated by Foreign Minister over telephone late yesterday to President Chiang.

Last night I received first intimation President would discuss Outer Mongolia with me if I requested interview. I did so and today went to Sun Moon Lake where I had over two hours plus luncheon time with Chiang. Foreign Minister and Mme. Chiang were only others present.

Foreign Minister apparently brought with him lengthy telegram describing conversation between Robertson and Koo. After reading it Chiang expressed astonishment that Department thought GRC did not understand gravity of situation. On contrary Chinese regard situation more seriously than US which seemed concerned solely with matters of UNO membership. It was a far bigger question.

President then asked me to state my case. I said that it had been presented in two messages from President Eisenhower and two from Secretary Dulles. I had no official information to add, but I was under instructions to emphasize strongly to him the seriousness with which the United States regarded the matter. I took occasion however to review developments as far as known to me. We seemed to be in box. Something had happened about mid-November (communications from Department suggest November 17–21) but I did not have details. US had done its best, I was sure, but we were now confronted with a most difficult and complex situation.

I then sketched briefly UNO history as regards universality of membership, collective security etc. My purely personal view was that events had overtaken question of revising charter. For better or worse UNO was again moving toward universality of membership with responsibility for collective security passing largely over to multilateral and bilateral defense arrangements. Unhappily many provisions of Charter could no longer be taken literally. While GRC had excellent legal case, it must be considered in light of laws already outdated and which no one would enforce. I thought GRC also had good moral case from its point of view, but there was another moral case. All countries of free world including GRC wished to see number of states admitted to UNO (I mentioned Spain, Japan and Italy in particular). Many nations among our friends felt strongly on subject while only China and Russia were interested in Outer Mongolia as such. To most of free world, bringing deserving nations into UNO was much bigger moral issue than that with which GRC at present concerned.

I added that whatever future in store for UNO, membership in organization remained very important: witness strong desire of additional countries to enter. We wanted GRC to remain in UNO and to maintain its position, both because we valued its presence and support for our side and because it was block to entry of Red China. In summary US had done its best in present case but had not succeeded. We were asking GRC to go along in its interest and ours, making best of difficult situation.

President then reviewed history past several years (memorandum follows)³ explaining how US had frequently misunderstood China’s problems. All experience had shown that any form of neutralism was bad for GRC; it must stick to principles. He cited League of Nations in Manchuria, pro-Japanese British policy before war, Sino-Soviet Treaty, Marshall mission etc. GRC’s continued stay in UNO would be for two reasons only: (1) as symbol of anti-communism and (2) as acknowledgment of moral support it continues [receive] from US. Otherwise its continued presence in UNO could bring more shame and disgrace to China than if not there. GRC not proposing use veto as blackmail in hope of getting something; US should understand that.

Chiang then mentioned Russia, stating he could not understand how in present case GRC considered worse rascals than Soviets, who have used veto 25 times on membership questions. US puts all blame on GRC in present case (Foreign Minister noted he was referring to messages from Eisenhower and Dulles) thereby placing seal of approval on Soviet actions. No Chinese with sense of justice can accept this, President said.

Chiang then compared package deal with Sino-Soviet treaty, particularly in light of US-GRC relationships. Present proposal not only against GRC interests but conclusion inescapable that US giving deal at least tacit support. Therefore this case affects US moral leadership of free world far more than in case of Sino-Soviet treaty as he believed history would prove. He considered Secretary Dulles very able and a friend who has made no mistakes so far, but he warned that package deal might wipe out all previous achievements.

Comment: Despite strong statements described above, I believe Chiang may be softening slightly. He remarked my presentation of US case was best he had heard. But he still convinced we have made deal behind GRC back and took second paragraph of Secretary’s December 6 message as further confirmation, particularly since France and Belgium have abstained in committee vote. If we could take GRC somewhat more into our confidence on what US representatives found when they explored possibilities, it might help. Also we have offered him no “out” or “steps to get down” as Chinese say. I was in position only to suggest showing deference to desires of Spain, Japan et cetera, in latter connection.⁴

Rankin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–855. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Hong Kong.
2. Telegrams 335, 340, and 341 are printed as Documents 202, 206, and supra. Telegram 342 reported a Japanese initiative on the membership question. (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–655) Telegram 347, December 7, reads: “It now appears probable membership issue will reach Security Council December 9. Ad Hoc committee this afternoon approved Canadian resolution by vote of 52 in favor, 2 against (China, Cuba) and 5 abstentions (Belgium, France, Greece, Israel, U.S.). It is evident that support for 18-member proposal overwhelming.” (Ibid., 310.2/12–755)
3. Not printed.
4. In telegram 535 from Taipei, December 9, Rankin reported: “Late last night I received relayed telephone message from President Chiang re reply to Secretary Dulles December 6 message on UNO membership for Outer Mongolia. Chiang said all points he had intended make in his reply were covered in December 8 conversation with me. Could this be considered as his reply? I thought so and review of Taipei’s 533 this morning confirms my opinion if Secretary does not object to form of reply.” (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–955)