188. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China1
317. Eyes only Ambassador from Secretary. Following for Chiang Kai-shek from President Eisenhower:
“Dear Mr. President: I have received through your Embassy under date of November 26 your message in reply to mine of the twenty-second.2 I am impressed by the strong case to be made against the independence of the present régime controlling Outer Mongolia. I agree that it should be perfectly clear that neither of our countries admits that Outer Mongolia is now independent any more than is Byelorussia, the Ukraine or Albania. Neither should we accept the legality or the rightfulness of the enforced detachment of Outer Mongolia from the Republic of China.
Both of our countries can, and I think should, make clear our attitude toward Outer Mongolia. The central issue is not whether there is or is not a good case against Outer Mongolia, but whether a good case can be made for use of the veto in the Security Council, a highly artificial voting procedure whereby any one of the 5 permanent members can thwart the will of the great majority.
The United States has never believed that the veto power should be used in the Security Council to prevent an election to membership of those approved by two-thirds majority of the General Assembly and by 7 of the 11 members of the Security Council. We have never ourselves used the veto under these circumstances. Three of the other 4 permanent members, namely, France, the UK and the Soviet Union, although each finding that the proposed admissions of 18 involve admitting certain states highly distasteful to them have nevertheless felt that they should bow to the weight of world opinion and accept the result wanted by the great majority of the present members and by 13 other free nations who are applicants for membership.
I greatly hope that instead of resorting to a highly technical voting right which would have the effect of defeating the overwhelming desire of the members in effecting the solution of the membership problem on an over-all basis, you will decide that your legal and moral position which you so eloquently set forth can be [Page 409] maintained by a clarifying statement made at the time that you act. We expect to follow the same procedure.
You will recall that at San Francisco all 5 of the permanent members agreed that the veto power should be used with great caution and that it should not be abused. I am afraid that the use by your Government of the veto under these circumstances would be judged by the world opinion which we all need to value and respect as an “abuse” in view of the fact that you can by a timely statement make clear the juridical position which you describe.
Permit me therefore in the name of our friendship and the friendship of our two countries to urge that you should reconsider the matter in the light of the point of view which I take the liberty of presenting. Sincerely, Dwight D. Eisenhower”
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–2855. Secret; Priority. Repeated to USUN eyes only for Lodge. Drafted by Dulles. Telegram 501 from Taipei, November 29, reported that this message was delivered to Foreign Minister Yeh that afternoon and he promised to relay it to Chiang as the latter was leaving town that evening, (Ibid., 310.2/11–1955)↩
- See Documents 185 and 176.↩