Office of the Historian

157. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Delegation at the Foreign Ministers Meetings, at Geneva1

New York, November 12, 1955–1 p.m.

15. Eyes only for Secretary, from Lodge. Following is sent in view of your meeting with Molotov tomorrow2 so as to give you picture of existing situation at UN concerning membership.

1.
It has been clear to me since November 4 (Geneva 123) that US should take initiative so far as publicity is concerned.
2.
I had hoped that statement which you approved (Secto 230 November 104) could be issued promptly.
3.
When this was impossible, I hoped for release for this a.m. Saturday papers because of signs that Canadians and Indians were getting restless and would table 18 rather than 17-nation proposal and would start proceedings in ad hoc committee rather than in Security Council, both of which concepts are unsatisfactory to the US.
4.
I still hope to be able to release statement early next week.
5.
We have, of course, talked with both French and Soviets. We cannot get assurances from Soviets not to use veto without getting into negotiating position with them which inevitably would require assurances from US on actual operation of entire plan. I believe we would be in much stronger position vis-à-vis Soviets in subsequent and necessary negotiations regarding the operation of plan after I have issued press statement. If Soviets in subsequent negotiations regarding procedures to be used in Security Council to implement our proposal insist upon Outer Mongolia, they would be held responsible for preventing admission of new members.
6.
Issuance of press release is distinct from having a commitment from the Soviets before beginning actual operation of the plan itself in the Security Council. Such commitment is necessary, although we would, of course, always be in a position to protect ourselves in case of a Russian breach of faith.
7.
French advance agreement not necessary even for start of operations. Believe they are now trying to use membership issue to trade with Arabs on Algerian question and could not risk disapproval of world opinion by being sole permanent member to block the deal. But this French angle is a matter for later determination and should not stand in the way of our press release.
8.
Suspect Molotov may realize situation here and may be trying to steal the play and get the credit, leaving us in the unenviable position of tagging along, picking up the pieces, fighting a rearguard type of action against Outer Mongolia and defensively against going into ad hoc committee first.
9.
It is good that he is going to see you rather than me going to see Kuznetsov because you can listen to him and, if his proposal is not satisfactory, you need not show your own hand.
Lodge
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–1255. Secret; Niact. Repeated to the Department eyes only for Hoover and Wilcox as Delga 275, which is the source text.↩
  2. Dulles reported in Secto 259 from Geneva, November 12, that “Molotov on his initiative will come to see me Sunday morning [November 13,] ten o’clock on membership in UN. Please hold everything until result known”. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Printed as Delga 217, Document 139.↩
  4. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1 GE/11–1055)↩