139. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State1

Delga 217. Department for Hoover and Wilcox. After considerable thought I have concluded that I should be authorized to make the following statement to the press:

“Thirteen deserving and qualified nations have been blocked from admission to the United Nations because of Soviet Russia’s abuse of the veto power in the Security Council.

This list includes such important nations as Italy, Japan and Spain.

It includes such small, but old and civilized, nations of the Western world as Austria, Finland, Eire, and Portugal—nations whose sons have also contributed to much of our own national culture.

It includes in the Near East and Far East: Cambodia, Ceylon, Jordan, Laos, Libya and Nepal. All of these nations have emerged into sovereignty since the Charter was written and have made distinctive contributions to the free world. Many of the Asian nations, in particular, were specifically endorsed for membership by the Bandung Conference of last spring—a list which the United States had endorsed.

In his speech at the opening of the General Assembly on September 22nd, Secretary of State Dulles pointed out ‘that our organization’s power derives largely from moral judgments formed here’ and that, therefore, it is essential ‘that there should be here all of those eligible nations which, by their policies and conduct, have demonstrated their devotion to the purposes and principles of UN charter’.

He went on to point out that ‘about a score of sovereign nations are not represented here and many of them meet the membership tests of our charter. They are peace-loving and they have shown themselves able and willing to carry out the Charter’s obligations. Their governments would reflect here important segments of world opinion. To block the admission of such nations by use of the veto power is a grave wrong, not only to them, but it is also a wrong to this organization and to all of its members. I hope that during this tenth session action will be taken by the Security Council and by this Assembly to bring these nations into our membership. Thus, the [Page 322] United Nations would enter its second decade better equipped to serve mankind’.

It is reported that the Soviet Union will withhold its veto and that these free nations can become members of the United Nations if the free world is willing not to block the admission of governments behind the so-called ‘iron curtain’—governments which are not equals among equals as are the large and small nations of the free world, but are in a subordinate relationship to Moscow. We refer to Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania.

We will not disguise our feeling that to see such governments enter the United Nations is not pleasant for anyone who takes seriously the words of the Charter.

On the other hand, there is an overriding argument which, after mature consideration, seems to us to outweigh this drawback. This is that the admission of these 13 free nations greatly outweighs the admission of the 4—because the 13 nations would add so tremendously to the moral weight of the United Nations. In fact, if these 13 whom we support were all admitted, the balance in the General Assembly with a total membership of 77 would be even more heavily weighted in favor of the free world than it is now with 60.

There is also reason to hope that membership in the UN will to some extent bring the people of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania closer to freedom.

We must speak too with warm and friendly feeling of the Republic of Korea and of the Republic of South Vietnam whose allies and supporters we are but who, because their territory is divided, cannot reasonably hope for admission in the present state of the world.

For all these reasons, the United States intends to vote for the admission of the thirteen and to raise no objection to the four mentioned above.”

For your information, the arguments for this course, in addition to those which are contained in the statement itself, are as follows:

1.
The situation is developing here in such a way that we will be confronted with a proposal of this sort in any event and will have to accede to it or incur considerable unpopularity throughout the world.
2.
In the past week there have been clear indications from Italy and Ceylon that we were being blamed for the failure of these nations to be admitted. Yesterday the Japanese observer said in front of a large group of people that “the United States holds the key”. The Spanish observer is spreading reports that the Latin Americans will gladly vote for a satellite if Spain is admitted—which I believe to be completely true.
3.
If we do not do this, we run the risk of getting into a position where we might be compelled to vote for the admission of [Page 323] certain Arab-Asian countries with the USSR excluding our Western European friends. The admission of anti-colonial countries at this stage of the development of the United Nations without the admission of our friends from Europe could be very harmful indeed.
4.
I have cleared the above statement with Tom Stephens,2 who thinks it is all right if we organize statements of approval from Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Scandinavian representatives to be printed in the next day’s newspapers.
5.
I have also cleared it with Congressman Hays, Congressman Merrow, and Senator Pastore of the US delegation, who all approve.
6.
If we decide to make this statement, I would notify all the representatives of the thirteen countries in advance that I was going to make it.
7.
This will put us in a more favorable position with respect to support of the moratorium arrangement on Chinese representation, and would make it easier for us to prevent a two-thirds vote on anything.
8.
A prompt announcement along this line makes it easier to keep out Outer Mongolia because it puts the initiative on those who sponsor Outer Mongolia to bring her into the picture.

The statement I propose, because of the influence of the United States, would set the stage and it would be up to others to modify our presentation instead of our being in the position of dragging our feet and then making a last-minute attack on Outer Mongolia.

Believe I should decide timing in consultation with Washington and in light events here, but urgently request authorization as soon as possible.

Department should make arrangements for statements of approval from Irish and Portuguese Ambassadors.

Lodge
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–455. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Also sent to Geneva for Dulles.
  2. Presumably Thomas E. Stephens, Secretary to President Eisenhower.