Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume XI

158. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary’s Suite, Geneva, November 13, 1955, 10 a.m.¹

USDel/MC/38

Geneva, November 13, 1955, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

• UN Membership

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Amb. Bohlen
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. Wainhouse
• USSR
  • Mr. Molotov
  • Mr. Sobolev
  • Mr. Troyanovsky

Mr. Molotov, at his request, came to see the Secretary this morning to discuss, inter alia, the problem of membership in the United Nations.

Mr. Molotov started the conversation saying that it would be useful to exchange views on the membership question. The Secretary also thought it would be useful to exchange views. Mr. Molotov asked whether there was hope of settling the matter in the General Assembly. The Secretary replied that that depends on what we and other concerned countries agree on and asked whether Mr. Molotov thought it could be settled.

The Secretary added that the United States would forego the veto in the Security Council and had gathered that that might be satisfactory to Mr. Molotov. Mr. Molotov thought that the matter was on a different plane and stated that we ought to see what can be done concretely. He referred to a conversation he had with the Ambassador of Ceylon. He said that as far as the Canadian proposal is concerned, there is a majority in the United Nations in favor of it and explained what that majority consists of–the Latin Americans, the countries of Asia and Africa as well as the majority of Europeans. Mr. Molotov was certain that the United States was aware of the positions of these countries. He went on to say that the USSR has certain reservations regarding Japan and that the United States was aware of the USSR attitude toward Spain, but he felt, nevertheless less, that it was possible to find a solution on this between the United States and the USSR. The Secretary stated that the United States also has reservations about certain countries and asked whether Outer Mongolia is on the Canadian list. Mr. Molotov said that it is and the Secretary said that he did not consider Outer Mongolia an independent state and had great reservations regarding Albania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania. The Secretary suggested that if Mr. Molotov would drop his two reservations, we might find a way to drop ours regarding the satellites. He was not prepared, however, to accept Outer Mongolia. Mr. Molotov replied that he thought we should find a common decision which would be acceptable to the United Nations as a whole, and that we should recognize that the Canadian proposal is acceptable as it stands. He appreciated that there would be absentions on the part of certain countries.

The Secretary stated that there are other countries besides the United States and the USSR, which have the veto in the Security Council. The Secretary then went on to say that a general agreement could presumably be found on certain European countries: Italy, Austria, Portugal, Ireland, and Finland. This sets aside Spain because of the USSR objection. We could also accept the Bandung seven states which did not recommend Outer Mongolia.

Mr. Molotov restated his position on Spain and Japan and contended that he would not differentiate between the treaty countries. For that reason, he felt, it would be more advisable to seek agreement on the Canadian proposal of 18 or the earlier Canadian proposal of 17 which was minus Spain. He said he was prepared to come to an agreement on either of these two Canadian proposals.

The Secretary said that he would be prepared to make some concession to reflect the Soviet objections to Spain and Japan, but we could not agree to accept Outer Mongolia and Albania. Mr. Molotov replied that it is difficult not to recognize Albania as a state since it has existed for a long time and is referred to in the Italian peace treaty. It would also be difficult to deny the existence of Outer Mongolia which has diplomatic relations with a number of countries and which has recently established relations with India. In making concessions on Spain and Japan, the Soviet Union feels that the matter should be settled simultaneously. This view, he stated, is shared by the overwhelming majority in the United Nations. The Secretary commented that he didn’t feel that there is an overwhelming desire in the United Nations for Albania, Outer Mongolia, etc., and if the matter were put to a vote those applicants would be defeated, whereas if all the other applicants were put to a vote they would not be. If there is any doubt on this, the Secretary said, we could put them up one by one, to see what the outcome would be.

Mr. Molotov said that in the peace treaties we undertook to support these states for United Nations membership and he felt that the signatures to those treaties were worth something. The sentiment in New York, as he understood it, is quite definitely that a majority of the United Nations members is in favor of simultaneous admission. The Secretary again pointed out that the Soviet Union knows the United States views on the satellite nations. The views of the United States were expressed by the President here in Geneva at the Summit Conference and in his speech of August 25. In view of our well-known position regarding the satellites it is difficult for the United States to accept these nations into the United Nations. The Secretary went on to say that no one will want to raise any objections to the Bandung states. In view of the general approval by the Bandung Conference of these seven, we, of course, would not want to disapprove. However, the Bandung Conference left out Outer Mongolia and if the African-Asian states did not consider Outer Mongolia deserving of membership it is hardly expected that we should. In Europe, there are five to whom we cannot find any objection–Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Austria, and Finland. Finland is friendly and close to the Soviet Union; Ireland is strongly anti-UK; Austria is neutral. That leaves for discussion Spain, Hungary, Rumania, Albania, and Bulgaria. The Secretary expressed a willingness to discuss this group in the hope of reaching some agreement.

Mr. Molotov responded by saying that it is true that Outer Mongolia was not mentioned in the Bandung list. The reason is it was not represented there. We cannot, he said, accept the accusations levelled against the other four in Europe. The peace treaties were concluded with them and signed by the United States. In the treaty with Italy special mention is made of the rights of Albania. We, he said, attach importance to these treaties, and we cannot differentiate these treaties from those with Italy and Austria.

The Secretary said that the United States could not accept Outer Mongolia, and as far as Europe is concerned, we cannot disagree concerning the five he first mentioned. He is prepared to negotiate on Spain and the four satellites. It is against our principles, he said, to admit the four satellites to the United Nations. He was prepared to take two satellites, any of Mr. Molotov’s choosing, if Mr. Molotov would take Spain. One, he said, should be sufficient in Mr. Molotov’s eyes to match Spain, but he was prepared to take two. Mr. Molotov said the best way to settle this matter simply and clearly, bearing in mind the overwhelming sentiment in the United Nations for the Canadian proposal of 18, is to agree on that proposal. He felt that we could find a way to overcome these difficulties in order to meet the desire of the United Nations members. Otherwise, he was afraid that we are not placing ourselves in a good position before world public opinion in holding up agreement on a situation which is ripe for settlement. It would hardly be understandable to raise objections to some special countries if public opinion would not understand it. This is true with respect to Outer Mongolia and Spain. He thought that there was a good basis for settlement on the Canadian proposal.

The Secretary said that if Mr. Molotov wants Outer Mongolia, he doubted we could reach an agreement. He was willing to take the Bandung seven and negotiate on the European countries but he repeated that there could not be a package settlement with Outer Mongolia in it. Mr. Molotov said it is impossible for the Soviet Union to segregate the 18 into acceptable and non-acceptable countries. We regard the list, he said, as an acceptable basis for agreement. Outer Mongolia was not on the Bandung list because it was not at that conference. Israel however was not represented there either.

The Secretary responded that Israel’s absence from Bandung is quite different. It is not recognized by any Arab country just as Outer Mongolia is not generally recognized.

Mr. Molotov restated the USSR view is to accept the suggestion of an American neighbor, Canada. He didn’t think Canada had wanted to harm the United States.

The Secretary said that Canada is a good neighbor but the United States does not always agree with Canada. In this case, said Molotov, we could achieve good results on the basis of your good friend and neighbor. The Secretary said we have already considered this and strongly urged Molotov that Outer Mongolia be excluded from the list. Mr. Molotov replied it would be difficult and impossible to divide the list and discriminate on Outer Mongolia. That in turn would raise the question of Spain and would hold up the settlement. The Secretary recognized that an agreement would be difficult for the USSR but it would be just as difficult for us. There is a difference between difficulty and impossibility. If one uses the word impossible, then there is little room for negotiation. Mr. Molotov replied that difficulties and impossibilities regarding Outer Mongolia are the same as those regarding Spain. The Secretary replied that we have the same problem with the four satellites. Mr. Molotov said that this was the reason he was suggesting that there not be a one-sided approach and that we take the Canadian proposal in toto—one supported by an overwhelming number in the United Nations.

The Secretary said that the United States was anxious to try to settle this question in considerable part at least at this time. We were willing to make sacrifices and if the Canadian proposal is the only basis then he thought there was not much to discuss here.

Mr. Molotov said, there are in fact two Canadian proposals: one dealing with 17 applicants and one dealing with 18. The USSR is prepared to support either of these.

The Secretary responded that the United States was not prepared to take either of the Canadian proposals. He said that there is a large area of agreement and that it would be generally helpful in relaxing of tensions to solve the membership problem. He stated that we were not consulted on the Canadian proposals and the issue is on what applicants we can have an agreement.

Mr. Molotov said that the USSR also views the matter from the standpoint of relaxation of tension and believes that the Canadian package proposal is directed toward that end. The USSR, he concluded, attaches great importance to an agreement being reached with the United States on the membership problem.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF 584. Drafted by Wainhouse on November 14. In a covering memorandum to O’Connor, November 13, Wainhouse indicated that the memorandum of conversation was sent to Dulles for “review and approval”. A handwritten notation by O’Connor reads: “Sec cleared summary cable and Merchant read this memo–so I am o.k.ing it for distribution.” (Ibid., Central Files, 310.2/11–1355) A summary of this conversation was transmitted to the Department in Secto 280 from Geneva, November 13, and also sent to USUN eyes only for Lodge. (Ibid.)